Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

299. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London,September 22, 1955—8 p.m.

1167. From Russell.Deptel 1580,² Cairo’s 528³ and 530⁴ to Department. I have discussed with Shuckburgh today and will discuss with him and Macmillan tomorrow some of implications of Egyptian arms deal with Soviets.Macmillan will wish to discuss question with Secretary at New York Monday or Tuesday.⁵ I am leaving for Washington tomorrow evening if possible, and if not on Saturday, and will report on Foreign Office views.

In interim, following are my tentative analysis and recommendations:

1. Nasser’s view is, and apparently has been, that he would be unwilling to engage in exchange of views with Israel on settlement from what he considers to be a position of weakness and that he will negotiate only after substantial change in balance of power between Egypt and Israel (Cairo telegram 528 to Department).

2. It would be impossible for U.S.–U.K. to cooperate with him in such a sizeable arms build-up in effort eventually to secure his cooperation in efforts toward Israel settlement.

3. Arab-Israel conflict holds great danger of increase in intensity and settlement must remain a primary U.S.–U.K. goal in area. U.S.–U.K. cannot realistically support either Arab countries or Israel in complete disregard of other.

4. Against the background of recently increasing Soviet interest in the Middle East we must regard Egyptian arms deal as a very serious step toward the penetration of the Western position in the Arab World and we must consider all possible steps of preventing Egypt from consummating it. The arrival of Soviet arms with technicians in Cairo, whatever Nasser may say, would lead to a grave threat to the ultimate security of the Suez Canal. Once the Soviets obtained a foothold of this kind in Egypt, similar penetration of other Arab states would be hard to prevent.

5. The U.S. and the United Kingdom Ambassadors in Cairo should be instructed, speaking perhaps in the name of the President and the Prime Minister to make vigorous representations on the following lines:

The proposed arms deal is not just a “commercial transaction”. The evidence is overwhelming that the Soviet Union uses deals of this kind only for the purpose of extending its influence and to gain special status. It would not be possible for the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide arms to Egypt if the Soviet Union were to acquire this position in Egypt. As we have previously informed Nasser, we have anticipated being of assistance to Egypt in many ways. If Egypt is to enter into such arrangements with the Soviet Union we should be obliged to review our entire policy in regard to Egypt. Security considerations alone would make it difficult for us to envisage any sort of cooperation in military matters with a country which was receiving arms from the Soviet Union. Also this would bring Egypt into a position which we feel confident she would not wish for. Insofar as Egypt’s power relationship with Israel is concerned, we believe that any effort by Egypt to change the balance of power as a pre-condition of negotiating a Palestine settlement would result only in a great increase of armaments on both sides, without any improvement of Egypt’s relative position, and a consequent increase of dangerous tensions in the area. If Nasser fears to negotiate with Israel from what he believes to be a position of relative weakness we can assure him that if he is willing to negotiate a settlement which we believe sound safeguard Egypt’s vital interests, we would be prepared to exert U.S. and United Kingdom influence on behalf of such a settlement. We would be prepared to discuss with him what the terms of such a settlement would be.Nasser has said to us on many occasions, and we thoroughly believe, that he desires to associate Egypt with the Free World. We believe that the considerations which have led him to contemplate a policy divergent from that are not substantial and we earnestly hope that he will discuss with us whether steps such as we have just suggested cannot be taken to accomplish at one and the same time his object of building an increasingly strong Egypt and measures designed to relax the tensions in the area.

Foster

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2255. Top Secret;Niact; Alpha. Received at 9:07 p.m. Repeated niact to Cairo.
2. The Department informed Russell of the imminence of the Soviet-Egyptian arms sale agreement and observed that, “If sale materializes our ability cooperate with Egypt and Alpha tactics inevitably will be affected. You may wish discuss with UK.” (Telegram 1580 to London, September 21;ibid., 684A.86/9–2155)
3. Document 293.
4. Byroade on September 22 reported in telegram 530 that Nasser had told Ambassador Hussein on September 21 that the Soviet Union had offered “Egypt a formal guarantee of her borders if US made a security guarantee with Israel.Nasser told Hussein he had replied to Russian Ambassador that he did not wish discuss such matters.” (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–2255)
5. September 26 or 27.