Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

50. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1955¹

Washington,March 16, 1955

SUBJECT

• Jordan Valley Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Governor Stassen
• Ambassador Eric Johnston
• Assistant Secretary Allen
• Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner—NEA

Ambassador Johnston reported on the nature of the negotiations undertaken in January and February in Israel and the Arab States which involved three principal elements: storage sites, neutral control of the waters, and the division of the waters in quantitative allotments to the various states.

On his first visit to Israel, Ambassador Johnston thought that the Israelis might accept 40 percent of the River as their allocation but instead he found that the Israelis wished at least 50 percent. He had left Israel for Egypt to meet with the Arab Committee where the conversations were important but had led to no understanding. In Jordan the King had been extremely helpful, and it was probably his influence which had led the Jordanians to take a reasonable and constructive view in later negotiations which culminated in a tentative agreement with the Arab States in Beirut. Ambassador Johnston kept the Beirut understanding tentative as far as he was concerned to keep open his negotiating position in Israel. On his return to Israel, there was a slight modification in the Israeli position. To meet the Jordanian requirements of 131 mcms of Jordan water, the Israelis agreed to find 50, and another 50 but with conditions attached which Mr.Johnston considered not negotiable on the Arab side. Mr.Johnston was prepared to try to persuade the Arabs to reduce their claims on the Jordan itself from 131 to 100 million cubic meters, however.

Since his return to the United States Mr.Johnston had met with Mr. Eshkol, the Israeli Finance Minister in charge of the negotiations, and there were indications that Israel might remove the conditions which they wished to attach to the second 50 mcms of Jordan water.² Mr. Eshkol had undertaken to seek Cabinet approval of such a course. Still unsettled in Israel were technical questions underlying the use of Lake Tiberias as a storage reservoir for the Arabs, but these problems were not insuperable.

Mr.Johnston then referred to a conversation held in the morning with Mr.Eban.³ Mr.Eban reported a conversation he had held on March 14 with Mr.Allen.⁴ According to Mr.Eban, Mr.Allen had threatened to withhold aid from Israel unless the Israelis came to terms with Mr.Johnston. Mr.Johnston emphasized that it was not his role to consider the Department of State’s policy in such matters, but that Mr.Eban had advised him that such a course would be harmful to the Jordan Valley negotiations and that he had therefore not reported his conversation on this matter to his Government. Mr.Johnston continued to point out that he felt that Mr.Allen had rendered a very helpful service in indicating to Mr.Eban the extent of support within the United States Government for the Jordan Valley program.

Mr.Allen then outlined the course of his conversation of March 14 with Ambassador Eban.Eban had called to discuss the Gaza incident and to seek our support in including on the agenda of the Security Council a list of Arab incursions, as well as the Israeli attack on Gaza. The conversation then turned to the Jordan Valley program, which Mr.Allen indicated had his full support. Mr.Eban then raised questions regarding the remaining $10 million of aid which Israel is expecting from FOA in 1955, the problem of surplus foods to Israel to be made available under Public Law 480,⁵ and the level of aid to Israel in 1956. Mr.Allen stated that he had advised Mr.Eban that agreement on the Jordan River problem would furnish a useful basis for aid, as we could point out to the Congress that our aid was providing a permanent benefit to Israel and her neighbors. He had informed Eban that we had taken a similar line in dealing with aid to Iran during Mossadegh’s regime.⁶ Mr.Allen thought that Eban had emphasized the negative point of view in interpreting his conversation; whereas Mr.Allen’s remarks were intended to be positive.

Mr.Johnston then stated that whatever course of action might be taken on aid should not be attached to the present Jordan Valley negotiations. This he felt would be a great mistake at this time, as he hoped for a favorable decision by Israel in two or three weeks. Governor Stassen pointed out there was no great urgency in reaching a decision on 1955 aid funds; this could be taken any time prior to June 30. The aid could be allotted now, or later, or the amount could be split for release at different times. Mr.Allen referred to Ambassador Eban’s opinion, that withholding 1955 aid would have a detrimental effect on his Government’s attitude on the Jordan Valley plan. Mr.Johnston stated once again that it would be unfortunate to use the status of the Jordan Valley negotiations as a reason for our failure to allot aid. Mr. Gardiner pointed out that in the case of surplus foods Israel intended to use the proceeds for irrigation projects, and a decision in this case was less urgent as the foods in question are intended to build up Israel’s stockpiles.

The Secretary inquired as to the cost of the Jordan Valley project. Mr. Gardiner indicated that the estimates for the elements in Jordan itself were $90 million, and that we could hopefully look for contributions from other countries to diminish the U.S. burden as it was intended to carry out the project in Jordan through the UNRWA. Estimates in Israel total $45 million to be spread over three or four years. The additional $60 million which Ambassador Johnston had been authorized to discuss, intended for Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, had been used by Ambassador Johnston only in part. Ambassador Johnston then related his negotiations with President Chamoun of Lebanon, which primarily involved loans of $5 million in 1955 and $5 million in 1956, which the Lebanese probably would wish to apply to road construction in Lebanon. Otherwise he had not availed himself of the $60 million fund, but he thought that a further sum would be required to assist in financing power installations in Syria. U.S. funds might be required for equity money, and the Syrians might be able to finance the remainder of the prospective power project from the IBRD. The Syrians anticipated obtaining a substantial block of power from the Yarmuk. This might not be possible, for technical reasons, and a substitute project might be necessary to assure Syrian support.

Mr.Allen and Ambassador Johnston then pointed out that the best argument for the plan lay in refugee resettlement. This plan is the best one we have to help solve the refugee problem, and it would go far to break the log jam posed by the attitude of many of the refugees. Governor Stassen observed that if some constructive action is not taken there might well be a war for the Jordan waters.

The Secretary asked about the cost of the project in Israel. Mr.Johnston said that appeared to be a matter of little concern to the Israelis, who seemed to feel that they would obtain their money sooner or later from their backers in the U.S. and elsewhere. He indicated that strong forces were at work in Israel encouraging the Government to start work at Jisr Banat Yaqub before July, and there would be much trouble if the Israelis did resume operations in the demilitarized zone. This was a factor in Israeli desires for a settlement of the problem in the near future.

The Secretary in congratulating Mr.Johnston on the progress that he had made, summed up the conversation by stating that the immediate issue appeared to be the proper line to take with the Israelis. Mr.Allen suggested that the appropriate techniques were a combination of the carrot and the stick. Mr.Stassen indicated his willingness to support whatever line the Secretary adopted.

The Secretary then determined that we should allocate the remaining 1955 aid funds of approximately $10 million to bring Israel’s total for the year up to $40 million, that we should move slowly on the surplus food program as there appeared to be no urgency in this case, and that as far as aid for 1956 was concerned Israel’s allotment should be kept secret and buried in a regional total.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1655. Secret. Drafted by Gardiner.
2. See supra.
3. The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Framework of the Fourth Mission—No. 18 (Jan. 1955–April 21, 1955)
4. The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/ 3–1456)
5. Reference is to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, which became Public Law 480 on July 10. For text, see 68 Stat. (pt. 1) 454.
6. For documentation concerning U.S. policy with respect to the question of extending military and economic assistance to Iran during Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq’s administration, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X.