Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

184. Messages From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles¹

London, September 7, 1956.

[Message 1]

MESSAGE FOR MR. DULLES

Our messages from Cairo are depressing. It looks as though Nasser is not prepared to budge at all and therefore the probability is that by the week-end Menzies will have to announce that his mission is a failure.

On that assumption it seems to me most urgent that we should concert together our next steps. These seem to me to fall under two heads:

(a) Recourse to the Security Council.

(b) Action with regard to the dues would, I hope, be coupled with the setting up of some kind of International User Agency such as you suggest.

Although I agree that these two matters are inter-related, for convenience I deal with them in separate messages.

[Message 2]

Recourse to the Security Council.

I feel that the state of public opinion in the United Kingdom and indeed in the United States and elsewhere makes it necessary that we should, having explored the possibilities under Article 33 of the Charter, now go to the Security Council preferably under Chapter 7, as you suggest. I discussed this matter with the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in Paris yesterday. They are reluctant to take this course, but are prepared to acquiesce. They do, however, feel and I agree that we should have agreed among ourselves a common approach before we embark upon this course which is obviously full of pitfalls.

2. I readily give you the assurance that any recourse by us to the Security Council will be genuinely directed towards a peaceful settlement. We have no idea of using the Security Council proceedings as a cover for military operations. We would regard them as another effort to using international pressure to bear upon Colonel Nasser to make him conform to the kind of solution which you so admirably expounded at the London Conference. At the same time I take it that we are agreed not to countenance any resolution or wrecking amendment which would tend to limit our respective freedom of action in the last resort if Colonel Nasser continued to be obdurate.

3. The item which we would propose to inscribe would be something along these lines:

“The situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.”

4. The resolution which we have in mind (without prejudice for the moment as to the time at which it would be tabled) is contained in my immediately following message. I obtained from the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister yesterday agreement to the deletion of any reference to the passage of Israeli ships. That I am sure is an improvement.

5. Would you like to join with the French and ourselves in calling for the meeting and/or sponsoring this resolution? I have no doubt that we are agreed that our resolution should advocate the London plan and that we should all of us agree not to put forward or support in the Security Council any resolution or amendment involving any significant modification of it.

[Message 3]

Following is text of the Draft Security Council Resolution:

“Recognising that the unilateral action of the Government of Egypt in relation to the operation of the Suez Canal has disturbed the status quo and, by bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, has created a situation which may endanger the free and open passage of shipping through the Canal, without distinction of flag, as laid down by that Convention, and has thus given rise to a threat to the peace;

Noting that a Conference to discuss this situation was called in London on August 16, 1956, and that eighteen of the twenty-two states attending that Conference, who between them represent over, ninety-five percent of the user interest in the Canal, put forward proposals to the Egyptian Government;

Regretting the refusal of the Egyptian Government to negotiate on the basis of the above-mentioned proposals, which offer a just and equitable solution;

Considering that such refusal constitutes an aggravation of the situation;

1. Finds that a threat to the peace exists;

2. Reaffirms the principle of the freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal in accordance with the Suez Canal Convention of 1888;

3. Requests the Government of Egypt to negotiate on the basis of the Eighteen Power Proposals with a view to reaching a just and equitable arrangement for the international operation of the Suez Canal.”

[Message 4]

Following is the text of the letter which Sir P. Dixon would send to the President of the Security Council asking him to call the Meeting:

“In accordance with instructions received from Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, I have the honour to request you in your capacity as President of the Security Council for this month to call an emergency meeting of the Council for —. The purpose of this meeting would be to consider the following item:

‘Situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888’

“Since the action of the Egyptian Government created a situation which may endanger the free and open passage of shipping through the Canal without distinction of Flag, as laid down by the above-mentioned Convention, a Conference was called in London on August 16, 1956, of the twenty two States attending that Conference. Eighteen, representing between them over 95% of the user interest in the Canal, put forward proposals to the Egyptian Government for the future operation of the Canal. The Egyptian Government have, however, refused to negotiate on the basis of the above-mentioned proposals which, in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, offer means for a just and equitable solution. Her Majesty’s Government consider that this refusal constitutes an aggravation of the situation which, if allowed to continue, would constitute a manifest danger to peace and security.”

[Message 5]

Nasser’s rejection of the proposals put forward by Menzies constitutes a major rebuff to the eighteen powers. We know that Nasser wants to string us along and meanwhile to strengthen his hold on the Canal. To this extent we are playing his game if we go to the Security Council. There is the danger that whilst we are engaged on discussions there the situation will deteriorate and the pro-Western regimes in the Middle East will be fatally weakened. To avert this it is essential that we should all make it publicly clear that Nasser is not [by?] pending discussion going to benefit from his act of unilateral expropriation. I should regard our action in going to the Security Council as fraught with even more than the obvious dangers if we have not beforehand reached some agreement with regard to payment of the dues.

2. Therefore I propose that we should ask all the major user friendly governments to make a statement as early as possible and on the lines suggested by M. Spaak in N.A.T.O. yesterday to the following effect:—

(A) We do not recognise the nationalisation of the Canal;

(B) We shall take steps to deny the transit dues to the Egyptian Government or the new Egyptian Board;

(C) We are advising our ship owners accordingly.

3. Your wider scheme for a users agency seems to us to have distinct advantages but I think it unlikely that it will be formulated in time for us to take action as urgently as we think is necessary. The above proposals would however be a first step towards it.

4. In a following message I deal with your proposal in greater detail.

[Message 6]

Your proposal for a users agency, if I have understood it correctly, is entirely in line with the plan approved by the eighteen in London, and its adoption would have the great merit of showing our determination to implement it as far as we could in the absense of Egyptian participation. In the absence of Egyptian consent, there will of course be limitations to the authority which such an agency can effectively exercise. But I assume that your plan would be to establish an interim authority with its headquarters outside Egypt and to invite the widest possible cooperation with this authority by the users of the Canal. As a minimum this cooperation would take the form of payment of transit dues to the interim international authority, which would thus become the agent for the policy which in an earlier message I have suggested adopting in the immediate future.

2. Your suggestions as to the juridical basis for the proposed agency are being studied by my legal advisers. Meanwhile it seems to me that the preamble of the 1888 Convention, which shows that the intention of its signatories was to complete the system under which the navigation of the Canal had been placed by the concessions previously granted to the Company, would provide firm ground for our action. We could argue that because the concessions and convention are linked in this way, the unilateral abrogation of the concessions automatically brings into question whether the rights assured under the Convention are any longer effectively guaranteed.

3. I take it that your plan would be to take rapid action to bring an agency of this kind into existence. I should be grateful for your thoughts on ways and means. I assume we should want to leave the door open for future Egyptian membership and to organise the agency in such a way that it could eventually take over all functions envisaged for the International Board in the London proposals.

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK official corres. with Secretary Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol I. Secret. The six messages printed here were delivered to the Department of State under cover of a note from British Chargé Coulson to Secretary Dulles which reads: “I have been asked to deliver to you the enclosed six messages from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.” This note is dated September 6; but the memorandum of conversation with Coulson, infra, indicates that these messages were delivered on the morning of September 7.