Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

172. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, July 27, 1955¹

Washington, July 27, 1955

SUBJECT

• Meeting on OSP in UK of Centurion Tanks for Iraq

REFERENCE

• Memorandum from Dillon Anderson of July 26, 1955²

A meeting presided over by Mr.Hoover and including representatives of Defense and CIA considered on July 27 the British request that we provide Iraq with Centurion tanks by off-shore procurement in the UK. The meeting concluded that for the reasons given below we should not accede to the British request.

A. Political

1. Adverse effect on the Arab-Israel problem of supplying tanks to Iraq. It was recalled that assurances had been given to Israel’s supporters, to Israel, and to Congressional leaders that no heavy equipment was being programmed for Iraq at this time.

2. Establishment of a precedent which was likely to provoke similar requests from other countries. In particular, Saudi Arabia would have additional grounds for pressing a demand for Centurions or their equivalent.

3. The adverse effect upon other Arab states of off-shore procuring Centurions for Iraq only. Egypt especially might be encouraged to turn to the USSR for tanks.

4. Iraq’s concern that US support for the Turk-Iraq Pact has diminished could be offset adequately by informing Nuri of our intention to establish close liaison with the Pact organization and to adhere when an Israel-Arab accommodation was reached. The Secretary gave Mr.Macmillan in Geneva assurances that we would so inform Nuri.

5. Contrary to the implications of Eden’s memorandum to the President,³ Iraq signed the Turk-Iraq Pact in its own self-interest. Among the important benefits accruing to Iraq may be mentioned: an increase in her security against Communism, revision of her treaty with the UK, and the prestige accruing from her seizure of area leadership in defense matters.

6. Iraq has indicated to us a preference for US equipment, and has complained that the Centurions previously furnished by the UK were obsolete.

B. Military

1. Our current appreciation concludes that in the event of a major war, the UK would not be in a position to supply equipment or spare parts to the Middle East.

2. The Turkish, Iranian and Pakistan forces are being supplied with US equipment. Since, in the event of hostilities, Iraqi troops would be grouped with forces from these contiguous countries as well as forces from Britain and Jordan, the logistical problems would not be simplified appreciably by providing Iraq with British equipment.

C. Political Military Factors

1. In the FY 50–54 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the US has programmed arms and equipment for Iraq to the extent of $10.9 million. There were no additional funds proposed for Iraq in 1955. Out of the total program for Iraq toward the equipment of two infantry divisions, the items currently scheduled are: vehicles, engineering equipment, supplies and artillery. No mention was made of tanks in the initial program, and no tanks were called for in the division T/O & Es. Out of the total program, $372,000 in scout cars, $850,000 in anti-aircraft artillery, $1,290,000 in artillery pieces, and $1,500,000 in ammunition (totalling $4,100,000) are planned for OSP in the UK. The UK is able to provide only $3.9 million of this total. Thus, out of the total program of $10.9 million, approximately 30% of this total would be off-shore procured in the UK.

It should be noted that the world-wide mutual defense assistance programs for FY 1950 through 1955 are presently unfunded in the amount of approximately $500 million and the MDA losses under Section 1311 of the Appropriation Act of 1954⁴ result in an additional shortage of $228 million. From this it can be readily seen that any provisions for tanks to Iraq in the MDA Program for the fiscal year 1956 would have to be accomplished at the expense of other priority items in the existing MDA Programs for Iraq or higher priority programs for other countries. It is believed that US military objectives in Iraq are not sufficient to justify a higher priority than those defined for other countries of the area, nor to validate an additional request to Congress for funds to finance US or Centurion tanks for Iraq, as grant aid.

The current programmed and planned programs for furnishing military end items through FY 1956 to Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan amount to $1.3 billion. No information is available as to United Kingdom programmed and planned expenditures during this period, but these are understood to be nominal.

2. Difficulties might be expected with Congress on the general principle of off-shore procurement in the UK for Middle Eastern countries. The Congressional attitude would be affected by sensitivity over the relation to the Israel problem.

3. The establishment of a ratio between equipment sold by the UK and off-shore procured by the US, particularly the 7-to-l ratio suggested by the UK, would set an undesirable pattern. The US might find itself confronted by demands that the same ratio be applied to other countries.

1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NEA Files. Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 5. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. Supra.
3. See Document 161.
4. Not further identified.