Office of the Historian

28. Telegram From Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State1

Rome,February 24, 1955—5 p.m.

3068.Johnston number 10. Negotiations Israel frankly disappointing.2 In three days strenuous discussions I was able extract preliminary possible statement on water division and use Tiberias which is probably inadequate on both points so far as possible Arab acceptance concerned.

On water division we required minimum 131MCM of Jordan River water to meet Arab adjustment 520MCM from river. Israel offered guarantee 50 unconditionally at JX plus additional 50 recoverable by Israel if adequate wells supplies developed in Jordan. While Jordan would have prior claim to second 50 conditions imposed by Israel relating to recoverability would in my judgment virtually preclude chance obtaining Arab assent.

Re Tiberias Israel position improved somewhat from earlier insistence to storage Yarmuk water in Lake. Now prepared to accept subject to certain conditions which probably but not certainly can be met. Tiberias question deeply involved politically and probably figures more importantly in Israel thinking than quantities.

[Page 69]

Re supervision Israel reiterated insistence on minimum possible since present trend is toward division formally leaving control of Jordan and Yarmuk to Israel and Arabs respectively, there is reason believe Israel can be satisfied on this point.

It was evident Sharret, Eshkol and others worried by internal political problems which compel them proceed carefully on Jordan River question. Hard bargaining position may have been effort convince Cabinet their toughness and I was informed privately by Kollek and others that final attitude will be more favorable. It is quite possible that Ministers’ inability to make decision on such vital matter without prior approval Cabinet and Party leadership. If this is the case we may have clearer picture of actual position in few days. I have asked Lawson White comment local political aspects separately.3

In my judgment despite rigidity Israel leadership wants accept proposal ultimately and we have not yet heard their final word.

In discussion Sharret evening prior departure he inquired pointedly about Syrian attitude toward agreement, asking whether I was sure agreement in April would include Syria. In ensuing discussion he said it would be essential for Israel resume work Banat Yacob project not later than June prior Cely [July] elections. Sharret and Eshkol asked my opinion what would happen if this were done without agreement being concluded.

I attempted evade reply, but when pressed said I assume that matter would result Security Council action with Russia vetoing decision to leave matter to Burns. Result of resumption in these circumstances might be to draw Syrian fire with obvious possible consequences. My opinion produced dead silence.4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–2455. Confidential. Received at 3:05 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Baghdad, Brussels, and Jidda.↩
  2. Johnston had discussions with Israeli officials, February 20–22. Summary minutes of these conversations areibid.,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254,Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.↩
  3. See Document 32.↩
  4. On March 1, Ambassador Moose, in telegram 450 from Damascus, commented: “Syrians may still be expected react strongly against unilateral Israeli resumption work Banat Yacub diversion project.” (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/ 3–155)↩