Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

472. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, December 30, 1955, 5 p.m.¹

Washington, December 30, 1955, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Israel-Arab Negotiations Through an Intermediary

PARTICIPANTS

• United Stares
  • The Secretary
  • F. H. Russell
• Israel Government
  • Ambassador Eban
  • Minister Shiloah

The Israel Ambassador called at his request and said that Mr.Sharett had received on December 23 the message (Tab A²) … and had just cabled to Mr.Eban instructing him to give an affirmative reply. Mr.Eban handed the Secretary a copy of Sharett’s message (Tab B³).

Mr.Eban said that he wished to supplement the message with some oral remarks. He said that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had asked him to express their appreciation for the effort that the United States Government was making to initiate negotiations and that if they were brought about it would be a historic achievement. Mr.Eban said that the second sentence was the crux of the message.⁴ The Israel Government hopes that there might be direct negotiations as soon as possible but, until it is possible, is willing to work through an intermediary. He said that the IG would hope that the intermediary would concentrate on bringing about a direct meeting of the heads of State and not on the substance of the various issues. Mr.Eban said that the Israel Government especially hoped that the envoy would not identify himself with any special positions on matters of substance. Egypt could ask for anything and the Israel Government would respond. The negotiations, however, should begin free of substantive commitments. Mr.Eban said that with respect to the final paragraph of the message, on arms, there would be alarm in Israel if no arms arrived during the period of negotiations which might well take several months. It would be an invidious situation for Israel to face negotiations with a steadily weakening military position.

The Secretary said that while he agreed that the negotiations should commence free of substantive commitments, he was not sure that it would be possible to achieve any progress if the intermediary was not to help in developing an exchange of information on the substantive position of the two sides. Upon Mr.Eban interjecting that Ralph Bunche had always insisted that the parties had to win each other over and not to convince him, the Secretary said that he agreed that that would, of course, be the situation here but that the positions of the two sides would have to be developed through covert channels at least during the first stages. This was particularly true as Nasser would have a dual task, speaking for himself and lining up the other Arab countries. The Secretary said he envisaged the negotiations as commencing with frank talks by the intermediary with the head of State first of one government and then the other in their own countries and then engaging in an effort to get agreement on the various principle issues. He would also have as one of his objectives bringing about a meeting of the two heads of State at some feasible time. Ambassador Eban said he agreed.

The Secretary stressed that it was important to take advantage of the present period prior to Egypt’s achieving any change in the ratio of military power. The Secretary said that he knows that Israel is counting on getting arms to off-set those which the Arabs are obtaining, or may obtain, from the Soviet Bloc but that he wanted to emphasize that in his opinion the time is past when Israel can count on over-matching, or even continuing to match, Arab capacity to get and absorb arms. The West is no longer the only source of arms for the Arabs. They appear to have an unlimited call on military equipment from the Soviet Bloc. Israel’s capacity to absorb arms cannot match that of 40 million Arabs. Israel must rely more than ever before upon the good will which would make available outside strength and not on its own strength alone. Given present Soviet policies in the area, Israel could not win an arms race nor could it find any security in such a race. Ambassador Eban said that he agreed that Israel cannot rely exclusively on its own arms. Israel’s concurrence in this point of view had been demonstrated by its interest in a settlement and by its efforts to obtain a security guarantee from the United States. Israel, however, believes that its greatest security would lie in a position half-way between attempting to keep up in an arms race and sitting back and doing nothing. It makes a difference whether the ratio of power is 5–1 or 3–1. The Secretary said that he was not sure that there was very much difference. He said that Israel will not be swept away unless, by appearing to be aggressive, it ties the hands of those who would help it. Mr.Eban said that the trouble for Israel is that at present it has no assurance that it would get help and that it must, therefore, be in a position to carry the brunt of its own defense. He said, therefore, that he hoped the question of the U.S. making arms available to Israel was not closed. He said the French Government has agreed to release twelve Mysteres to Israel but because of the connection of French Mystere production with NATO it had informed Israel that it would have to contact the United States. Mr.Eban expressed the hope that the United States would approve the release of the Mysteres. The Secretary said that the question of arms would, of course, never be completely closed. We should in any event have to wait for the Security Council to act on the matter of the attack on Syria. With respect to the Mysteres, he assumed that it might involve questions of off-shore procurement and it might, therefore, be a matter for General Gruenther. He said that he thought that the fact should not be disguised that Israel’s peril has mounted in the last few months as a result of the new Soviet policies in the area. The critical question is how best to deal with Soviet efforts to exploit the Israel-Arab controversy. The Secretary said he was convinced it could not be met by supplying arms to Israel. The only real way of removing the threat and obtaining security is by settling the controversy itself.

JFD

1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on December 31.
2. The message stated, in part, that the “Secretary [of State] desires proceed rapidly and proposes that high-level special envoy be appointed to facilitate negotiations”. Additionally, “It is Secretary’s view that if the negotiations move sufficiently rapidly, then arms [for Israel] issue will fall into different pattern.” The message concluded: “Tentative inquiries addressed to N[asser] during the past few days give encouragement that he will be prepared to enter negotiations.”
3. The message said, in part, that “it would appear that N.[asser] has not yet given a definite reply to inquiries on his readiness to meet. We [Israel] should like to have his clear answer without delay.” Moreover, “B[en] G[urion] is willing to meet with N.[asser] to negotiate, without prior conditions… . We [Israel] are strongly interested in the earliest possible commencement of the negotiations and their swift conclusion.” The message also stated that “Any refusal to respond favorably to our November 16 request for arms would, in our view, constitute a serious danger to Israel’s very survival, and to the peace of the Middle East.”
4. The second sentence reads: “We should like to have his [Nasser’s] clear answer without delay.”