18. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1
492. London eyes only for Ambassador. Reference Deptel 382.2 Since Pineau had asked me to keep in close touch with Joxe regarding Suez, I saw latter this afternoon in accordance instructions reftel.
I commenced interview by repeating U.S. position as given in paragraph one of London 510 to Department,3 saying that I wished to confirm information which had already been given Chauvel by our Chargé in London. I then told Joxe that I had specific message re the 24 Mysteres which Pineau had mentioned to me yesterday. I said that while U.S. understood French feelings in the matter, we considered it most important to act in such a way as to isolate Nasser to the greatest extent possible. Therefore we felt that any action which might tend to confuse the Canal problem with the Arab–Israel quarrel would be most undesirable as it would only serve to rally the other Arab countries to Nasser’s side, and would thus further complicate settlement of Suez Canal problem.
Joxe replied that he could well understand the importance of keeping the two issues separate. In fact French felt that Western action should be directed as much as possible against Nasser as an irresponsible individual dangerous to his own people as well as to the rest of the world. The West should make a real effort to differentiate Nasser from Egypt and from the Egyptian people. On the other hand Joxe said that the French were particularly susceptible to the sort of action Nasser had taken not only because of their previous troubles with him over Algeria but also because of their memories of Hitler. Therefore, the French took an extremely grave view of the present situation and felt that it was essential that some positive action be taken promptly. If it should not be possible for Western powers to agree rapidly on concrete action of some sort, there would inevitably be a strong movement in public opinion and in governmental circles to induce Israel to go to war with Egypt in order to put an end to Nasser by this indirect means.
Joxe said that re the Mysteres the French would of course take no action that was not approved by the three powers in NEACC, and he said that the matter could be discussed further on Monday in [Page 32] London. The French have clearly calmed down about the need to send Mysteres to Israel immediately but unless some alternative concrete means can be found to take action against Nasser I feel that subject of Mysteres for Israel will continue to be brought up with greater insistence by the French.
Joxe said that he had heard that Murphy would be in London Monday morning and inquired if there was really no possibility of the Secretary’s coming. I repeated that the Secretary would in any event not reach Washington until Sunday afternoon and that as indicated by our Chargé in London the Secretary did not think it would be advisable or appropriate for him to come immediately to London. Joxe said that he regretted this decision because meeting in London would lose some of its importance and Nasser would be apt to feel that U.S. did not place importance on issue equal to that placed by French and British. In spite of assurances that I had given him earlier that U.S. took very serious view of situation, he wondered whether U.S. fully realized the gravity with which the French and British Governments regarded the affair. I again reassured him that we considered the situation to be very serious and were giving it our entire attention.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–2856. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:18 p.m. Repeated priority to London.↩
- See Document 13.↩
- Document 7.↩