377. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 30, 19561
SUBJECT
- Israel’s Arms Position; Request for U.S. Financial Assistance
PARTICIPANTS
- Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Yohanan Meroz, First Secretary, Israel Embassy
- Col. Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché, Israel Embassy
- G—Robert Murphy
- NE—Slator C. Blackiston
Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that he desired to review Israel’s efforts to procure arms but prefaced his remarks on this subject with comments on Arab armed strength.
At the present time, according to the Ambassador, Egypt has received 89% of the arms promised by the Soviets. Twenty more IL–28s have recently arrived, making a total of 60 of this type of aircraft in Egyptian possession and Nasser has already received 200 MIG–15s. Mr. Eban confirmed that Egypt had not received any MIG–17s. Arab strength in other countries is constantly increasing, and he pointed to the receipt of 20 MIG–15s by Syria. Equally important was the growth of the armored strength of the Arab nations. The movement toward a central command of the Arab armies boded ill for Israel. The Ambassador felt that Jordan was even more caught up in the Egyptian web since the fall of the Rifa’i Government2 and Israel expected increased Armistice violations on the Jordan border. During the past week Jordan was condemned three times by the MAC, and Israel intelligence reported the likelihood of an early renewal of fedayeen activity based in Jordan. Against this unfavorable background Mr. Eban claimed that the Secretary General felt no real prospect for maintaining the momentum towards easing of tensions which his visit to the Near East had generated, and the Ambassador stated that there was likewise no progress toward peace on the diplomatic front.
Turning to the subject of Israel’s attempts to obtain arms from various sources, Mr. Eban opined that the French hope Canada will fill Israel’s order for F–86s since this would remove some of the pressures generated by the Mystere deal. The Canadians have given no real reason for not filling the Israel order. Public opinion in Canada was not unfavorable to the transaction and Canadair, the [Page 693] manufacturer, is anxious to supply and can give immediate delivery. Despite the previous, Mr. Eban stated that the F–86 matter was not moving and his government did not know quite what to do about it. At present Israel has enough planes to annoy Nasser but not enough to deter him.
Mr. Murphy replied that our views had been made known to Mr. Pearson and there was no question of a possible misunderstanding of the U.S. position. The matter was before the Canadian cabinet and we understand that no final decision has been made. Mr. Murphy pointed out the need for the U.S. to act circumspectly in dealing with our Canadian friends so that we did not give the impression that we were interfering in Canadian affairs. Mr. Murphy asked whether the Israel Ambassador in London had sought a UK approach to the Canadians. Mr. Eban replied that the UK was known to be sympathetic but that he would bear in mind Mr. Murphy’s suggestion. Mr. Eban stated that even if Canada agreed now to fill the Israel order, because of the delay in shipment, the target date of this summer for receipt of F–86s could no longer be met.
In seeking alternative suppliers Israel has turned to Italy for purchase of F–86Ks. The Italian position, according to Mr. Eban, is that the decision on the sale is up to the U.S. He therefore sought our assistance in facilitating this transaction.
Mr. Murphy said that the apparent Egyptian reaction to U.S. participation in the Mystere sale was Egypt’s recognition of Red China. There followed some discussion of whether or not such recognition would not have taken place in any event and Mr. Murphy agreed that it was a moot point.
Replying to Mr. Murphy’s question, Col. Salmon explained that Israel wanted twelve F–86Ks since this model was an all weather interceptor and could be used both as a day and night fighter. This versatility appealed to Israel. Securing 12 F–86Ks from Italy was predicated on obtaining 24 F–86s from Canada. If the Canadian deal did not materialize Israel would want 36 Italian F–86s. Fiat, the Italian firm involved, is anxious for the contract, said Col. Salmon, and would bend every effort to fill the order as quickly as possible although they could not give immediate delivery.
The French have stated, continued the Ambassador, that in the absence of U.S. participation in the supply of arms to Israel they can help no further. Israel does not intend to approach the French again unless the Canadian and Italian transactions fall through.
Turning to the subject of ground forces, Mr. Eban claimed that the growing Arab armored strength was as frightening as their air superiority over Israel, and he wished to raise the question of obtaining tanks and half tracks through our good offices. Super [Page 694] Sherman tanks were available in European countries but their transfer required our concurrence in view of the conditions attached to their original sale by the U.S. Mr. Murphy requested Mr. Blackiston to determine what strictures existed governing the sale of the Shermans mentioned by Mr. Eban.
Col. Salmon stated that Israel desired to buy 100 Shermans but pointed out that many would be used for cannibalization. Asked by Mr. Murphy the size of Israel’s standing army, Col. Salmon replied that it was a difficult question to answer due to the Israel practice of calling up reserves each year for duty. In full mobilization he said 200–250 thousand men and women could be put under arms. Ambassador Eban interjected that such extreme mobilization would wreck Israel’s economy.
Ambassador Eban also expressed the need for half tracks which, though no longer manufactured, provide the mobility which Israel needs for her armed forces. In all, 250 half tracks are desired.
The Ambassador then stated that Israel intended to submit a new arms list which would bring her needs up to date. Certain items no longer desired and included on the earlier requests would be eliminated. These were: 10,000 semi-automatic rifles; 80 75 mm recoilless rifles; 40 F–51Ds. However, the new list would include the following items which were especially needed: 5 H–19 (S–55) Sikorski helicopters; 18 C–82 cargo aircraft with engines and accessories; 50 half tracks. Colonel Salmon averred that since we had supplied Israel with the above equipment in the past there should be no difficulty in the sale of additional quantities of the same items.
Ambassador Eban declared that the financial burden placed on Israel by purchase from European countries which extended no credit of such expensive items as the Mysteres had become staggering although new sources of revenue had been developed as the result of Israel’s critical situation. The Ambassador asked whether U.S. economic aid to Israel could not be increased but said that he did not mean to imply that the U.S. should stand the burden of Israel’s arms program. The Ambassador said he understood that of some $73 millions appropriated for Near East economic aid this fiscal year $36 million was unused and if unspent by June 30 would be returned to the Treasury. This unspent balance had been earmarked for the Aswan Dam. Israel sought the use of part of these funds. Another possible means of assisting Israel was described by Col. Salmon who stated that France, owing to last year’s drought, planned to buy wheat from the U.S. under P.L. 480. Israel would like the use of the francs generated by this transaction.
Mr. Eban referred to the fact that no decision had been reached on Israel’s request for a $75 million Export-Import Bank loan for internal water development. Mr. Murphy stated that the Secretary [Page 695] was favorably disposed toward the loan but that final decision would come from the bank. Concerning the JVA plan, Mr. Murphy said that the plan had not been dropped and that we were merely waiting for a propitious time to press it. He confirmed that agreement on the JVA plan was not tied to the Export-Import Bank loan.
Mr. Eban said that he had met the Indian Ambassador to Cairo,3 who was now in the U.S. on a visit. The Indian Ambassador averred that Nehru was impressed with Ambassador Johnston and the JVA plan and could not understand the Arab attitude of obstruction. There followed a discussion of the advisability of using Nehru’s influence to gain acceptance of the project.
On the subject of the Secretary General’s report4 and the SC discussions5 Mr. Eban said that Israel would commend the SYG for the progress already made and support further action of the SYG to improve the situation. He did not feel, however, that the world should become unduly complacent.
Ambassador Eban offered to discuss the points which he had made with the Secretary on his return from vacation if this was deemed advisable by Mr. Murphy. Mr. Murphy felt that such a discussion should take place.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–3056. Secret. Drafted by Blackiston.↩
- Said al-Mufti replaced Samir al-Rifai as Prime Minister of Jordan on May 21.↩
- Ali Yavar Jung Bahadur.↩
- See Document 348.↩
- See the editorial note, supra.↩
- Ambassador Eban and Secretary Dulles met on June 8. The memorandum of that conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)↩