4. Despatch From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Arab-Israel Settlement
The following comments are submitted by the Embassy in pursuance of the Department’s request transmitted in CA–3378 of November 22, 1954.2
A. General Observations
It has been the Embassy’s observation, based on comments made by Israel leaders to Embassy officers over a period of some months, that the Israel Government itself believes that a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt is a prerequisite to a general Arab-Israel settlement. Prime Minister Sharett recently commented to an Embassy officer that “it may be taken as axiomatic that Egypt is the key to the problem”. Defense Minister Lavon in a conversation with an Embassy officer at the beginning of November said that if Israel could reach an understanding with Egypt “things would rapidly fall into their proper position elsewhere”. He added that Israel had no outstanding problems with Lebanon which was merely waiting for one of the stronger Arab states to set a precedent; Jordan was a mess but could be straightened out by the British if the Egyptian problem were solved; and Syria was so weak and divided internally that it really didn’t constitute such a problem (to Israel) anyway.
Secondly, there is extreme skepticism among Israel Government leaders of the ability of the Nasir regime to survive and, therefore, of its ability or willingness to face up to domestic and Arab League pressures to the extent necessary to negotiate a settlement with Israel on terms acceptable to the latter.
Thirdly, the period of discussion envisaged by the Department, i.e. February–April 1955, is the time period when the Israelis will be entering vigorously into a campaign period leading up to the general elections scheduled for July of this year. It is quite possible that before the end of that period the coalition Government here will have been dissolved and a Government of a quasi-caretaker character established. It does not follow from this contingency that negotiations during that period would prove impossible. It is unlikely, [Page 6] however, that such a caretaker Government would be prepared to present to the Knesset an agreement unless its provisions could be successfully defended as having on balance specific advantages to Israel.
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that from the standpoint of either country much progress could be made in the general atmosphere prevailing today. This would point to the need of a modus vivendi which would permit the establishment and maintenance of a period of relative calm while the United States and United Kingdom were discussing permanent settlement matters with the two parties individually. This observation would point to the conclusion that pending current issues between the two countries which are now occupying such prominence in the press of Egypt and Israel, such as the Bat Galim case, spy trials,3 and recurrent destruction of the Israel pipeline near the Gaza strip, would have to be taken out of the limelight. In order to establish a period of calm it would appear necessary at the same time as an approach is made to Nasir to make an approach to Prime Minister Sharett, explaining to him on a confidential basis the purpose of the exercise, the ultimate objectives we have in mind, and the techniques we plan to use in attaining such goals. This discussion should be accompanied by a request for a commitment from him that Israel would pursue a course of action during the period of discussions designed to assist rather than to retard the course of negotiations. The limits of this course of action might include commitments (a) to permit the Suez Canal and Gulf of Akaba issues to remain dormant; (b) positive support to UNTSO in border matters; (c) restraint on military and police activities along the Gaza strip; and (d) the exercise of unusual restraint in the public statements of Israel leaders regarding Egypt. A comparable list of commitments on the Egyptian side would also appear to be necessary if real progress is to be made. In this connection, Prime Minister Sharett will be under considerable pressure from the more militant members of his Cabinet to show some measure of progress in lessening restrictions on the movement of Israel goods through Suez as a condition precedent to active negotiations. The Bat Galim case in its present status is a handicap to the obtention from Israel of a constructive approach to the problem of Israel-Egyptian relations.
Finally, the Embassy believes that the participation of the British Embassy here in any discussions with the Israel Government will serve a useful purpose. The position of the United Kingdom with [Page 7] the local public and with the Israel Government has been greatly strengthened by the remarks of Foreign Secretary Eden in the House of Commons on November 2, 1954, particularly by his policy statement that the United Kingdom would continue to keep a balance in arms deliveries “as between Israel and the Arab States collectively”. With respect to the question of French participation, the Department is aware of the special problem existing here. The solution suggested of keeping France generally informed but without her active participation would lead to unpredictable results as regards the use the French Mission here might make of the information at its disposal.
B. Specific Comments
[Here follow specific comments on the questions in the reference airgram.]
For the Ambassador:
Counselor of Embassy
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–755. Top Secret; Alpha— Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lawson and White. Copies were sent to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Ankara.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 2.↩
- On December 11, 1954, Egypt’s Supreme Military Tribunal began the trial of 13 persons charged with spying for Israel and attempting to incite insurrection in Egypt. The trial ended on January 5, 1955, but no verdict was announced at that time. Documentation relating to this case is in Department of State Central Files 774.00 and 784A.5274.↩