Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

85. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem,April 29, 1955—5 p.m.

306. General Burns left with me April 28 copy aide-mémoire he had given Eytan same day re Israel’s refusal participate joint patrols Gaza area. Aide-mémoire states that while no reasons given for refusal Burns assumes they may have been based on thoughts expressed articleJerusalem Post diplomatic correspondent April 22 (Tel Aviv telegram 908 to Department²) upon which Burns proceeds to comment. Summary herewith.

Begin Summary:

(1) Egyptians have informed Burns officially that only regular troops are in positions within one kilometer of DL. Burns offers investigate Israeli allegations to the contrary and requests details.

(2) Position expressed by Egypt about erecting barbed wire fence along certain parts of frontier would not appear rule out discussions regarding erection effective continuous obstacle along the DL.

(3) ReferringJerusalem Post reasoning against joint patrols,Burns expressed opinion that if joint patrols had been established following discussions begun last December incidents, which Israeli complained to SC on April 4, would not have occurred. He points out that Israeli patrols adjacent DL are peculiarly vulnerable. Such patrols further back would be less exposed and more effective; while joint patrols would show those evilly-disposed toward Israel that Egypt cooperating preventing violations. On the contrary, Israel’s refusal accept joint patrols plus continuance Israel patrols along DL possibly indicative Israeli refusal cooperate efforts relieve tensions, prevent further incidents.

(4) Argument that joint patrols infringe sovereignty is unrealistic since for all practical purposes patrols would be moving along the DL and would not infringe territorial rights.

(5) Finally, statements in newspaper believed to carry official views to effect Egyptians acting in bad faith respecting measures they have accepted may well endanger possibility arranging the “high level conference” which Israel professes to desire; since Israel’s refusals consider one of the proposals which Egypt has accepted may result in latter’s withdrawal of her agreement to the other proposals. This would destroy basis for holding conference.

End Summary.³

Pouching text.⁴

Have informed Bums regarding Deptel 125.⁵ He considered Shimoni’s⁶ observations numbered paragraph 5 as “erroneous.”⁷

Cole

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2955. Confidential. Received at 5:22 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris,USUN, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.
2. TheJerusalem Post article of April 22 justified the Israeli Government’s rejection of joint patrols on the grounds that this would foment popular indignation, would infringe upon Israel’s sovereignty, would reflect adversely upon the competency of the Israel Defense Force, and would make the Israeli Government a party to the deception that Egypt was fulfilling its obligations to implement General Burns’ proposals. (Ibid., 674.84A/4–2255)
3. The Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department that the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the evening of May 2 had replied to Burns’ aide-mémoire, saying that Israel “(a) was prepared to have this question included in agenda for joint talks, but (b) that its position on joint patrols was one of opposition.” (Telegram 933 from Tel Aviv, May 3;ibid., 674.84A/5–355)
4. Reference is to despatch 168 from Jerusalem, May 2. (Ibid., 674.84A/5–255)
5. Also transmitted to Tel Aviv as telegram 628; see footnote 3, Document 83.
6. Ya’acov Shimoni, Counselor of the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
7. When Department officials spoke with representatives of the Israeli Embassy on April 27 and urged Israel to accept Burns’ joint patrol proposal, Shimoni justified Israel’s refusal on the grounds that Egypt had in fact only accepted Burns’ proposals for joint patrols and a modified form of his suggestion to erect physical barriers, but had failed to agree as well to the conclusion of a local commander’s agreement or to the exclusive use of regular forces along the frontier. (Telegram 628 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2755)