Office of the Historian

400. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

Cairo,November 12, 1955—3 p.m.

934. For the Secretary. Have no basis from here to form judgment probability Israelis may act in accordance Department telegram [Page 735] 964.2 While making this reservation clear, told Secretary in Paris it my general feeling chances such Israeli action probably about 50 percent. Also stated I felt time estimate of some persons this stage might be reached in 4 to 6 months excessive, and that if it came probably first 2 months more likely.

We have some doubts that Nasser would topple now without really decisive destruction his forces. It would have been easy during period when he was hesitating about accepting Soviet arms.

It is perhaps worth repeating that if Israel takes such action we believe it will be widely interpreted in Middle East as our response to Soviet arms deal and that Israeli action either suggested or condoned by United States. In such event United States position in Middle East would be virtually untenable. While use of force dreadful to contemplate, believe in end we in all implications clear, American public would criticize us for not doing everything possible including use this ultimate step. Trouble is Israelis would probably feel that they could finish job before we could move. If this the case, and intelligence sources considered good enough, suggest we might consider supplementing warning reference use of force by indication we would close America as any source of supply to Israel, including transfer of capital. This would not be done during just few days of operations but extended to point of lasting detriment (this of course would be extremely difficult to maintain). Another thought is that we might say as far as we concerned she would lose her right to participate as equal in peace settlement. We would work one out with Arabs and use all resources our disposal force her to accept it.

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–1255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:19 p.m. Repeated priority to Geneva.↩
  2. In telegram 964 to Cairo, November 11, repeated for action to Tel Aviv as telegram 340, the Department requested comments on reports to the effect that the Israelis intended to effectuate Nasser’s overthrow by attempting to “drive to Suez across Sinai in endeavor to trap Egyptian forces thereby causing Nasser’s downfall.” (Ibid., 674.84A/11–1155)↩