Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

30. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Bangkok,February 24, 1955—midnight.

Secto 13. Following account luncheon conversation between Secretary and Eden on Eden–Nasser talks:

Eden said that [he] was agreeably surprised with friendliness of reception accorded him by Nasser. This was first time he had been in Egypt since conclusion Anglo-Egyptian agreement,² and he had not been sure just how he would be received.Eden was more convinced than ever that Suez Canal base settlement was worth all it had cost. They had discussed Middle East defense problem with Nasser, and General Harding³ had outlined British thinking on Middle East defense strategy.Eden had taken line it was in Egypt’s interest to have Middle East defense based on Caucasus rather than Suez just as in Europe UK wished its defense on Elbe and not the Channel. Everything had gone smoothly with Nasser agreeing with their ideas until Iraqi-Turkish pact came up.Nasser had been completely impervious to all arguments about desirability this treaty. His general attitude was that Egyptian people would never condone Iraqi-Turkish pact and that it was not in best interests Arab cooperation with West. Anglo-Egyptian agreement had been a very good beginning toward Arab-Western cooperation, but Iraqi-Turkish treaty was completely in wrong direction.

Nasser had said that Menderes⁴ had suggested possibility of visiting Cairo, but he,Nasser, did not think it would be good idea unless Menderes would scuttle Turkish-Iraqi treaty.Eden said he told Nasser he felt sure Menderes would not do this and suggested that Nasser should accept treaty as step in right direction and assume leadership in building support for further cooperative defense efforts. His arguments had been to no avail.

Eden believed situation hinged on question of leadership in Arab world which Nasser obviously desired to assume. His opposition to Iraqi-Turkish treaty really stemmed from fact that another Arab nation had taken lead in concluding collective defense arrangement.Eden said he had concluded that while Nasser was bound to cause trouble, Iraqi-Turkish treaty should go ahead as desirable step in Middle East defense arrangements.

Secretary asked how Eden expected trouble from Nasser to be manifested.Eden thought Nasser would denounce treaty at time of signature⁵ and that there would be Egyptian efforts in Iraq to bring about downfall of Neri,⁶ on whom Nasser had centered all his antagonism. In response to Secretary’s further question,Eden said he doubted Egyptians had capacity to be successful in these activities within Iraq.

…Eden said French had also been causing considerable difficulties in regard Iraqi-Turkish pact although French Ambassador London had denied when British raised this with him.Eden thought it might be wise for us to make representations to French to effect that treaty should be encouraged as step in right direction.

Eden said that when he came through Karachi, Mohammed Ali⁷ had discussed Turkish-Iraqi pact. As means of getting over difficulty with Egypt, Mohammed Ali suggested possibility enlarging Turko-Pakistani treaty to include Arab nations as possible means bringing about solution difficult problem.Eden had advised him that, while this might be good idea at later stage, he felt Turkish-Iraqi defense cooperation should not be delayed but moved ahead resolutely.

Subsequently at dinner Mohammed Ali spoke to Secretary about Turkish-Iraqi pact. He said he did not think that Egypt had any right to challenge defensive buildup of the northern tier and felt that the treaty should go ahead. He also spoke of Iranian participation. The Secretary said he had the impression Iran would join as soon as it felt that it could contribute and not be in an inferior position. Ali said that he had the same view.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2455. Secret. Received at 11:27 p.m., February 25. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Baghdad.
2. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base was signed in Cairo on October 19, 1954. For text, see 210UNTS 3.
3. Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
4. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey.
5. Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey and Prime Minister Nuri Said of Iraq signed the Turkish-Iraqi defense pact at Baghdad on February 24. For text, see 233UNTS 199.
6. Presumably reference is to Nuri Said.
7. Prime Minister of Pakistan.