204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
324. We informally advised by IBRD that both engineering and economic reports on High Aswan Dam now prepared for management consideration early date with recommendations GOE be invited [Page 372] further discussions over-all problems of financing and organization connected with project.One of major remaining problems is absence Egyptian Sudanese agreement on division Nile waters.
We believe US and UK should make strong effort secure Egyptian-Sudanese agreement.Fawzi requested Secretary for assistance during visit here. Best chance success offered by agreement in principle on political level leaving in abeyance to maximum extent complicated technical problems. Latter could be resolved subsequently perhaps through assistance international commission of experts. Agreement should provide Egypt sufficient water to make High Aswan Dam feasible about 12MCM. Consequently necessary obtain Sudanese acceptance in general Egypt proposal for 50–50 division present surplus water after deduction evaporation loss at Aswan.
Embassy London requested approach foreign office outline our views and seek British cooperation in demarche to Sudanese.2 Embassy should state we concur UK policy avoiding friction with Egypt over Sudan London 6383 and believe steps suggested would calm situation and demonstrate to RCC,UK and US desire assist Egypt. Because status of Sudan British might make main effort through Governor General.USLO Khartoum could make informal representations Azhari.
Comments requested from Khartoum4 and Cairo.5 Do not inform Egyptian and Sudanese governments in absence of further instructions.
Pouching additional explanatory information.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/8–2055. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London and Khartoum, and pouched to Addis Ababa and Nairobi.↩
- The Embassy in London reported in part on August 22 that it had approached the Foreign Office about making a joint démarche to the Sudanese. Although the preliminary British response was unfavorable, Foreign Office officials pledged to study the question thoroughly before replying to the Embassy proposal. (Telegram 667;ibid., 645W.74322/8–2255)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 745W.00/8–1955)↩
- The U.S. Liaison Office at Khartoum recommended on August 23 that, given the present state of tension that existed between the Sudan and Egypt, the United States should not make any demarche to the Sudanese at that time. Any U.S. initiative which was “based on Egyptian aspirations in the Sudan [would be] taken as indication of non-neutral position at this critical stage of self-determination.” (Telegram 34;ibid, 645W.74322/8–2355)↩
- The Embassy in Cairo on August 22 reported its concurrence with the Department’s position. (Telegram 279;ibid., 645W.74322/8–2255)↩
- Reference is to circular airgram 1631, August 25, which was sent to London, Cairo, and Khartoum and repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi. (Ibid., 645W.74322/ 8–2555)↩