147. Note From the British Minister (Coulson) to the Secretary of State
1
Washington
,
August 29,
1956
.
My Dear Secretary of State: I enclose the
text of a message which Mr. Selwyn
Lloyd has asked me to communicate to you. As you will
understand he is extremely anxious that no idea of its contents
should become known.
I should be grateful for an opportunity to discuss this question with
you as soon as you have had time to consider the message. There are
also one or two questions arising out of the studies now proceeding
in London which I should like to raise with you at the same
time.
Yours sincerely,
[Attachment]
Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles
2
London
,
August 28,
1956
.
As you know, it is our intention to proceed with our plans unless
Nasser can be seen
clearly and decisively to have given in. I have therefore been
considering what our next step should be, if he rejects the
proposals endorsed by the eighteen countries. I think that there
is on balance much to be said for raising the Suez problem in
the Security Council immediately we have his reply if it is
negative. This course would have the advantage that it might
affect his further attitude to our proposals. It would also put
us in a better posture if we are obliged to take action against
him.
[Page 320]
- 2.
- I realize the risks involved. All sorts of things might be
suggested. For example, a call to the parties to settle
their differences by discussion, a call to the London
Conference to resume, a reference to the International Court
or the appointment of a Committee of the Security Council.
There might be a desire to refer the matter to the General
Assembly or even to despatch a peace observation commission
to the area. I realize that it would be impossible to get
from the Security Council a resolution justifying the use of
force without further reference to the United Nations. Nor
would it be possible to get even if we wanted it a
resolution in favour of economic sanctions passed by a
satisfactory majority.
- 3.
- On the other hand, the concentration of our forces in the
Mediterranean is bound to result in someone raising the
matter in the Security Council. It might be the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia or even Iran under pressure from the Arab
states. This last possibility would be most
unfortunate.
- 4.
- Therefore I think that the balance of advantage lies in
our taking the initiative in raising the matter in the
Security Council immediately after a negative reply from
Nasser. The
following points of procedure arise:—
-
(a)
-
Calling the Meeting
This could be done either by the United Kingdom
alone, or by the United Kingdom and France or by
the five members of the Security Council who
supported the Eighteen Power Declaration with the
possible addition of Belgium.
-
(b)
-
Representation at the
Meeting
So far as possible this should be at Foreign
Minister level. Pineau and I should represent France
and the United Kingdom. It is my hope that you
will be able to come yourself. We should try to
get Spaak
to represent Belgium. His views are particularly
robust.
-
(c)
-
A Resolution
A resolution should be tabled emphasizing the
seriousness of the situation and recommending the
Eighteen Power solution and perhaps expressing
regret at Egypt’s rejection of it.
- 5.
- The essence of the matter would be to infuse an atmosphere
of urgency into the debate, making it clear that we want an
expression of opinion from the Security Council within one
week. And that we were not prepared to embark on a lengthy
procedural discussion. The presence of Foreign Ministers
would make it easier to attain such an atmosphere. If the
proceedings become bogged down in procedural wrangles and
interminable amendments, the Foreign Ministers would
endeavour to wind up the debate, saying that the proceedings
were futile and that the United Nations had shown itself
incapable of dealing with the matter.
- 6.
- I cannot emphasize too strongly that your active help is
essential to the success of this plan. The plan might pay a
dividend [Page 321] with
regard to Nasser’s
reactions but the main object of the exercise would be to
put us in the best possible posture internationally in
relation to the action which we may be obliged to take. I
think that moderate opinion would be shocked at forcible
action by us without any reference at all to the United
Nations. In view of the great issues at stake I venture to
suggest that it is of the greatest importance to the United
States that our action should be shown to be reasonable,
that is to say that we had tried the Conference of
twenty-two under Article 33 and then we had gone to the
Security Council under Article 35, that neither of these
courses had produced any result so we were bound to take
police action to procure an international solution.
- 7.
- I know that to go to the Security Council is full of risks
because of its dilatoriness but I believe that not to do so
would be certain to have consequences of greater gravity. I
had a brief talk with Pineau whilst the Conference was sitting
along these lines. He did not dissent. I should welcome your
views very urgently. If we could tackle the Security Council
as a combined operation in the way in which we managed the
London Conference I think that we could derive considerable
benefit. After all the composition is not too bad. There are
five signatories of the Eighteen Power Declaration together
with Belgium, whose Government feels most strongly. In
addition there are two friendly Latin Americans and the
possibility of Nationalist Chinese support. It is not a bad
membership and under your leadership I believe that we could
pull off another success.
- 8.
- I cannot tell you how grateful we all are to you for your
masterly handling of our case here during the
Conference.3
