383. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State1
Secto 145. At tripartite meeting November 2, on Pinay’s request Margerie reviewed French thinking re Middle East.2 He said three Western powers faced with new fact. This is reentry of Russia in Middle East.
He said all French relationships with Arab countries under shadow of events North Africa. While attitude of Arabs in UN and elsewhere often not helpful or friendly, bilateral relationships between France and Arab countries continue on reasonable basis. As example mentioned there never so many Arab students enrolled in French schools in such countries.
He went on say problem is prevent other Arab States from taking same path as Egypt re receiving arms and aid from Soviet bloc. France never thought Baghdad Pact good idea and believe it one principal reason for Russian reentry into Middle East. However Pact was fact which must be accepted and problem is to prevent Arab States from turning to Soviets. France had still powerful influence in Syria and Lebanon. Lebanese fearful of Soviets. While situation Syria not good, French felt with some modest arms shipments from West, Syria could be kept on side of West. French believe Syria, Lebanon, and possibly even Egyptians, prefer receiving arms from France and West rather than Russia.
Margerie said French thought three Western powers should talk to Syrians and Lebanese and offer modest quantity of arms. From discussions with Sharett, French believe Israel would agree modest arms shipments to Lebanon and Syria particularly because Israel wants Syria remain independent and not absorbed by Iraq.
Re Egypt, France would only furnish arms if latter adopted favorable attitude re French North Africa. By favorable attitude he meant Egypt must 1) stop inciting French North African Arabs by Cairo radio; 2) stop training commandos for infiltration North Africa; 3) stop smuggling arms North Africa via Libya. (He mentioned Libyans behaving well since agreement on Fezzan and beginning evacuation French forces from there.)
Re 1950 Declaration, French still believe it good policy because its basis is avoidance of arms race. However it a bit outmoded and [Page 706] possibly three Western powers could expand it not going so far however as to guarantee existing borders of Israel. French also thought General Burns’ proposals on UN action sensible but believe it wiser not to support them by tripartite statement, but by separate démarches to Israel and appropriate Arab States.
In reply to query as to type arms French envisaged for Syria and Lebanon, Margerie said thirteen-ton tanks, some artillery, and mortars. Specifically, about forty such tanks for Syria. He reiterated France convinced with modest shipment arms and French influence, Syrian military could be swung from present dangerous drift to left. In reply question how Syrians would apply for equipment, Margerie vague, indicating Syrians had blocked Francs Paris and also transactions could possibly be financed through “Banque de Liban et Syrie”.
Secretary inquired whether France had pending any arms orders for Israel. Margerie replied affirmatively but said all shipments had been suspended. However position of Israelis difficult, and France believed some defensive weapons such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns should be provided.
Secretary said greatest danger in Arab-Israel situation is that war could start with no one being able determine responsibility. If UN could make some arrangement for demilitarized area around borders of Israel so aggressor could clearly be identified, this would greatly reduce risk of conflict.
Secretary said it important that France,UK, and US coordinate their activities in Middle East area particularly re arms shipments.Macmillan fully agreed and said this important matter of policy. He had impression NEACC not effective in attaining such coordination. It low level committee which some paid little attention. Margerie said it had become simply group where information was exchanged re arms shipments, but often after shipments made.
Macmillan suggested in view gravity situation Middle East, might be well coordinate policy, including arms shipments, through diplomatic channels, with NEACC continuing serve as group which kept records, etc. He added if Arabs got into an arms race they would soon go bankrupt which was one of objectives Soviets, since bankruptcy and economic difficulties would lead to social and political deterioration.
Above meeting ended inconclusively with no conclusions reached on future activities NEACC or means by which policy re arms shipments to Middle East could be coordinated although it generally agreed effective coordination necessary and possibly could best be done through diplomatic channels.
In a later discussion Henri Roux, in charge of Middle East affairs in French Foreign Office, and presently in Geneva for a few [Page 707] days, said he believed chances good of getting Egyptian agreement on three points mentioned above and that French would shortly release shipments of arms Egyptians had ordered and paid for but which French had held up because of Egyptian policies in North Africa.3 Roux indicated French policy currently is to try influence Near East Arabs to cease anti-French policies in North Africa rather than apply sanctions against them. Result appears to be less clearly Israel-oriented French policy in Near East.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:37 p.m. Repeated to Paris and London.↩
- The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Geneva Conference—10/27/55–11/17/55: (1) Memos of Conversation; (2) Intelligence Briefing Notes)↩
- The memorandum of this conversation between Roux and Russell on November 2 is not printed. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)↩