Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

44. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London,March 9, 1955—3 p.m.

3930. From Russell. 1. As a result meetings past ten days² (attended by Shuckburgh,Beeley,Rose,³Arthur,Vallat, Simpson⁴ Berncastle,⁵ Belgrave⁶ and others Foreign Office; by myself, Burdett, Gardiner and Troxel for Department;Wilson and Mak for Embassy) we have agreed (on ad referendum basis) upon the elements of a settlement between Israel and Arab States which US and UK might at proper time and in appropriate ways urge upon the two sides.Eden has asked to discuss Alpha with me this afternoon.⁷ I will arrive Washington Saturday.⁸

2. Israeli raid on Gaza has, of course, greatly increased difficulties of launching Alpha.Shuckburgh and I feel, however, that US–UK should continue to make the acceptance and implementation of what we believe could be an equitable settlement one of the guiding considerations in our policy toward the area during coming months.

3. With respect to Israel, we suggest that US–UK take position that because of overriding need which must concern all of us, including Israel, we intend to continue with our policy of strengthening the Middle East against outside aggression by working out agreements based on the northern tier approach. Because of the state of Arab feeling toward Israel, not improved since the Gaza raid, it is not possible to consider associating Israel with these area defense arrangements at this time. First essential is to get these arrangements into shape. When this has been achieved and when state of Israel’s relations with the Arab States permits, we would be prepared to consider discussions with Israel about its role in area defense. Concerning Israel’s need for intra-area security we should say that, as IG has already been informed, this problem is receiving our active consideration; that we are not disposed to assume obligations with respect to the security of a border which is continuously marked by border raids and military actions and that we therefore are giving consideration to steps that could be taken to produce a genuine reduction of tension as a prelude to security undertakings. The IG’s Gaza raid has obviously set back for sometime the possibility of success in this effort but we intend to press forward with it, and, in view of Israel’s need for security guarantees, we entertain the hope we may receive more cooperation in the future than we have in the past in our efforts to reduce tensions. (With respect to economic aid and the supplying of military equipment, e.g. British tanks, French planes, and US small arms, we might tighten up or delay somewhat but gauge our restrictions by the likelihood of their promoting IG cooperations.)

4. Shuckburgh and I continue to believe that Egyptian Government is the one through which efforts to obtain Arab agreement should be initiated, difficult as this may appear at the moment. There appear to us to be four possibilities: (a) Give our representatives in Cairo discretion to approach Nasser at an early date (but bearing in mind state of UK–Iraq treaty negotiations⁹). As point of departure, they could make use of Gaza raid as symptomatic of situation which weakens Egypt’s position at home and abroad; and then make points outlined in brief prepared for Eden’s talk with Nasser; or (b) wait two or three months for present tensions to relax and then make approach to Nasser; or (c) if at end of four or five months approach to Nasser has not proved feasible, explore possibilities of approach to Jordan; or (d) if none of above prove possible publicize some such plan as Alpha as a solution advocated by western powers. A variant would be to try to arrange Pakistan-Turkish sponsorship ostensible authorship.

5. In Security Council consideration of Gaza incident, it will, of course, be difficult for any resolution which may be passed to avoid urging parties to move toward settlement. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that in view of Arab sentiments toward UN role in Palestine they would be predisposed to reject Alpha proposals at outset if they believed US–UK effort at over-all settlement stemmed from Israel use of force at Gaza and from resulting UN recommendation. From this point of view, it would be preferable to have any reference to settlement go no further than those in previous resolutions.

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 1:12 p.m. Repeated to Cairo.
2. Summary minutes of these meetings prepared by British officials areibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: Minutes of Meetings held Feb. 28 thru March 10 (Mimeo).
3. Edward Michael Rose, Head of Levant Department in the British Foreign Office.
4. Presumably Kenneth John Simpson, Assistant Head of Levant Department for Economic and Social Development in the Middle East in the British Foreign Office.
5. J.M. Berncastle, an official of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
6. Thomas Robert Dalrymple Belgrave.
7. See Document 46.
8. March 12.
9. The United Kingdom and Iraq were engaged in negotiations which led, on April 4, to the signing of an agreement terminating the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and securing British adherence to the Iraqi-Turkish pact of February 24. Two days thereafter, on April 6, the new Anglo-Iraqi agreement came into effect.