Office of the Historian

317. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 27, 1955, 9:30 p.m.1

POM(NY) MC–6
New York, September 27, 1955, 9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • US:
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Phleger
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. McCardle
    • Mr. Merchant
  • USSR:
    • Mr. Molotov
    • Mr. Troyanovsky
    • Mr. Sobolev
    • Mr. Malik
    • Mr. Zarubin
    • Mr. Kuznetzov
  • UK:
    • Mr. Macmillan
    • Mr. Hancock
    • Mr. Roger Makins
    • Sir Geoffrey Harrison
    • Sir Anthony Nutting
    • Lord Hood
  • France:
    • M. Pinay
    • M. Couve de Murville
    • M. Sauvagnargues
    • M. Soutou
    • M. Andronikof
    • M. Daridan

Following a discussion on arrangements for the forthcoming Geneva Conference, and on UN membership (both covered by separate memoranda),2 Secretary Dulles asked the other three Foreign Ministers whether there were any other matters they would like to discuss.

Mr.Macmillan said that he would like to raise another question on which his Government took a very serious view. He believed that everyone should be trying to find ways to ease world problems. And in this connection, he felt obliged to say very frankly that his Government was disturbed over recent events which were not calculated to calm difficulties in an important part of the World, but on the contrary, were calculated to increase such difficulties and tensions. He said he referred to the furnishing of Soviet arms to Egypt.One of the problems which was worrying his Government a great deal was that of the growing tension between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries as evidenced by the recent incidents which were symptomatic of danger and tension. Mr.Macmillan said that the UK and certain countries were doing all that was possible to keep developments in the Middle East within tolerable bounds and prevent serious disturbances. In this connection, efforts were being made as a part of that policy to meet legitimate requests from Israel and the Arab countries for arms; but, in meeting these requests, a reasonable balance was being maintained. If Mr.Molotov would allow him to speak very frankly, he must say that UK is very much disturbed to hear of arrangements whereby Egypt would receive very considerable arms from the Soviet Union. The UK felt that any deliveries on the scale which had been reported would increase the arms race between Israel and the Arab countries and lead to demands from other countries for similar increases in armaments. This would, in turn, create a dangerous situation and greatly increase tensions in that part of the World. He said that he would appeal to Mr.Molotov to prevent such increased tension and danger since this would not be compatible with the expressed desire of the Soviet Union to ease tensions. On the contrary, it would lead to additional [Page 531] strain. This was important because when the four Foreign Ministers meet in Geneva late in October, they should meet in an atmosphere conducive to progress and not one of stress. The UK Government felt strongly that the Soviet action in furnishing arms was not compatible with the general détente which they professed to desire. He therefore earnestly hoped that Mr.Molotov would keep this in mind since all the Foreign Ministers wished to meet in Geneva in an atmosphere in keeping with what the four Heads of Government had hoped for.

Mr.Molotov said that perhaps he was not sufficiently prepared to exchange views on this subject but nonetheless he had a few observations to make. He had had a talk with Secretary Dulles recently about this matter.3 He had left Moscow only recently, but up to the time of his departure, “not a single rifle or bullet had been sold to any country in that area”. He did know that certain requests had been made of the Soviet Government and said that the Soviet Government did not refuse to discuss such transactions on a commercial basis. As for the area mentioned by Mr.Macmillan, the Soviet view coincided with that of Mr.Macmillan. The Soviet Government would like relations among such countries not to become more acute. With respect to the question of arms sales, he was not clear as to how it was being posed to him. He said, “We have not been discussing these kinds of matters, but perhaps it would be useful to do so. Do you, Mr.Macmillan, propose that we exchange information on such transactions?” Mr.Macmillan said that any step to preserve a balance would be useful and he would be grateful for anything Mr.Molotov might be able to contribute. He wished only to reaffirm the serious apprehensions of his Government on any steps which would change the balance between the countries in this area and lead to a serious increase of tension.

Mr.Molotov said he was grateful to Mr.Macmillan for his frank observations and would inform his Government.

The Secretary said he would like to add a word. As Mr.Molotov had mentioned, he had had a brief conversation with Mr.Molotov last Tuesday.4 Since then, our information had become more precise. He thought in all candor that he should express his Government’s views on this matter. This was not a theoretical and academic matter as to whether nations should sell arms or exchange information on arms sales. It was a very serious practical matter at this moment. There were in the US millions of peoples of high and low estate who hoped that out of Geneva would come a real improvement in relations between our countries. The Secretary said [Page 532] he thought that he was right in forecasting that, if at this juncture there were large shipments of arms to Egypt, the result would be largely to dissipate all these hopes. It could be argued that this should not happen and that arms shipments were only something that had been done in the past. However, the fact is that whether it is right or wrong, it will produce such a shock.

The Secretary said that in a talk he had with the President late Friday afternoon5 before the latter was stricken6 the President had expressed his deep concern on this matter and said he was planning to write a letter on Saturday to Premier Bulganin. Because of illness, the letter was not written, but the Secretary thought that Premier Bulganin, through Molotov, should know what was in the President’s mind.

Mr.Molotov said that he had little to add.

Mr.Pinay said he would like to associate himself with what Mr.Macmillan and Mr.Dulles had said. He said that France had particular reason to be concerned and believed that the Soviet action was contrary to the “spirit of Geneva”.

Mr.Molotov said that if Mr.Pinay had concluded his remarks he would like to say that he believed that there were “no grounds for any disturbance or concern on this”. So far as he knew, arms deliveries being made by others to countries in the area were considerably larger than in this particular case. He said he had inquired whether the suggestion was to exchange mutual information on such transactions. In any event, he would inform his Government fully of the discussions that had taken place this evening.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 556. Secret. Drafted on September 30. No other drafting information is given on the source text.↩
  2. Not printed; memoranda of conversations covering these subjects areibid.,CF 551.↩
  3. See Document 286.↩
  4. September 20.↩
  5. See Document 303.↩
  6. President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack at about 1:30 a.m. on September 24.↩