260. Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State1
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SUEZ SITUATION
Reasons for UK Referral of Suez Question to UN2
Dixon has told Lodge3 that the UK took fast action on referring the Suez problem to the Security Council because: 1) the UK had an “indication” that the USSR might be intending to take the issue to the Council and, therefore, the British had moved quickly to avoid being put on the defensive; 2) public reaction in France over the results of the second London conference required some action to bring the French into line. According to the British plan, Dixon will probably state at the Council meeting on Wednesday that Lloyd and Pineau will “come out” to participate in the debate and Dixon will perhaps hint that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi should do likewise. The British plan to make a big thing out of calling Egypt to the Security Council to answer for her behaviour.
Lodge observes that the British have moved so fast that they have not thought out what is to take place afterwards. Dixon speculated that his Government might regard the Council debate as letting off steam rather than pointing to anything constructive. Lodge, however, pointed out to him that the same logic impelling the British to take the initiative also impelled them to have a resolution at the outset; the USSR and other friends of Egypt were bound to put something in if the UK hesitated very long. While Dixon readily recognized the validity of this point he said he had nothing thus far to go on.
Pakistan’s Probable Abstention from Users’ Association
Hildreth reports4 that the Deputy UK High Commissioner in Pakistan induced Prime Minister Suhrawardy to instruct Foreign Minister Noon not to denounce the users’ association at the closing London meeting. However, when Hildreth thanked Suhrawardy for [Page 570] his action and remarked that the final decision on the users’ association would probably be made when Noon returned, the Prime Minister said that no further decision was needed; Pakistan was willing to concede to the West to the extent of not denouncing the association, but would not join it. Suhrawardy also remarked that the West had lost the first round in the Suez issue and that he would be willing to tell Nasser that he should be magnanimous in facilitating a reasonable settlement. In view of the mounting emotionalizing of the Suez issue in Pakistan, Hildreth comments that Suhrawardy, even if he were so inclined, would be running against public opinion if he tried to get Pakistan to join the users’ association.
Hare to Discuss Suez with Nasser
Hare has cabled from Cairo5 that, following the presentation of his credentials tomorrow, he expects Nasser will arrange a private substantive discussion. The Embassy has learned through an Egyptian source that Nasser’s reaction to the users’ association plan will largely be determined by his suspicion that a principal US–UK objective in the maneuvering has been to deny him funds with which he might build the High Dam. This issue dominates Nasser’s thinking at present and, during the substantive discussions, he will try to ascertain whether US vessels will continue to pay Egyptian authorities for transits as they have since the nationalization of the canal. If the answer if affirmative, Nasser will probably look with greater sympathy upon the users’ association which, according to the source, Egypt is considering as a possible nucleus for a negotiating group.
… Reports on Nasser’s Views
… Cairo has been informed that: 1) as of his departure on Saturday noon, for the Big Three Arab meeting, Nasser was willing to meet Eden at Geneva or any other mutually agreeable spot to discuss any and all outstanding issues;6 2) Nasser has stated that Soviet bloc pilots would not be assigned to US vessels transiting the canal.7
(Summary closed 11:45 a.m., September 24, 1956)
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient.↩
- On September 23, Great Britain and France requested that the Security Council convene to consider the Suez situation. On September 24, Egypt requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the actions against Egypt, taken particularly by Great Britain and France. (U.N. docs. S/3654 and S/3655)↩
- Reported in telegram 242 from USUN, September 22, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2256)↩
- In telegram 840 from Karachi, September 22, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 854 from Cairo, September 22, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- Reported in telegram 860 from Cairo, September 23, not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/9–2356)↩
- Reported in telegram 859 from Cairo, September 23, not printed. (Ibid.)↩