311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1
Tedul 2. Following text of first message … dated September 262 mentioned this morning by Under Secretary:
In three and half hour meeting . . . ,Nasr indicated he pleased cooperate . . . “on personal and unofficial basis” to find way out of difficulties which he now realizes will follow Soviet Arms Agreement. Drew line at making outright conciliatory gesture towards immediate future (“deaths Egyptian soldiers too fresh in memories our people”) but agreed to go along with . . . suggestion to issue public statement asserting peaceful intentions and stating desire discuss directly with Secretary Dulles concrete steps to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions. Foil procedure adopted: . . . write statement in terms which would get favorable reception U.S.:Nasr will then do whatever editing he feels is required to make statement palatable Arab world. Upon . . . agreement on final text, enquiry will be made of Department to ascertain that its issuance will have good chance of, at least “softening blow”.
Although Nasr talked at length of his country’s determination, if necessary, to “fight Israeli indefinitely on Guerilla basis with knives, etc.,” he did not appear at first able to recognize and face the magnitude of the damaging consequences certain to follow implementation Soviet arms deal. He later appeared to be quite moved by . . . prognostications (“speaking stricting [strictly] unofficially and as old friend”) of what is in store for him, and wanted make it clear that although he “not a stooge” he yet willing follow our advice to extent such advice made sense to him. (This in spite of damaging effect of A.P. story which arrived during meeting. To be subject separate cable.)3
Although we feel Nasr prepared go considerable length in cooperation . . . , we still somewhat uneasy in that he appears be merely taking our word that his position is difficult and may not be disposed to act from real personal conviction. We convinced, however, that Nasr absolutely sincere in his belief that acquirement of arms was an absolute necessity, not only for his survival but that of his country; that in spite of repeated efforts on his part, U.S. could not or would not give him the kind of deal he needed; that he can [Page 521] withstand any Soviet attempts gain influence over him: He is equally confident he has capability carry to conclusion successful war with Israel “Guerilla basis” and is determined that “Ben Gurion will not dictate foreign policy”. On other hand he has faith in Secretary Dulles and easily accepted suggestion that should he have opportunity of talking directly with Secretary something profitable both sides would be forthcoming.
Our conviction, which fully shared by Byroade and Eric Johnston is that Nasr remains our best, if not our only, hope here.Johnston says flatly that Nasr is only man who can put his water scheme across. Therefore all feel most strongly that we must make every effort mitigate the evil effects of Nasr’s mistake which largely result of concentrating on one problem (the Army and its essentiality to his survival) to the complete exclusion of all others. Pls confirm urgently our feeling that statement of kind suggested would do at leastsome good. So far it seems to us best we can salvage from bad situation. Would welcome any suggestions.
. . . Hope we can have Washington reaction in time to have full discussion with Nasr before departure. End Message