Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

118. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, February 23, 1956¹

Washington, February 23, 1956

SUBJECT

• Lloyd’s Visit to Cairo

Ambassador Makins called at his request and said that Selwyn Lloyd will be stopping in Cairo and seeing Nasser on March 1.² He feels that it is important for him to know the state of the Anderson negotiations before he sees Nasser and also important for him to show to Nasser that he has a knowledge of the negotiations. Ambassador Makins said that the extent of his and Selwyn Lloyd’s knowledge at the present time is that Ben Gurion is insisting on a direct meeting with Nasser and is reluctant to disclose Israel’s position on the various issues to anyone except Nasser; and that Nasser takes the position that a direct top level meeting will take several months of preparation. The Secretary said that that is about the substance of the situation; that it looks as though it might be possible to work out an agreement on most of the issues except the Negev, on which there is a sharp conflict of positions. The Secretary said that he feels our main objective for the time being should be to bring about a situation in which talks could be held. He said that Mr. Anderson was coming to Washington this afternoon³ and was planning to leave for a second round of talks next week. He said that Mr. Russell would keep Ambassador Makins informed of any important developments.

The Secretary said that we face a difficult problem in connection with Israel’s request for arms. If we delay too long in providing any, we may be put in the position of becoming a moral guarantor of Israel. On the other hand, if we provide arms the prospects of obtaining a settlement would be greatly diminished. Because of the recent increase in tension, the time within which negotiations can take place may be fairly short. Ambassador Makins said that the U.K. is in much the same situation as the U.S. with respect to the problem of supplying arms to Israel. He said that he understood the French were about to release some Mysteres to Israel and that the U.K. had sold, but not yet delivered, six Meteors to the Israel Government.

The Secretary, in response to Ambassador Makins’ request about Selwyn Lloyd informing Nasser that he was aware of the Anderson negotiations, said that he agreed that it would probably be necessary. (Mr. Anderson saw Ambassador Makins the following day,⁴ however, and told him that he felt that such a step would probably result in Nasser calling off the negotiations. Ambassador Makins said that he would recommend to Selwyn Lloyd, on that basis, that he say nothing to Nasser about the negotiations.⁵ Mr. Anderson reviewed at some length the line that he was taking with Nasser as to why it would be to Egypt’s advantage to make a settlement and Ambassador Makins said that he thought Selwyn Lloyd would wish to make the same points.)

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell on February 29.
2. See Documents 157 and 175.
3. See footnote 4, Document 110.
4. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
5. The Department, on February 27, informed Ambassador Byroade of this conversation and asked him to support Anderson’s recommendations with the British in Cairo. (Message 1 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing telegrams—Jan.–March 1956) Byroade informed the Department on March 2 that “Selwyn Lloyd told me last night he had never had any intention of mentioning Anderson mission and would not do so.” (Message 102 from Byroade at Cairo; ibid., Incoming telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II)