243. Annex to Watch Committee Report No. 3201
SC
05496/56
Washington, September 20,
1956.
CONCLUSIONS ON BRITISH-FRENCH INTENTIONS TO EMPLOY FORCE AGAINST EGYPT
There are no indications of imminent Anglo-French military action against Egypt; resort to force in the immediate future is unlikely unless Egypt should offer some serious provocation.
- 1.
- An apparent softening of the French position regarding the need to employ force against Egypt, revealed in a high level French statement that the establishment of the Association of Canal Users “fully satisfies the need for action,” and that there is a good possibility of avoiding war provided Nasser does not commit a “grave act.”
- 2.
- Apparent realization by the British Government that there is serious British internal, as well as world-wide, opposition to the use of force, and that all means short of war—including the imposition of further economic sanctions on Egypt and the reference of the problem to the UN Security Council—ought to be exhausted before a decision can be taken to resort to military action.
- 3.
- Continuing evidence that Nasser intends to maintain a “correct position” and will endeavor to prevent acts which could be regarded by the UK and France as serious provocations. There are indications, however, that the Egyptians, having reiterated their determination to defend their sovereignty over the Canal, and increasingly [Page 544] confident of their ability to manage it, will not permit passage of a Users’ Association ship.
- 4.
- Lack of evidence of a change in the British-French estimate that the USSR will not intervene militarily in the Middle East, in spite of repeated Soviet declarations of support for Egypt and warnings that the USSR “cannot stand aside” in situation which “threatens the security of the Soviet State.”
- 5.
- Indications that the UK and France continue their preparations for the use of military force against Egypt if other methods fail.
- a.
- The increase to a total of three British aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, the deployment of a British light cruiser and destroyer from Malta to Cyprus, and the stationing of another British light cruiser and destroyer in the Red Sea within 24 hours’ sailing time of the Suez Canal.
- b.
- Some increase during the past week in British and French ground combat strength in the Mediterranean area and a continuing apparently urgent augmentation of medical, service, air, and unloading facilities on Cyprus, as well as additional preparations to move several divisional size combat units to the Eastern Mediterranean at some later date.
- Source: CIA Files. Top Secret; Noforn; Limited Distribution.↩