Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

237. Telegram From the Delegation at the Suez Canal Conference to the Department of State ¹

London , September 20, 1956—11 a.m.

Secto 13. Second session started Wednesday 4 p.m.² with Lloyd calling upon Spender of Australia. After tribute to colleagues of Menzies in Five Power Committee, Spender stressed need achieve peaceful solution Suez problem. Discussed legal basis 18 power position and stated Nasser had exceeded his right in taking over Canal. Asked that more attention be given legal aspects problem. Referred to Paragraph 11 in Committee of Five Report. Stressed Nasser had absolutely refused basic principles proposals first conference. Said present conference must re-examine these principles, otherwise disaster. Pointed out Nasser’s tactics since Cairo had objective divide 18 powers. Stressed importance powers remain united. Reaffirmed validity Article 33 UN Charter calling for negotiation between parties to a dispute before referring to UN. Said we must first organize our interests in manner suggested by Secretary before going to UN and make clear to world legal grounds on which our position rests since these had not been set forth adequately in public press. Said considered Secretary’s proposal first step toward negotiations which might perhaps be protracted and that he reserved his rights make further specific comments on Secretary’s proposal.

Italian Foreign Minister then spoke and expressed regret rejection proposals first conference by Egypt stating Egypt had shown lack good faith. Rejected Egypt’s September 10 proposal which full political arguments. Stated that Nasser’s nationalization Canal violated Convention 1888. Referring to regulations for operating Canal, questioned whether true, as Lloyd had said, that there is nothing which obliges 18 powers use pilots provided by Egyptian Canal Board. Pointed out they stipulated that freedom of navigation depends on observance of regulations, which provide that local Canal authorities shall supply pilots. He said it could be argued that since Egypt violated convention, use Egyptian pilots not mandatory, but while this may be valid legal argument, issue really political and in order to use Canal, we must have Egyptian agreement. Thus whatever legal situation, de facto situation is that we must have Egyptian agreement before Canal can be used. Approved Secretary statement that no question coercing Egypt and gratified Lloyd’s statement that UK not thinking military measures but peaceful road solution. Commented that Iranian Foreign Minister had stated earlier that rerouting ships would gravely affect Asian countries economically, but that this equally true for Europe and particularly for Italy. Dulles proposal, he said, should be considered as step toward agreement and new base for negotiation. Approved idea CASU for defense legitimate rights under 1888 Convention and as contribution toward reaching agreement with Egypt. Said he had one or two doubts on specific points CASU proposal, such as necessity single administrator but felt that association should be established now. Did not agree with Spender that now no time for approach to UN since 18 powers have good basis for approach. UN good offices should be requested facilitate task negotiating convention with Egypt protecting rights users. Martino then tabled resolution of which text being cabled separately.³ Martino concluded with reminder that right on side 18 powers and that they must be firm.

Followed by Norwegian Foreign Minister, who supported approach to UN with request for good offices and agreed with need for establishing CASU. Suggested terms of reference be broadened provide total coordination needs of powers in event passage through Canal prevented or delayed. Association should establish working relationship with local Canal authority and supply pilots to extent local authority unable handle traffic, plan rerouting and rebunkering needs taking into account financial factors. Also should be empowered deal with all problems arising from present situation pending final solution. Expressed general agreement with Martino resolution.

Netherlands Foreign Minister⁴ stressed necessity uphold Menzies committee proposals and 18 power unity. Agreed particularly point six. Approved approach UN “in one way or the other” but recommending careful study on how and when. Said would study Martino resolution carefully and recommended need support not only decisions present conference but also conclusions previous conference.

Danish Foreign Minister⁵ expressed regret Nasser turned down first conference proposal but stressed need avoid infringing Egyptian sovereignty. Recommended peaceful solution. Supported approach to UN and rejected Nasser’s suggestion of Sept. 10. Said he understood CASU concept better since Secretary’s statement but still had many questions in mind. Stated that for constitutional reasons Denmark unable now take final position CASU.

Pakistani Foreign Minister⁶ said greatly reassured that everyone agreed on need peaceful means. Had felt that means previously employed by 18 power approach Nasser meant failure unavoidable because Menzies committee had no power negotiate and had merely presented proposals rigidly. While Egypt had nationalized Canal, he said, 18 power resolution tries internationalize it, thus both sides equally inflexible. Must not proceed again in this manner since waste time. Should carefully consider organization CASU. Then quoted from preamble UK draft resolution association, which, he said, also contained seeds failure. Referred to Pakistan solidarity with other Middle East countries to which bound by ties race and culture. Stated Egypt alone entitled under 1888 Convention ensure navigation Canal. Thus present draft proposal cannot be supported by Pakistan. Welcomed tone Dulles’ statement and expressed hope might lead to fruitful negotiation with Egypt which should be tried first and then in event failure, approach UN. Reiterated need that any new approach negotiation with Egypt should be made on basis full negotiating powers.

French Foreign Minister then spoke listing two major objectives conference so far. Avoidance armed conflict and agreement Canal should not be subject to decisions single man or power. Said certain countries have been doing all they could encourage Nasser and prevent negotiation. Disagreed with Pakistani representative with regard role and tactics Menzies mission. Reaffirmed reasonable character proposals made to Cairo and said new negotiations undertaken on basis suggested by Pakistani, would give Nasser all trumps. Recommended payment dues be withheld from Egypt as inducement negotiate. Said so long Egypt feels if she turns down proposals she may expect more favorable ones, she will never agree negotiation. Supported CASU and recommended approach Security Council, which should be “seized” with problem on basis specific and detailed presentation. Concluded 18 power principles should be upheld and defended.

Hallstein spoke for Germany. Supported CASU and recommended present conference become permanent group with institutional arrangements. Approved practical and de facto character Secretary’s proposal. Said we should prepare for future eventualities, such as rerouting and recourse to UN good offices. Followed by Japanese representative⁷ who echoed position expressed by Japanese Foreign Minister at previous conference in favor peaceful solution. Raised several questions regarding character and role CASU which were later answered by Secretary in his statement cabled separately. Lloyd for UK then stressed CASU proposals complementary to and not substitute for proposals first conference. Disturbed by thought expressed by some delegates that 18 powers should abandon their idea of what is fair and reasonable simply because Nasser rejected proposals. This slippery path on road toward unconditional surrender. Rejected idea Nasser nationalization not breach legal obligations. Rejected view that rights formerly vested Suez Canal Company now vested Egyptian board which we not recognize as legal authority. Stated support CASU irrespective powers assigned and said functions should not be restricted immediate future Canal but for continuing problems. Stressed advantages cooperative body users Canal to safeguard rights threatened by possible covert and devious actions Egypt. Recommended establishment association now and regretted Denmark statement that could not join association at this time since important go ahead. Said dues should be paid CASU and held suspense pending final settlement with Egypt. UN matter should be dealt with later but at some stage problem should be placed before Security Council.

Australian Representative⁸ then said he wished correct impression he opposed going to UN, and that merely felt important question was when and how, not whether recommended matter only be referred to UN after association had been organized. Followed by New Zealand Representative⁹ who reaffirmed need for international control, unity and stressed legal rights. Felt should not approach UN prematurely since have not exhausted all possibilities [garble—to settle] matter by negotiation. Endorsed CASU. Swedish Foreign Minister¹⁰ then said opinions within conference still divided on legal aspects and therefore suggested wiser not go into these too much. Session concluded with extemporaneous address by Secretary which cabled separately.¹¹ Third session scheduled 11 a.m. Thursday morning.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2056. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:33 a.m. Drafted by Tyler, according to a copy of Secto 13 in the London Embassy File. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 775)
2. Reference is to the second plenary session, which began at 4 p.m., September 19.
3. Not printed. (Transmitted in Secto 14 from London, September 20; ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/9–2056)
4. Joseph Luns.
5. Hans Christian S. Hansen.
6. Malik Firoz Khan Noon.
7. Haruhiko Nishi.
8. Sir Percy Spender.
9. Sir Clifton Webb.
10. Osten Undén.
11. Dulles’ extemporaneous comments were transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 12 from London, September 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2056) They are printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 1, 1956, p. 505; and in The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956, pp. 356–364.