Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

413. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 16, 1955¹

Washington, November 16, 1955

SUBJECT

• Israeli Request to Purchase Arms

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Acting Secretary of State
  • G—Mr.Robert Murphy
  • NEA—Mr.George V. Allen
• Israel
  • Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador
  • Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister
  • Col Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché

Ambassador Eban said he had called in pursuance of a conversation between Foreign Minister Sharett and Secretary of State Dulles in Geneva regarding arms.² He emphasized that the Israeli Government had had no intention whatever of expending its resources for any considerable arms purchases until a few months ago, when themassive imbalance being created by the Czech-Egyptian arms deal became known. He said the Israeli request for arms sprangdirectly from that imbalance. He was fearful that other Arab states might also obtain large quantities of arms from the Soviet bloc and cited the continued threats and hostile acts against Israel by its Arab neighbors as the basis for the dire apprehensions of the Israeli people.

Ambassador Eban said that Israel, like the United States, wanted to be strong militarily in order toprevent aggression.

The Ambassador explained that Israel came to the United States because the 1950 Tripartite Declaration led his Government to believe that it could expect United States help. (His succeeding formal presentation followed almost verbally the attached note to the Secretary of State.³

Mr.Hoover’s reply was in accordance with the attached talking paper⁴ and draft press release.⁵ He emphasized the statement by President Eisenhower on November 9 and the statement of the Secretary of State on August 26, and United States support for the current proposals and efforts of General Burns, United Nations Chief of Staff in Palestine. He said that the State Department and other appropriate United States agencies would examine the Israeli request and that we would have to take into consideration the other governments which signed the Tripartite Declaration.

Ambassador Eban expressed appreciation for this clarification of the principles which would govern the United States in its examination of his Government’s request, which, he felt, was fully in accord with President Eisenhower’s statement opposing an arms race and stating that arms would be accorded for self-defense. He emphasized that the Israeli request for arms wassolely for defensive purposes. He asked that the Israeli list of arms be kept strictly confidential, for security reasons. As regards General Burns’ proposals, he said the General was already fully aware of his Government’s approval. The only reason General Burns had not been authorized to inform the Egyptian Government of this approval was a technical one, i.e., the Egyptians would have refused if they felt Israel had already agreed.

Mr.Allen asked whether the Israeli Government would agree to a demarcation of the entire El Auja demilitarized zone, pointing out that if United Nations observers are to certify the absence of military installations and personnel in the zone, they would need to know the precise boundaries of the zone on all sides. Mr.Eban said he would not wish to go beyond the Burns proposals⁶ at this time since, if additional proposals were added, his Government might wish to ask, for example, that the area in Sinai beyond which Egypt is forbidden by the armistice to maintain troops and installations should also be demarcated.

Referring to Mr.Hoover’s references to a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, Mr.Eban spoke in strong opposition to the recent Mansion House speech of Prime Minister Eden. He said that references had often been made for the necessity for secret diplomacy when matters such as frontiers were to be discussed. Consequently, he had been shocked by Mr.Eden’s proposals regarding frontiers made from the most public platform possible. Even more important, Israeli objections were to the substance of Mr.Eden’s reference to the United Nations resolutions. Speaking frankly, he did not think the United Kingdom could qualify in any way as a mediator in this question, since the United Kingdom had tried to prevent the creation of Israel from the start and today has numerous and intimate treaty relations with the Arab states. He thought it remarkable that the United Kingdom would now invoke the 1947 resolution when, at the time it was passed, the United Kingdom denounced it bitterly and refused even to permit the United Nations commission to enter Palestine. He said the United States and France were in quite a different position since “you don’t sign up with any Arab state that comes along while leaving Israel out.” He said his Government would be ready at any time any Arab state asked for boundary discussions under the armistice. He spoke in highest terms of the Secretary’s speech of August 26 on the grounds that it did not prejudge the territorial settlement. He felt that the most urgent matter referred to in the Secretary’s speech was the question of compensation for refugees. His Government was ready and anxious to begin discussions on this question promptly.

In answer to a question by Mr.Murphy, Colonel Salmon stated that Israel had no substantial arms purchasing programs in other countries. Mr.Eban referred to press reports that Israel was obtaining Mystére fighter planes from France and said that not one single Mystére had been obtained. He did not know what possibility there might be for obtaining Mystéres.

As regards financing, Mr.Eban referred again to the statement in the note that Israel hoped we would extend the lowest possible prices and most liberal credit terms in view of his Government’s difficult economic and financial situation. Mr.Hoover pointed out that the question of financing was a complicated legal one requiring serious examination. In answer to a question, Mr.Eban and Colonel Salmon stated that the Israeli request wasnot contingent upon special financial arrangements being accorded by the United States.

Mr.Shiloah said that Mr.Sharett had pointed out to Mr.Dulles in Geneva that Israel did not know how to fight submarines and would welcome consultations with appropriate United States authorities on this subject. Mr.Hoover remarked that anti-submarine weapons are often under highest security classification.

Mr.Eban terminated the conversation with renewed emphasis on the solemnity and importance of his call on the Acting Secretary, on a subject which his Government regarded as a significant landmark in United States-Israeli relations.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/11–1655. Secret. Drafted by Allen.
2. Reported in Document 371.
3. The note, not attached to the source text, requested approval for Israel’s purchase of arms and equipment, listed on an attachment. It declared that Israel’s decision to expand its military procurement program was due to the “massive influx of Soviet arms into Egypt” under the Czech-Egyptian agreement which would enable Egypt to threaten Israel’s population centers and to extend belligerent practices into the Mediterranean. It argued that in the past, the United States had opposed creation of an arms imbalance which could be used for intimidation or aggression, and it declared that Israel’s proposed arms purchase program was intended “to strengthen Israel’s capacity of legitimate self-defense to the minimal extent compatible with her security.” (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/11–1655)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., 784A.5–MSP/11–1555)
5. No copy of the draft press release has been found in Department of State files. According to a conversation between Willie Morris of the British Embassy and Burdett, however, a Department of State spokesman read a statement to the press after the conclusion of the Hoover–Eban conversation. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–1655)
6. See Documents 376 and 382.