Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State ¹

Tel Aviv , April 5, 1955—4 p.m.

859. Embassy submits the following comments in regards to Sharett’s presentation yesterday as reported Embtel 858:²

1. Consideration of the Egyptian problem at four Cabinet meetings, two of them extraordinary, within a nine day period creates the presumption that the situation is regarded here as of such gravity that it cannot be placed in the same category as the recurring “crises” which have characterized Arab-Israel relations since the armistice.

2. In the Embassy’s judgment, the majority of Israel Cabinet members believe the situation along Egyptian border has become intolerable and that something will have to be done soon.

3. Sharett yesterday afternoon gave the impression of a man under great emotional strain who had been subjected to strong pressures from his colleagues during the morning Cabinet session. His demeanor and his words gave the impression that he may have been given a last chance within a limited time period to achieve a settlement with Egypt, failing which military means might be adopted to effect a transition from an armistice to a peace arrangement between Israel and Egypt.

4. In view of Israel’s past record of using dramatic means to obtain western power assistance in various projects vis-à-vis the Arabs, Embassy has not excluded the possibility that moves adopted yesterday to obtain action through the USG and the SC have a tactical purpose. Certainly this demonstration of willingness to use pacific means should prove most useful to Israel from standpoint world opinion in case open warfare with Egypt ultimately occurs.

5. Nevertheless the preponderance of the evidence here points to conclusion that GOI and Israel people are indeed earnest and it would be unfortunate if the GOE pursued a course of action based on the assumption that most that could happen would be localized retaliation and counter-retaliation.

• Firstly, the IDF,GOI and Israel people generally share the view that time is working against them; that US–UK policy and program in the area will ultimately result shift balance military power which will enable Arabs to do what their leaders have consistently said they would do; namely, push Israelis into the sea. The effect of this psychosis is to remove the normal caution which deters military actions through fear that they might lead to something bigger. Prevailing mood is that if there has to be a second round much better to have it now than later.
• Secondly, sources available to the Embassy within and without government point to the conclusion that Ben-Gurion, supported by the IDF and such Mapai “old guard” members as Aranne and Eshkol, is dominating the formulation of foreign policy. Their activist propensities may be somewhat strengthened during this election period by the growing appeal to the younger voters of Achdut Haavoda with its militant foreign policy program.
• Thirdly, members of the government are known to have been giving close consideration to the Arab political situation generally, and it is a reasonable assumption that they have arrived at the conclusion that divisive forces growing out of the leadership contest between Iraq and Egypt are so great as to minimize the possibilities of collective Arab military action in any short period of time and from military standpoint the IDF may feel that a short period is sufficient to deal with Egyptian forces north of Suez.
• Finally, the failure of Sharett to make any reference to the portion of the Department’s message³ dealing with General Burns program may be symptomatic of a general Israel feeling, particularly within the IDF, that UNTSO is not and will not be in the future an effective instrument and that real stability on the border can only be achieved by creating the will among the Egyptians as the Israelis say they have already done in the case of the Jordanians to control effectively the borders situation. This tendency discount in advance Burns efforts may also reflect basic attitude among Mapai leadership as became apparent during Johnston water negotiations that UN efforts in area were infringement Israel sovereignty and that time had come to decrease rather than increase UN responsibilities.

While the Embassy does not want to be unduly alarmist, its conclusion is that I–E situation has changed from static to dynamic one and that the possibilities military operations should not be minimized if Sharett’s new effort through USG and security council does not result quick and effective improvement border situation.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 174.84A/4–555. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:56 p.m., April 8. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad.
2. Supra.
3. Presumably reference is to telegram 1648 to Cairo; see footnote 4, Document 62.