Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

402. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Geneva¹

Washington,November 12, 1955—6 p.m.

Tosec 246. There follows copy of message dated November 10 from British Embassy Cairo to Foreign Office re conversations between British and Egyptians:

“Palestine.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and put to him the points in your two telegrams under reference. He replied as follows:

(a) He told me confidentially that the Egyptian Government welcomed the statement,² and would be prepared to associate themselves with the task of seeking a settlement. He was not prepared to commit himself to saying on what basis this settlement would be, nor would he say that they would necessarily start from the point of the 1947 resolution. He said that the Bernadotte proposals of 1948,³ for example, might be more acceptable to the Arabs as a start. He reiterated the view, which he had previously expressed, that the Arabs would have to have the Negev, including Beersheba, and that they would not accept either Jewish corridors through an Arab Negev, nor Arab corridors through a Jewish Negev. He expected no difficulties over Jerusalem and probably no serious difficulties over the refugees.

(b) They would do their best to see that reactions to the Prime Minister’s speech on the press and radio were not too critical. He said that we must understand that it would be a tactical mistake for the Egyptian press and radio publicly to support the speech. Everybody would suspect that there was some conspiracy with the British, and the chances of making progress would be diminished. They would, however, try and taper off public opposition to a Palestine settlement both in Egypt and the other Arab States, and try to create an atmosphere which would help to lead to a settlement. The Egyptian Government would not issue any statement themselves on the speech, since this would be bad tactics at the moment, and would reduce the chances of working towards a settlement.

(c) They would not be willing to negotiate directly with the Israelis. Any form of negotiation on a multilateral basis which brought in the other Arab States would kill all possibilities of a settlement. They would, however, be prepared to discuss the details of a settlement with ourselves and the Americans, either separately or together, in a way which would not attract notice. As they had said before, the conversations must be extremely confidential and known to those only directly concerned in London, Washington and Cairo;

(d) They would be prepared at the right time to “stick their neck out” more than was prudent for them, as they had in the case of the Jordan waters. For the present, he would do what he could cautiously to improve the reactions of the other Arab States to the Prime Minister’s speech. Incidentally, he wished to tell me, as he had told Mr.Johnston in New York, that they were doing their best to bring the Jordan waters’ scheme to the surface again;

(e) They would exercise the greatest restraint on the borders, and abstain from every kind of provocation.

2. Your instructions arrived just after I had seen Nasser yesterday. He will probably be able to see me on Saturday. I think it better not to press for an earlier interview, particularly as he has to see Mr. Pearson and General Burns tomorrow, and was very tired when I saw him yesterday. Moreover, by Saturday I shall be able to get a more useful reaction from him than if I were to insist on pursuing this with him immediately.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and my American colleague are dining with me in a small party on the 6th at which no other foreigners will be present. Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that this will be a suitable opportunity for an informal tripartite discussion. I have discussed this with my American colleague who also agrees.⁴ I hope that by that time he and I can have instructions from Washington and London which will enable us to take the matter some way further, both as regards method of procedure and on the boundary question. On this latter question we hope that we can have general instructions, which will enable us to try and move towards something more possible than the Beersheba line, without committing Her Majesty’s Government or the United States Government.

4. We both consider that the Minister’s reaction was quite encouraging and that our best chance of getting anywhere is to proceed on the lines which the Egyptians propose, by confidential Anglo-American discussions with them.Nasser’s views may not be the same, but I have heard of a Scripps Howard report of an interview with him, published in today’s American press, which apparently records him as going surprisingly far.”

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 619. Secret. Received at 2:59 a.m., November 13.
2. Reference is to Eden’s Guildhall speech on November 9.
3. For text of suggestions put forward by Count Folke Bernadotte, U.N. Mediator on Palestine, on June 28, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1152–1154. For text of Bernadotte’s report to the U.N. General Assembly of September 16, 1948, which contained revised proposals for a Palestine settlement, see U.N. document A/648; excerpts are printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1401–1406.
4. See Document 416.