Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,July 27, 1955—2 p.m.

146. For Allen. Invite your attention Embdes 95 July 20² evaluating Egyptian-Soviet bloc relations and describing Soviet capabilities capitalize on important points at issue between US and Egypt.

While Nasser continues follow anti-Communist line on domestic front we must recognize danger to US objectives arising from Soviet ability present program of parallel action with Egyptians on several important issues of foreign policy and fact that more experienced men than Nasser and his advisors have been beguiled into opening road for Communist subversion by less tempting prospects than those offered Egypt by Soviet. Despite increase of moral prestige which we believe has accrued to US as result of apparent sincerity US conduct at Geneva Conference, reduction of international tension which should ensue may be expected facilitate Soviet efforts encourage this regime believe it can safely pursue course of expanding cooperation with Cominform bloc.

Only US has the capability of checking growing Soviet influence this area and this can only be accomplished through a coordinated positive program designed convince the Egyptian Government that despite numerous issues in which our short term objectives do not coincide close cooperation with the US and other Western powers offers Egypt maximum opportunity of achieving its long-run political, economic and social objectives.

Embassy has forwarded individual recommendations covering some of the most important elements which should be included in such a program. Am encouraged by proposed policy line pertaining ESS and Turk-Iraqi Pact (Deptel 107 July 15³) which should somewhat reduce Nasser’s fears that US objectives this area would result in isolation of Egypt. Forthcoming US decision regarding sale military equipment may be of decisive importance. Our ability convince Egyptians of our long-run sympathetic and effective interest in economic cooperation will be affected by US cotton policy.

From long term point of view project for high dam at Aswan can potentially be developed into single most important factor influencing Egyptian economy during latter half this century a development which might well have correspondingly important implications in creating atmosphere conducive to greater political stability. It seems therefore important that it be made evident in IBRD consideration this matter that US has sympathetic interest in contributing towards progress this project.

We may be able follow with specific recommendations on subject Egyptian-Sudan relations in a subsequent despatch.

While fully realize complexities which make early action difficult, believe we should do our utmost in view situation outlined Embdes 95 to take some constructive move in our relations with Egypt. If we do not, present “drift” will surely continue with potentially dangerous results which I believe in end will surely affect more of Middle East area than Egypt alone.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.74/7–2755. Secret. Received at 4:26 p.m.
2. Not printed (Ibid., 661.74/7–2055)
3. In this telegram, the Department informed the Embassy that the United States supported, encouraged, and welcomed the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, but that, at the present time, the United States was not contemplating adherence to it. Conversely, the Department believed that “Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian pact will serve no useful purpose since it does not contain necessary elements area defense.” (Ibid., 780.5/7–1555)