Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, September 4, 1956—8:47 p.m.

640. Suez for Henderson. We have been giving careful thought to steps which might be taken if Nasser should reject Five Power proposal. As you know from recent messages, we have reiterated our belief that every effort should be made to find peaceful solution to problem. We attach utmost importance to avoiding application of force in any circumstances in which it would not be abundantly clear that this was last resort and that Egyptians were responsible for creation of situation which brought about hostilities.

We of course hope result of Five Power Committee’s work will be to bring about area of agreement and atmosphere conducive to negotiation of new treaty along lines 18-Nation proposal. If, however, this should not be possible believe you should know while you are in Cairo general lines of our thinking re next steps. British are contemplating bringing matter before SC, although we as yet unconvinced they are thinking along lines which give promise that SC would in fact be able to contribute materially to a solution. On the contrary British intention appears to be quick consideration by SC more as an “exercise” which must be gone through before moving to more drastic measures. Our feeling is that if matter is to be brought to SC it must be for purpose sincerely seeking action which would contribute to peaceful solution. We recognize, however, that resolution meeting minimum position of Canal users not likely be adopted by SC due to Soviet veto, and that procedural difficulties would require considerably more time for SC consideration than British have in mind. Added difficulty is that during this time it possible or probable that incidents in Canal would precipitate showdown.

Alternative which appears to us to have substantial merit is based upon thought that perhaps if and when Nasser rejects 18-Nation proposal, we should concentrate more upon guarantees provided by 1888 Treaty and measures which users of Canal might legally and morally take to assure that rights guaranteed to them under Treaty are not impaired. Although we have offered to negotiate a new treaty with Egypt, that should in no way indicate that we are not determined to utilize rights under existing treaty.

We know of no way to impose a new Canal treaty upon Egypt. Egypt’s resistance to the principles developed by the 18 powers is not a proper basis for action against her. Our case is legally weak so long as it rests on Egypt’s refusal to accept the 18 power proposal because this depends upon Egypt voluntarily agreeing to a new treaty. The rights accorded under the 1888 Treaty constitute a perpetual easement to use freely the Canal and insistence on the right so to use the Canal places us on the best possible ground. For the users of the Canal to form, through an agreement, an association to exercise the right of user is in no way dependent upon Egyptian consent nor inconsistent with the 1888 Convention which indeed by Article 8² contemplates some such possibility. Should the Egyptians seek to obstruct the use of the Canal under these circumstances, she would then in the eyes of the world be the party who has violated the Treaty of 1888. In these circumstances the Canal users would be in a far better position to bring case to the Security Council if they had to, or take such other action as might then be required.

Vast majority of shipping passing through Canal at present is owned by no more than half dozen nations. Over 90 percent such shipping is owned by 18 nations which Committee represents. Most if not all of those nations might agree to concerting among themselves and with other Canal users to effect arrangements for transit of Canal which do not depend upon any new agreement with Egypt. If it decided to pursue this course an announcement of a proposal for voluntary international association to operate the Canal, containing the following points, might be made:

1. Actual operation of Canal presently being matter of dispute with imminent possibility of difficulties in transit, and status of concession of Canal Company yet to be settled, nations which constitute majority users have taken cognizance of fact that Egyptian Government has asserted that it will continue to respect Constantinople Convention. They expect Government of Egypt to continue abide by this pronouncement. For their part, they are determined to ensure that their rights under Convention shall be maintained and fully exercised.

2. To this end they have agreed that they will establish an international shipping control association for purpose of transitting Canal. Association will be set up with headquarters to be determined. It will employ pilots who are fully qualified to effect passage. It will establish traffic and convoy system for those ships using its facilities so that Canal shall continue to be operated with maximum efficiency. It will prorate the cost of operation to ships using the Canal and the proceeds would be used for sole purposes of a) paying pilots; b) paying operation and administrative expenses of association and c) establishing a fund to be used whenever it is determined that construction and repair work should be undertaken on Canal.

3. Services and facilities of association will be available to ships of any nation at all times.

4. Association will stand ready at all times to cooperate with Egyptian authorities and ensure that Canal remains free and unobstructed to shipping.

It will be noted that foregoing does not provide for payment to Egypt, although Egypt would acquire profits under 18-nation proposal, as Suez Canal Company. Since the concession has been cancelled there is no existing agreement under which Egypt could claim “profits”. Any claim for rental or other compensation for use of her property would be matter for future negotiation but not a matter of Egypt’s right.

A main problem would be question of scheduling of traffic. A voluntarily organized scheduling of ship movements, not based on Egyptian soil nor operating under Egyptian authority could, we believe, effectively meet requirements in this regard although there would be many difficulties involved. An obvious point is that full compliance with traffic pattern established by the scheduling agency would be required of all vessels, including Egyptian vessels, since failure of a single ship to cooperate could, as today, block the entire facility. Users, however, would take cognizance this difficulty, and, through its standing offer, take all possible steps to cooperate in keeping Canal free and unobstructed. Onus for obstruction legally and in public eye would be on Egypt or non-cooperating users.

Regarding pilots, there would appear to be no legal or insuperable practical reasons why pilots would have to be hired through Egypt. These might be provided for the most part directly by the nations using the Canal for their own ships, and some might be provided in a central pool to be operated by scheduling agency. Such pilots provided locally might be stationed upon ships at either end of the Canal pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty.

It would, of course, be necessary to carry on certain maintenance operations, such as dredging and maintenance of buoys and other navigational guides. If Egyptian Government were willing to undertake this maintenance and did so efficiently (for which it would be paid by the control authority), there would be no reason to interfere. If it failed to do so, it would correspondingly be impeding the free use of the Canal and the users would then be entitled to take necessary measures themselves.

Our thought is that if it appears that your discussions with Nasser are not going well, it might be greatly beneficial for him to learn that proposition along the foregoing lines is being given serious consideration. First, however, we believe it necessary to have reaction interested parties. I am urgently consulting with British Chargé here to set forth general outline of thinking. I would appreciate receiving soonest your own reaction and any suggestions which you might have. In this connection, unless you perceive objection, I suggest you discuss matter on strictly secret basis with Menzies omitting of course reference to British intentions re SC action. If these various reactions favorable, we would plan discuss with other members of 18 power group.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–456. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rountree; cleared in draft by Dulles, Hoover, Wilcox, and Raymond; approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated Niact to London.
2. For text of the Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, Constantinople, October 29, 1888, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1887–1888, vol. 79, pp. 18–22; or The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956, pp. 16–20.