Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

8. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955¹

Washington Washington Washington Washington Washington, January 21, 1955

SUBJECT

• Unified Development of the Jordan Valley

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Undersecretary for Middle East Affairs, British Foreign Office
• Mr. G. G. Arthur, British Foreign Office
• Mr. Ronald Bailey, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Eric Johnston
• NEA—Mr. Allen
• NEA—Mr. Gardiner
• FOA—Mr. George Barnes
• FOA—Mr. Wayne Criddle
• UNP—Mr. Ludlow
• NE—Mr. Troxel
• NE—Mr. Bergus

Messrs. Johnston, Allen and Gardiner outlined the points on which Mr. Johnston hoped to obtain agreement in the forthcoming round of negotiations among the riparian states of the Jordan watershed.

These points included:

1. Share of waters. The basis of division was the average annual flow of the waters of the Jordan system. Storage facilities were required in order to make maximum use of these waters. The engineers of the Baker–Harza firm who had thoroughly examined the situation in Jordan at the request of that Government had come to the conclusion that Jordan required 760 MCM annually to irrigate 513,000 dunums.² The Charles T. Main report had stated that Jordan’s requirements were 829 MCM annually.³ The “Arab Plan” had called for over 900 MCM for Jordan⁴. The United States Government was convinced that the conclusions of Messrs. Baker and Harza were sound and based on the best available engineering technique and proposed to support them. The allocation to Syria was 132 MCM annually, and to Lebanon, 35 MCM annually. These figures had already received general acceptance from both Israel and the Arab riparian states, and no difficulty was anticipated on that score. This left 454 MCM annually for Israel. Of Israel’s allocation, 150 MCM would be diverted out of the basin for irrigation on the coastal plain.

2. Where to store the water? The Baker-Harza report had rejected the Maqarin site on the Yarmuk. The report recommended the construction of a dam further down the river at Wadi Khalid. There were two alternative heights to that dam—40 or 60 meters. The lower dam would cost $11 million and store 47 MCM, the higher would cost $17.5 million and store 118 MCM. Twenty thousand kilowatts of electricity could be generated by facilities constructed at the higher dam. The remainder of the necessary storage would have to take place in Lake Tiberias, which was the only feasible site, and in which storage facilities could be constructed without undue cost.

3. How to guarantee the enforcement of the division of waters. There would have to be some form of international control of the division of the waters. This had been a difficult point in the negotiations. The Israelis were most sensitive over their sovereignty and did not like the idea of an international agency exercising control over installations in Israel territory. The Arabs were distrustful lest at certain times of the year, Israel could defy an international water master and not be brought to terms until crops on Arab lands had been ruined. It was mentioned that the final plan provided some means of retaliation by the Arabs. Furthermore, the storage on the Yarmuk could be used as a reserve for this contingency.

4. Extra-basin use by Israel. The U.S. position was that once the allocations to the riparian states had been agreed upon, any of the sovereign states concerned could use the allocated water anywhere it desired in its territories. This meant that Israel could proceed with the construction of the diversion works at Jisr Banat Ya’aqub.⁵ The Arabs did not like this, and we were not sure of the outcome of negotiations on this point, but we had cautious grounds for optimism. The resolution of this point would mean the removal from the agenda of the Security Council of a very troublesome item.

. . . . . . .

There was a brief discussion of the problem of making the benefits of the development in Jordan available to refugees. Mr. Johnston pointed out that this was outside his own frame of reference and that the plan was that UNRWA should finance the works in Jordan under arrangements whereby significant benefits to refugees would emerge. He was meeting Mr. Labouisse, UNRWA’s Director, in Athens to discuss this particular aspect of the matter.⁶ It appeared that only about 12% of the land to be irrigated in Jordan belonged to the State and that there were between four and five thousand landowners owning the remainder. Some of the private tracts were reasonably large. It was doubtful whether Jordan would be in a position to undertake a full-fledged land reform aimed at establishing family-sized farms all over the Valley. We would probably have to be content with something less than that.

Mr. Shuckburgh expressed his appreciation for the very thorough resume of the position which had been given him. He undertook to relay this information to the Foreign Office and to British diplomatic missions in the field. The latter would be alerted to the forthcoming arrival of Mr. Johnston and instructed to give his mission general help. If the U.S. wanted further assistance on specific matters at appropriate times and places, it should ask the British Government for such help.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Minutes [by U.K. & U.S.] of meetings, Jan. 21 thru Feb. 1. Confidential.

   Shuckburgh, representatives of the British Embassy, and officers of the Department of State met, January 21–February 2, to discuss operation Alpha and to consider other subjects of mutual concern. Both delegations prepared summary minutes of these meetings. These documents, as well as other papers drafted in connection with these meetings, are ibid.,S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1, and ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. during progress of meetings (Dated 1/24 thru 2/4), Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55), and Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Minutes [by U.K. & U.S.] of meetings, Jan. 21 thru Feb. 1.

2. On January 14, the Harza Engineering Company of Chicago, Illinois, and Michael Baker, Jr., Inc., of Rochester, Pennsylvania, acting on behalf of the Government of Jordan, published these conclusions in an “Interim Report: Yarmouk-Jordan Valley Project.”
3. In 1953, at the request of the United Nations, Charles T. Main, Inc., of Boston, Massachusetts, presented its conclusions in a report entitled The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley.
4. Reference is to the Arab League’s The Arab Plan for Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley (Cairo, 1954).
5. On September 2, 1953, Israel began construction of a canal to divert the waters of the Jordan River at Jisr Banat Yaqub in the demilitarized zone dividing Israel and Syria. Work was suspended after 3 weeks due to Syrian objections. The matter was taken to the U.N. Security Council in October 1953. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1303 ff.
6. Ambassador Johnston and his party met with Labouisse and his associates in Athens on January 25. Summary minutes of this meeting are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.