Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

148. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 29, 1956, 5:30 p.m.¹

Washington, August 29, 1956, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Suez Canal

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Hoover
• Mr. Wilcox
• Mr. Rountree
• Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. Ronald Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy

The Secretary referred to Mr. Lloyd’s message of August 28² to him and said the suggestions concerning United Nations Security Council action had raised several problems in our minds. He pointed out that if the Suez issue was raised as a dispute, the parties at interest must refrain from voting. In this event, even with a lenient interpretation of who were the parties at interest, it was not at all certain that a proposed resolution could receive as many as seven votes. The wording of Mr. Lloyd’s letter indicated that the London conference had been held pursuant to Article 33 of the Charter,³ and the implication of this was that the matter would be raised as a dispute. Mr. Coulson said he had not realized the wording “dispute” appeared in Article 33. Clearly the intention of the British Government was to raise the matter as a situation and he wished to get on record at once that intention in order to avoid the problems which would arise if it were presented as a dispute. The Secretary said that the British were not, of course, bound to say that what was done at London was technically under Article 33. A more difficult question was, however, that if the matter was called a “situation,” it was doubtful that the Security Council would have power to make substantive recommendations, its action in this case presumably being limited to procedural suggestions only. Mr. Coulson expressed as his own view the idea that what would be sought from the Security Council would in fact be procedural, in that no decision would be asked upon the substance of the controversy.

In discussing the possible voting of the Security Council on this matter, it was mentioned that Cuba, Peru and Nationalist China probably could be counted upon to vote in favor of the United Kingdom position. Those definitely opposed would be the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and Iran’s delicate position rendered it doubtful that that country could definitely be counted upon.

The Secretary said that his initial reaction to Mr. Lloyd’s letter was that he would like further British views upon the question of whether the matter would be raised as a situation or a dispute. He wondered whether, in light of the interpretation of the Charter and previous practices, it would be possible to make a recommendation on substance rather than on procedure. Also, he asked whether it would not be difficult to exclude the appearance before the Security Council of at least those countries represented at the London conference who might want to be heard. Mr. Coulson observed that India might not wish to come, and that it should be possible to prevail upon members of the 18-nation group not to insist upon being heard.

The Secretary said that if any of the countries felt that the U.N. action was setting the stage for “police measures” they might wish to inject themselves into the matter. The general concept inherent in the British position of excluding direct military action until there had been recourses to the United Nations was sound. He observed that Mr. Lloyd’s letter had referred to United States public opinion in this regard, but he assumed that the Foreign Minister also had in mind, to some extent at least, public opinion in the United Kingdom.

Continuing, the Secretary said that the London conference was completed in just over one week, but we were able to accomplish that only because of simplified procedures and the fact that only simultaneous translation was provided. The procedural complications in the Security Council and the successive translation would require over three weeks to do the same amount of work. Mr. Coulson responded that the Foreign Office had that in mind in suggesting that representation at the Security Council be at the Foreign Minister level. Officials of that category could not engage too much of their time in the meeting.

Mr. Coulson said he wished to mention the studies which were now going on in London with regard to (1) the possibility of denying to the Government of Egypt Canal dues and (2) financial and economic measures which might be imposed as economic sanctions against Egypt. He said that Nasser was now getting only 40 percent of the Canal dues—the remainder being paid to the company in England and France. The British Government hoped that if Nasser should decline the 18-nation proposals, we could get as many countries as possible to refuse payments to Egypt but to place them in some special account. That, he felt, would “bring matters to a head very quickly.” The British Government also felt that if Nasser should reject the proposals, as many countries as possible should agree to take economic action against Egypt similar to that taken by the United Kingdom and France. He noted that the United States had blocked only those balances existing at the time the freezing order was put into effect. It would seem desirable for the United States, as well as other countries, to block current Egyptian accruals.

The Secretary and Mr. Hoover pointed out that, with regard to tolls, the British and French were essentially following past practices in making payments in London and Paris. United States ships were likewise following past practices in that most of the tolls for such vessels continued to be paid in Egypt at the time of the passage of the ships. It would be far more difficult for us to require payment under some other arrangement. While United States governmental influence might be brought to bear, it was doubtful that we had at this time legal power to stop ships from making payments in Egypt. It was also pointed out to Mr. Coulson that the freezing of current Egyptian accruals of funds in the United States would be far more difficult than the action taken several weeks ago in freezing balances current at that time. Mr. Coulson concluded the discussion of this matter by saying that the problems which he had raised were now being studied jointly in London but that he merely wished to emphasize the British interest in them.

Before departing, Mr. Coulson read a short telegram from Mr. Lloyd to the effect that the latter planned to attend the September 5 meeting of the NATO Council in order to give, in his capacity as Chairman of the Suez Conference, a personal account of what transpired. His own attendance should not be taken as indicating that he felt the meeting should be attended at the ministerial level.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–2956. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Attached to Coulson’s note, supra.

3. The text of Article 33 (Chapter VI), of the U.N. Charter reads:

   “1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

   “2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.” (3 Bevans 1161–1162)