Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

268. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,September 11, 1955—6 p.m.

442. Reference Deptel 401 and 402,² have following thoughts regarding future moves Alpha.

(1) Arab States either individually or collectively should be discouraged from ever taking public position on Secretary’s speech. We should return now to highly secret discussions as soon as possible.

(2) Arab-Israeli settlement can most probably never be achieved by treating matter in isolation from other matters in Middle East. If subject isolated settlement takes on too much character of final registration of “defeat” for Arabs by Israel. Matter must therefore be included in over-all package deal of some kind. Of primary importance in this regard will be (a) U.S. policy for Middle East as a whole and (b) use of U.S. economic and military aid resources. Department may wish to refer this connection Embtels 440 and 441³ which admittedly speculative but probably indicative of sweeping nature of over-all deal that will be required as regards (a) above. Since manipulation U.S. policy and resources such a cardinal factor, believe profitable utilization of “suitable person or commission designated by United Nations or by any government or person agreed upon by both sides” as mentioned Deptel 401 probably should be ruled out for time being.

(3) If Egypt is to take desired lead there must be some overt recognition on part of U.S. of Egypt’s position in Middle East. This probably most effectively accomplished through some manipulation our present concept of Middle East defense.

(4) While this philosophy subject to change we would not adopt traditional British approach in this part of world of “little steps for little people” but would rather move forward without delay or quid pro quo in certain fields as form of approach may cause us never to get off the ground to real start. In this connection and without minimizing difficulty for Department would recommend earliest possible action on sale of some military equipment to Egypt. Believe from talks with Jackson, Israel may be aware that increased cooperation and better relations between Egypt and U.S. is prerequisite to real progress on Alpha. The sale of some equipment would not in my opinion reduce our bargaining power but in fact enhance it in view of importance of military here. Even ignoring [garble] importance of moving forward in this field as contained recent cables this Embassy has not diminished in my mind and believe we should proceed if at all possible without hesitation.

(5) Following same philosophy it seems to me Department may wish reconsider that invitation to Nasser visit U.S. on basis recommended by this Embassy should be held up as quid pro quo for proper attitude on Alpha.⁴ Position of U.S. and this Embassy has improved considerably in past two or three months and particularly in view of our recent help during Gaza troubles. My own feeling is now is time to push forward wherever we can set best possible stage for Alpha—which is project of much importance probably cannot be attained without some risk and without criticism in some quarters.

(6) Feel Nasser will have difficulty with Trieste approach at least in early stages and that matter better be handled with him direct with such assist as we can get from Fawzi. In this connection there seems to be an inclination on part Trevelyan (although he does not insist) as with Stevenson to want to work towards actual joint and simultaneous conversations with Nasser. Have told Trevelyan my opinion mechanics of this most difficult and do not see how it could be done without causing great speculation as to subject matter such joint démarches. Feel it far better as matter of principle we work towards same ends separately. Have feeling British Foreign Office may not like this but hope Department will agree that we should avoid such approaches here on local level as long as possible after which time Department might wish to take up matter with Foreign Office. Am thinking somewhat of our experience on Iranian problem when that problem in early stages. If we ever get to actual drafting stage perhaps such an arrangement might work.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 10:48 p.m.
2. Documents 238 and 239.
3. Neither printed.
4. Byroade reported on September 1 that Fawzi had raised the question of Nasser’s visiting the United States. See Document 250.