266. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
236.Herzog, Chief American Division Foreign Ministry, called at Embassy today to discuss press report from Paris that Security Council was to be convened to consider Gaza situation. He repeated GOI views this subject as transmitted Embtel 230.2 In reply to inquiry as to what alternatives GOI had in mind as a means of getting off dead center problem adequate border controls,Herzog said that Foreign Ministry had concluded GOE’s previous adamant attitude in Gaza talks arose (a) from Nasser’s misplaced confidence in Gohar and (b) more importantly, from reluctance of GOE to appear before Arab world as cooperating with Israel. He said Foreign Ministry had arrived at conclusion that it had been a mistake to hold these talks in full public view and to publicize them.GOI therefore had arrived at conclusion that best procedure in future was to conduct secret negotiations probably through Burns with intermediary to shuffle back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem.
Embassy comment: From comments Lourie and Herzog it appears that GOI is at long last learning lesson that road to progress in ironing out difficulties with Arab States does not lie in conduct of [Page 456] propaganda battles. Secondly, although unmentioned by either Lourie or Herzog, it is believed GOI has concluded that its condemnation by SC for Khan Yunis is too high a price to pay for parallel SC condemnation Egypt for mine laying and homicide squad activities.
Of possible interest is opinion of Elmore Jackson, who has had much recent and intimate contact with very high level Egyptians and Israelis. He informed me today he is convinced that sense of restraint and desire to eliminate Gaza border troubles very much more evident both sides. He is likewise convinced neither side desires SC meeting.
He claims:Nasser, although unwilling re-engage in Gaza talks at this time will in lieu Gaza talks work through General Burns on all armistice matters, thus possibly meeting GOI procedure mentioned above as alternative to SC meeting;Nasser gave him definite assurance he would agree to erection of barriers “at certain points on line” thus retreating from previous position, expressed hope some physical separation military forces two countries could be used to remove major source of incidents on border; and in other ways indicated real interest in eliminating tension.
He equally if not more impressed with present genuine desire Sharett and Ben Gurion for border quiet. He cited fact that Khan Yunis raid, originally scheduled for night August 29 called off on receipt news Nasser’s conciliatory attitude as reported that evening by Jackson. Orders were countermanded although some Israel units had crossed over border. Spectacular murderous action by Egyptian saboteurs deep in Israel brought Israel raid on Khan Yunis later in week.3
In view new evidence Egypt–Israel attitudes Jackson feels SC meeting with attendant publicity might well eliminate possibilities effective quiet approach to problems.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–755. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:33 a.m., September 8. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris,USUN, and Jerusalem.↩
- The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on September 6 in telegram 230 that a senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official had informed the Embassy Counselor that day that Israel “believed SC consideration Gaza situation at this time was most inadvisable”, on the grounds that 1) a debate there would engender increased bitterness on both the Arab and Israeli sides, and 2) would especially influence Arab public opinion adversely, thus jeopardizing further the attainment of the Johnston mission objectives. (Ibid., 674.84A/9–655)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 251.↩