288. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 1, 19561
SUBJECT
- Jordan’s Request for Iraqi Troops
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. J.E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. W. Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE
Mr. Coulson called to discuss the question of Jordan’s request for Iraqi troops. Mr. Coulson said that since Glubb left Jordan it had not been easy for the U.K. to maintain its influence in Jordan. The U.K. had encouraged fraternization between Jordan and Iraq but not much progress had been made. King Hussein frequently changes his mind… . Recently, however, there had been some improvement in relations between Iraq and Jordan. Jordan had not received much help from Egypt. Israel had attacked Jordan.
Mr. Coulson continued that Nuri had asked that the Jordanian request be brought to the attention of the U.K. and the U.S. The Foreign Office feared that unless Iraq met the Jordanian request, Jordan would fall into Egyptian hands. Mr. Coulson said the British Embassy had been instructed to approach the Department and say that the U.K. believed it could not prevent Iraq from sending troops into Jordan and that Iraq should under present circumstances cooperate with Jordan. Jordan was jittery regarding Israeli attacks and was doubtful that the U.K. would honor its obligations under the Anglo-Jordanian treaty.2
Mr. Coulson said that the U.K. realizes that the Israeli reaction would probably be sharp. The U.K. believes, however, that there is no justification for such reaction. The Iraqis would move only into Transjordan and not into West Jordan. Furthermore, Israeli aggression would bring the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty into play and also [Page 621] action under the Tripartite Declaration. If it is decided that Iraqi troops shall be sent into Jordan, the U.K. plans to inform the Israeli Ambassador 24 hours in advance and to say that Jordan has requested Iraqi troops and that the U.K. believes it a wise move. Mr. Coulson said that if the U.K. should take this action and the U.S. should not, Israel might think we disapprove and might thus be encouraged to retaliate.
Mr. Coulson hoped that the U.S. would be prepared simultaneously to inform Israel we would say we would not consider the Iraqi action as justification for Israeli counter action; such counter action would have the gravest consequences and would bring the Tripartite Declaration into play. Mr. Coulson also said that when the U.K. approached the Israeli Ambassador he would be informed that Nuri had given the assurance that Iraqi troops would be sent to Jordan for defensive purposes only and would not be used except in the event of clear aggression.
Mr. Coulson added that the Jordanians were seriously apprehensive. The Jordanian Foreign Minister was presently in Baghdad and during the course of a meeting with the Iraqi and Jordanian officials the British Ambassador had given assurance that the U.K. intended to honor its Anglo-Jordanian Treaty obligations by providing air and naval support as planned. In addition, the U.K. would take action under the Tripartite Declaration and would call upon its co-signatories for action. Mr. Coulson explained that only air and naval forces would be used against Israel under such circumstances and no British Ground Troops would be sent to North Jordan or to the West Bank.
Mr. Coulson further said that he did not see how dispatch of Iraqi troops could be opposed. He thought the Israelis could be persuaded to accept it if they were informed in advance.
Mr. Coulson said that Ronald Bailey would supply the Department with further details of British plans tomorrow.
Mr. Wilkins said that the American Embassy in London had been told by the Foreign Office of the Jordanian request for Iraqi troops, but we had no detailed information. We therefore appreciated the information which Mr. Coulson supplied. Mr. Wilkins said that on the basis of the earlier report we thought movement of Iraqi troops to Jordan would have an unsettling effect and might be misunderstood not only by Israel but also by Egypt with serious repercussions. Mr. Wilkins noted that the Israelis were apprehensive because there was no Armistice Agreement between Israel and Iraq as there was between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors. He also said that it might be anticipated that Egyptian Radio broadcasts might cause trouble in Jordan as they had in Jordan last winter.
Mr. Wilkins asked Mr. Coulson if Iraq had given Jordan any material assistance. Mr. Coulson said that he thought not and that [Page 622] Iraq had rather hung back. Mr. Morris said that some might have been supplied to the Jordanian National Guard but very little.
Mr. Coulson concluded that Iraq would want to make its troop movement very soon and hoped that we could respond shortly. Mr. Wilkins said that he would inform Mr. Rountree and be in touch with Mr. Coulson.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5/10–156. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on October 2.↩
- Under Article 2 of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance, signed at Amman on March 15, 1948, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Transjordan agreed that should any dispute between either party and a third state produce a situation which would involve the risk of a rupture with that State, the parties would concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of any other international obligations which might be applicable to the case. Under Article 3 of that same treaty, the parties agreed that should either, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, become engaged in war, the other party would, subject always to the provisions of the U.N. Charter, immediately come to the aid of the party at war as a measure of collective defense. (77 UNTS 77)↩