Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 29, 1956—3:57 p.m.

254. Tel Aviv’s 295,² 296.³ Department believes reftels have most disturbing implications. At earliest opportunity and in appropriate manner Lawson should point out to GOI multiplying dangers which would emerge if Israel should take military action on grounds of Iraqi-Jordanian moves, especially if latter clearly of defensive nature. USG prepared take at face value Ben Gurion’s declarations that Israel will not start a war. Israelis have expressed appreciation United States effort prevent Suez issue from developing into armed conflict. At some time, if present cycle events along armistice lines not halted trend toward more serious hostilities between Israel and Arab states seems inevitable. United States has continued urge Jordanians reinforce measures maintain order along armistice lines, and believes King and HKJ Government sincerely striving prevent incidents, although it can not be 100% effective. We feel Israel fully aware this fact and also aware that primary cause of Jordan efforts seek military support from other Arab states has been series of heavy Israel reprisals against Jordan. If GOI sincerely desirous of maintaining political status quo in Jordan, Israel should not adopt policies which make it unlikely HJK can achieve this objective.

We realize Jordan-caused incidents create grave problem to GOI view public reaction. Heavy Israel reprisal, however, has effect of weakening rather than strengthening Jordan efforts control situation. We feel most promising method of assuring Israel security includes: 1) full cooperation with efforts UNSYG and UNTSO, 2) increased vigilance on Israel side of line.

Mallory should seek audience with King and advise him we have urgently made clear to Israelis our view that their heavy reprisal operations should be stopped. At same time we urge Jordan take all possible steps prevent incidents along armistice lines caused by Jordanians or others. United States appreciates important factor represented by status Jordan public opinion after Israel raids, but at same time such HKJ efforts coupled with fullest cooperation with UNSYG and UNTSO would put Jordan in position obtain maximum support world public opinion.⁴

London should inform FonOff of this telegram and Department’s 2283.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/9–2756. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and Rockwell and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Amman and repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Jerusalem.
2. In telegram 295, September 28, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Director General of the Prime Minister’s office, Teddy Kollek, had recently commented to an American official: “does the West realize that if Iraqi troops or the troops of other Arab States were to march into Jordan, Israel in self-defense would be compelled to occupy a portion of Jordanian territory?” The telegram also included several reasons why the possibility of Israeli action should be taken seriously. (Ibid., 685.87/9–2756)
3. Telegram 296 from Tel Aviv, September 27, responded to telegram 513 from Baghdad, September 27 (see Document 277). It noted that recent border incidents involved nothing more than a typical Israeli response to a series of incursions, that Israeli active duty strength was the lowest of any time during the past year, and that introduction of Iraqi forces into Jordan would increase pressure within Israel for a West Bank takeover. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/9–2756)
4. In telegram 302 from Amman, October 2, Ambassador Mallory reported that he had delivered this message to Hussein. In response, the King said that he was making every effort to prevent incidents, as he always did, but especially at this time when Jordan faced Israel alone. Hussein offered his view that the recent strong attacks by Israel were substantially linked to the fact that Egypt was preoccupied with the Canal problem and to the possibility of catching Jordan off balance for all-out hostilities before winter set in. Hussein personally estimated that as a matter of national economy and national policy Israel would be obliged sooner or later to attempt to expand territorially into western Jordan. (Ibid., 684A.85/10–256)

5. Regarding telegram 2283 to London, sent for action to Baghdad as telegram 462, see Document 277.

   In telegram 1783, October 1, the Embassy in London reported that it had conveyed the substance of these two telegrams to the British Foreign Office. In response, a Foreign Office official had mentioned two recent British démarches to Israel concerning the raids against Jordan. The Embassy also reported that the Foreign Office appeared firmly convinced that it would be unwise to discourage Nuri Said from sending Iraqi troops into Jordan for defensive purposes. On this point, the official had delivered a long list of arguments as to why such a troop movement would be desirable from the standpoint of Western interests in the Middle East and added that the British Embassy in Washington would be conveying the full extent of the Foreign Office’s views on the subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 684a.85/10–156)