374. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
393. Re Palestine in SC. During meeting with Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) held at British request this noon, it was agreed that we should seek to determine what position of Secretary General and General Burns was on desirability having Council meeting in light of present situation at El Auja. We also discussed problem created by likely injection into any SC debate of Soviet arms deal with Egypt.
At meeting this afternoon with Burns and Hammarskjold present we considered private report in nature of “Program of Action” made by General Burns to Secretary General, text of which contained in immediately following telegram.2
Purpose of “Program of Action” in Secretary General’s words was to seek practical answers to developing situation between Egypt and Israel. Hammarskjold felt solution lay more in direct implementation of this program by Burns with parties supported by vigorous joint démarches by UK, France and US Ambassadors in two capitals. He felt it was hopeless to attempt negotiate in SC since parties would only freeze positions in any public debate.
Secretary General also felt SC meeting now undesirable because, while Egypt might agree to implementation of Burns’ “Program of Action” without insisting that Israel withdraw Kibbutz from DZ, if matter discussed in SC they would most assuredly point out paramilitary character of Kibbutz and demand its withdrawal.
Since Israel would obviously refuse to do this, whole program would fall. He did not rule out, however, possibility of SC action confirming this program of General Burns if in circumstances as they develop this seemed desirable or necessary.
Hammarskjold regards this program as a coordinated approach for which agreement of three governments necessary and no action will be taken on it until comments and concurrence of three governments available.
Hammarskjold envisages that three points made in Burns’ “Program of Action” be put forward essentially as a simultaneous and unified proposal which, however, could be implemented in certain [Page 688] logical steps. He therefore believes that General Burns should proceed from point three, that the old international frontier be demarcated. This idea could be acceptable to Israelis if done by UNTSO, acting alone, provided they silently acquiesced in it and did not openly push their claims, which SYG regards as very weak, for sovereignty over present demilitarized zone up to old international frontier.
Second logical step of program would be point two, i.e., withdrawal by Egypt of checkposts which are now on Israeli side of old frontier line and in DZ. From his talks with Fawzi (Egypt) Hammarskjold believes Egyptians realize that once frontier has been marked by UN, position their checkposts beyond it will be untenable and they can see their way clear to withdrawal.
Thereafter point one of program could be implemented, i.e., withdrawal by Israel of military personnel in excess of Kibbutz inhabitants and civilian police who were present prior to 26 August. General Burns at several points in discussion emphasized strongly necessity of complete and immediate backing of his action with parties by tripartite approaches in capitals.
It was agreed that three delegations would transmit text of “Program of Action” to their governments for instructions. I said we should not decide in principle against having SC meeting nor should we prejudice General Bum’s efforts in implementing his program by premature meeting. Continuing to speak personally I felt it might be desirable to start with General Burns implementing his program. Meanwhile we could jointly consider desirability of SC meeting with attendant publicity if that appeared in the circumstances to be desirable. Hammarskjold said he agreed 100 per cent with this approach. It was understood that Burns would not undertake any action on his program until comments and concurrence of three governments had been received.
Request Department’s comments on suggested plan of action.
- Source: Department or State, Central Files, 674.84A/10–3155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:48 p.m. Transmitted priority to Geneva on November 1 as Tosec 105 and repeated to London and Paris. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 618)↩
- Telegram 394 from USUN, October 31, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 674.84A/10–3155)↩