Office of the Historian

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1

Tel Aviv,August 26, 1955—9 p.m.

169. Amman for Johnston.2 With reference to highly sensitive and critical situation which has developed in Gaza Strip during past 24 hours (Embassy telegrams 161,3 162,4 163,5 et cetera), Director, US Division Foreign Ministry,6 today conveyed urgent message to me from Prime Minister.Sharett requested US Government to make clear to GOE that Egypt cannot do such things as its military forces are now doing with impunity and expect pressure by the US Government on Israel to prevent reaction. Parenthetically, it should be noted that this statement is in complete accord with tenor of remarks Sharett has made to me recently whenever Gaza Strip [Page 401] problem has been discussed. Two days ago he expressed with some agitation his surprise over Egyptian forces attack on IDF Patrol (Embassy telegram 1357) and he stated emphatically, “Nasser feels he can make all sorts of trouble on the Gaza border and can get away with it by counting on strong US pressures on Israel”.Sharett made no reply to my comment that if Nasser has so much confidence in US pressures exerted on GOI, it seemed unlikely that he would refer so frequently to his fear of IDF action in Gaza. However, there was no question in my mind but that he wished to underscore his opinion that US warnings to Israel were operating as an effective screen behind which Egypt’s activities were undertaken.

Although Sharett’s message to me, coupled with his previous comments to me, may constitute a warning to Egypt, they may also be designed to establish a rationale for a more militant policy towards Egypt based on a governmental decision already made.

It has been my consistent view that there are two essential elements required prior to any drastic retaliation by GOI. These are:

(1)
Fatalities incurred as a result of border activity, and
(2)
Belief by GOI of clear Egyptian Government participation in border incidents.

We have no evidence that GOI will respond immediately to latest Egyptian incursions but it is apparent that GOI will regard their continuation as evidence bad GOE intentions border situation and will respond by more militant measures. Nor have we evidence of military activity which points to retaliatory measures of unusual character.

Lawson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2655. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:38 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, London, Paris, Beirut, and Damascus.↩
  2. Johnston arrived in Amman on August 24.↩
  3. The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported earlier that morning in telegram 161 on three incidents that had occurred within the previous 24 hours along the Egyptian-Israeli border: at 9:30 p.m. the previous evening, the civilian commander of Kibbutz Erez was ambushed in his jeep at the Erz-Yad-Mordecai crossroads and was dying of his wounds; a well was blown up during the night at Mekarat near Niram; and at 6 a.m. that morning, Egyptian troops crossed the frontier at Tel-Achmar and attacked fixed Israeli positions. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2655)↩
  4. The Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department in telegram 162 that the Israelis confirmed that they had sustained casualties as a result of these three actions, including a number of soldiers killed. (Ibid.)↩
  5. Not printed. (Ibid., 683.84A/8–2655)↩
  6. Yaacov Herzog.↩
  7. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2255) See footnote 2, Document 217.↩