269. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1

1450. London eyes only Ambassador; eyes only Secretary from Ambassador. Suez. During conversation with Jebb this morning regarding London Conference and prospects for UN debate, Jebb casually informed me that he had impression that Pineau, Bourges-Maunoury, and Mollet all felt that UN debate would be ineffective and that it would be terminated around the middle of October, at which time the way would be clear for military action against Egypt. I told Jebb that, as he knew, US had great fears regarding the eventual outcome of any military venture in Egypt in view of the feeling it would create throughout the entire Middle East. However, I told him, namely, that if hostilities should be initiated by France and Great Britain at any time between the 15th of October and the 6th of November such action would be most embarrassing and difficult for the Eisenhower Administration in the forthcoming election. I pointed out that military action would be bound to have the greatest possible effect on the election if it was initiated at such time.

Jebb said that he fully realized this and felt that if such action were to be undertaken it would be much better to put it off until later in November, or early December. I told him that I did not [Page 586] think that you2 had mentioned this aspect of the situation to Lloyd or Eden while you were in London, but I felt that at an appropriate occasion during their visit here he should point this situation out to them.

I feel it will be most important for you personally to obtain agreement from Lloyd and Pineau, while they are in New York for the UN debate, on course of action to be followed upon conclusion of debate. There is some rather loose talk here originating with Mollet, which has been reported to me by two completely reliable sources, indicating that he feels that some sort of dramatic action should be taken shortly. What Mollet apparently has in mind is some form of economic sanctions outside the framework of SCUA which he considers to be an impotent organization. There has also been some talk by members of the French Cabinet regarding the construction of a new pipe line, and they may want to propose that plans for construction of such a pipe line be promptly announced. In any event, I feel that we will have to develop some sort of agreed concrete action in the economic field in order to ensure that military action does not follow an unsuccessful debate in the UN.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2756. Secret. Received at 8:30 a.m., September 27. Repeated to London.
  2. Reference is to Secretary Dulles.