Office of the Historian

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

Washington,September 15, 1955—6:54 p.m.

516. In discussion with Eban here yesterday and in Deptel 195 to Tel Aviv2 we have informed IG that Dept has no blueprint for settlement which it will seek impose on parties. We are looking to IG to formulate most favorable position it can on various issues which can then be used as basis for initial exchange of views between parties. You may inform Fawzi we have done this.

As you know from Alpha papers forwarded you, problems involved more numerous and complex than it was possible to present in Secretary’s speech, an effort to highlight principal issues. At London next week Russell will suggest to FonOff that we draw up list of questions on which IG should prepare its position in order engage in realistic discussion of settlement.3 If UK agrees, list could be given to IG as basis preparation its position. Copy could also be given GOE with suggestion it might establish committee under Nasser’s chairmanship as done during Suez Base negots. He could name trusted subordinates discuss details. (FYI: It would appear to us Mohammed Riad might be desirable deputy to Nasser on committee. Phrase re suitable person or commission in Secretary’s speech quoted para 2Embtel 4424 designed avoid impression we seeking assume principal role. As practical matter US/UK must probably be [Page 473] principal agents this capacity. In London Russell will reach agreement with FonOff on respective US and UK roles in Alpha negots. End FYI)

In any discussions with Nasser and Fawzi you authorized in your discretion make fol points:

1.
Response Arab states in studying Secretary’s proposals carefully has been gratifying. We not asking public statements applauding proposals but only indication Arab govts prepared explore possibility progressing along lines outlined by Secretary.
2.
Response Arab states generally affords Egypt best opportunity exert leadership among Arab states. We hope GOE will take initiative which they appear ready permit Egypt take. Otherwise leadership might fall to other hands. We do not mean Egypt should negotiate for all Arab states but should take initiative to extent of exploring problems directly affecting Egypt. Once Egypt has set course (as in case armistice agreements) other Arab states might be expected follow similar path.
3.
We agree discussions should be conducted in secret and through normal diplomatic channels.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Jernegan and Wilkins; and approved by Russell, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.↩
  2. Document 273.↩
  3. The Department informed London and Cairo as well as Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Paris the day before Russell departed for London on Monday, September 19, “for Alpha discussions with FonOff on steps to be taken in implementation suggestions Secretary’s August 26 speech on Israel-Arab settlement.” (Telegram 1453 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1455)↩
  4. Document 268.↩