Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

46. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London,March 10, 1955—6 p.m.

3958. I accompanied Russell in discussion of Alpha yesterday with Eden and Shuckburgh.² After hearing outline of proposed settlement Eden stated it seemed to him to be on right lines.

Re timing Eden said he attracted by idea of early approach. He expressed concern about Nasser’s internal position in light recent events and desires to do what possible help him. Approach along lines proposed might provide Nasser way out his present dilemma.Eden suggested consulting Stevenson and Byroade regarding approach at present time. If their advice favorable they might be given discretion test ground. Important, however, bear in mind avoiding actions which might enable Nasser cause difficulties over conclusion new UK–Iraq treaty. Meeting agreed Byroade should make first move.

Eden felt it preferable not to use Egypt’s possible dilemma over Gaza incident as basis of approach but stress unique position of Egypt in Arab world and important role Nasser could play in helping towards settlement. He thought brief prepared for his visit to Cairo could be drawn upon by Ambassadors.

Eden agreed in general with suggested US–UK position towards Israel described paragraph 3 Embassy telegram 3930³ but thought it should contain stronger condemnation policy of reprisals as damaging to Israel’s whole position and her relations with West.

Russell outlined Byroade’s views re proposed Egyptian pact with Syria and Saudi Arabia (Cairo’s 1312 to Department) particularly point 9 C.⁴ Eden agreed with general proposition we should avoid unnecessary condemnation Egypt’s plans until we see how they worked. He felt however we must not allow Egyptians to spread belief our support Turk-Iraq pact weakened; moreover, effectiveness Turk-Iraq arrangements would be weakened if Syria permanently excluded.Eden added he did not wish to attack pact unnecessarily and had avoided questions in Commons so far re Egyptian pact but it might be difficult to continue to do so.⁵

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–1055. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Received at 7:10 p.m. Repeated to Cairo.
2. The British summary record of this meeting with Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9 isibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: (1) Memo of Conv. of 3/9 with Eden; (2) FHR’s letr of 3/10 to Byroade.
3. Document 44.
4. In telegram 1312, March 8, Ambassador Byroade recommended to the Department that while the United States could not support Egypt’s efforts to conclude a security agreement with Syria and Saudi Arabia, public expression of disapproval would be counter productive. Subparagraph 9(c) reads as follows:

   “Tell Egyptians we take realistic and practical view of Middle East defense problem and are adopting a wait and see attitude as to how new arrangements will shape up and under what rules.” (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–855)

5. Ambassador Aldrich subsequently informed the Department that Eden “said he was encouraged at the progress made so far and seemed quite hopeful about the future prospects for this operation [Alpha].” (Telegram 3972 from London, March 11;Ibid., 684A.86/3–1155)