264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 6, 19551
SUBJECT
- Preliminary Israel Reaction to Secretary’s Policy Statement of August 26, 1955
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
- NEA—Mr.Allen
- NE—Mr.Bergus
Mr.Eban stated that recent events had been so turbulent (he was referring to the Gaza border situation), that it had been hard for the Israelis to concentrate their minds on the Secretary’s policy statement of August 26. The Ambassador wished to make some preliminary observations, however, which would be followed up by a conversation between the Israel Prime Minister and Mr.Lawson in Israel. The Israel Government might also address a written memorandum to the U.S. Government in which concrete questions as to certain details of the Secretary’s speech would be raised.
Mr.Eban said that the speech had impressed Israel as a serious act of public statesmanship. Israel was aware of the impressive reverberations of the speech throughout the world. Mr.Eban saw in the speech that the positions of Israel and the U.S. were drawing closer together. Both countries envisaged an Israel living at peace with her neighbors. The concept of perpetual hostility and boycott had been repudiated. The most important single theme of the speech [Page 452] had been the effect of a U.S. treaty arrangement. The role of such an arrangement in creating conditions of peace and stability had been impressively described.
It had been dispiriting for the Israelis to pass to the paragraph dealing with the frontiers. It was unfortunate that a U.S. security guarantee had apparently been linked to changes in the frontiers. This contingency was so remote as not to come within the bounds of feasibility. The statement might therefore contain a “built-in deadlock.”
Mr.Dulles statement did not place full value on Israel’s present frontiers. Although these frontiers were based on military history, they had endured for seven years. Israel regarded them with an impulse of cherished possession, the Arabs had come to accept them, albeit grudgingly. These frontiers were real, while “agreed frontiers” were intangible. The armistice agreements provided that the demarcation lines could be changed by mutual agreement. In seven years, neither party had invoked these provisions. This amounted to Arab recognition of the frontiers. The United States had entered into treaty arrangements with Germany and the Republic of Korea which in effect guaranteed frontiers no more fixed in their nature than Israel’s.
Israel wondered if the U.S. had any specific thoughts about possible frontier adjustments. The problem of land communication among the Arab states was unimportant. Israel would not give up the Negev in whole or in part. In any event the normal communications between Egypt and the other Arab states had always been across the north of Israel. Israel was willing to consider transit arrangements, so the solution of the Arab communication problem lay in an adjustment of the Arab attitude toward Israel, rather than in adjustments of the frontiers. Did the U.S. feel that there was a “physical case” for frontier adjustments? Israel felt that border tension arose not from the shape of the frontiers but from Arab relations with Israel. There was no inherent tension in the situation.
Israel suggested that this problem be separated from the question of a security treaty. Israel was willing to discuss frontier adjustments with Arabs but felt that it should not be made an obstacle to a security guarantee. In such discussions, Israel would have claims of her own to put forward.
Israel had been impressed by the offer of a U.S. loan to finance compensation to the Arab refugees. In due course the Israelis would be placing a specific plan in the hands of the U.S. Government. Israel emphasized the need that compensation paid should be used for the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab states. Mr.Eban assumed that the problems of the Arab blockade and boycott had [Page 453] been included in the Secretary’s reference to “other questions, largely economic.”
Mr.Allen said that he welcomed the Israel Government’s analysis which showed sympathetic study and consideration of the Secretary’s policy statement. He was not surprised by the restatement of Israel’s desire to obtain a U.S. security guarantee as a first priority. This was probably the major difference between the U.S. and Israel: Israel felt the need for an early U.S. guarantee to prove to the Arabs that Israel was here to stay. The U.S. felt that it would be preferable to work toward our mutual objectives of peace and stability by obtaining Arab agreement rather than cramming a solution down their throats. He emphasized that the Secretary had mentioned “agreed frontiers”; Israel should not assume that all adjustments would have to be at her expense.
The Ambassador welcomed this observation, but asked if the U.S. Government had excluded the possibility of a security guarantee with Israel based on Israel’s present frontiers. Mr.Allen replied that the Secretary was acting on the expectation that progress could be achieved along the lines he had proposed and was concentrating on the success rather than the failure of the policy which he had outlined. Mr.Allen pointed out that the Secretary did not intend to “sit on his hands” in this matter. The speech had not been an end in itself.
Mr.Allen asked if the Ambassador had any comment on the subject of repatriation. Mr.Eban replied that Israel liked the Secretary’s emphasis on resettlement. Mr.Eban felt that the U.S. and Israel might disagree on what might be “the maximum extent feasible” for repatriation.
In a personal and informal exchange of views which followed, Mr.Eban hinted that Israel might be willing to accept Gaza along with its 70,000 indigenous inhabitants. He did not feel that Israel would accept the 200,000 refugees presently encamped there. Mr.Allen said he hoped the day might come when Arabs could live in Israel as fully accepted citizens and Jews could live in the Arab states in like status. Mr.Eban concurred but emphasized that Israel could not cast off its roots in Jewish tradition and Hebrew civilization. He thought, however, that the concept of the secular state would triumph both in Israel and the Arab states.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–755. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on September 7. In telegram 179 to Tel Aviv, September 6,Bergus and Allen summarized this conversation and indicated that it had occurred on the morning of September 6. (Ibid., 684.86/9–655)↩