Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

13. Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington , February 2, 1955 .

SUBJECT

• Discussions with Shuckburgh

Attached is the final summary of points of agreement reached on an ad referendum basis in the discussions with Mr. Shuckburgh during the past ten days. I would like to obtain your comments and to discuss projected next steps with you when you have a few minutes.²

It is presently planned to resume the discussions in London around the last week in February.

F.H.R.

[Attachment]

POINTS OF AGREEMENT IN DISCUSSION ON ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

I. General

1. The present is as favorable a time as is likely to arise in the foreseeable future for an attempt to achieve a settlement of the dispute between the Arab states and Israel.

2. An attempt at a general settlement will allow us to present a balanced set of proposals which might permit us to dispose of some problems, such as boundaries which are resistant to solution in isolation.

3. An effort to reach a general settlement should therefore be made soon; but this should not interfere with attempts being made to solve the problems of Jordan Valley development.

4. The method which offers the best chance of success and involves the least risk is that the United States and United Kingdom Governments should work out the general terms of a reasonable settlement and then by separate discussion with the parties concerned, and if possible through direct talks between them, attempt to get them to agree to the settlement or to an agreed variation of it.

II. Method and Timing of the Approach to the Parties

1. The first approach should be made to Nasser by Sir Anthony Eden on his way through Cairo. It would be left to Eden’s discretion to determine how fully he would develop the subject. If Nasser’s reaction warrants, he could give him a general idea of U.S.–U.K. thinking, but not reveal the existence of a plan. Eden would endeavor to ascertain what steps Nasser is willing to take, what role he is willing to play with respect to the other Arab states and how Nasser believes the U.S. and U.K. should approach the other Arab states. Eden would emphasize the confidential nature of his discussions.

2. The exact nature of the next step would depend upon the results achieved under 1. It will probably be necessary to follow up the Eden–Nasser conversations by developing further the substance of the proposals. If Nasser indicates a desire to proceed immediately, an officer could be sent from the State Department for this purpose. Otherwise the discussions could be carried on by Ambassador Byroade. In view of Mr. Eden’s first approach Ambassador Byroade could raise the matter shortly after his arrival. (Should the Johnston discussions still be in progress at the time of Mr. Eden’s arrival in Cairo, the extent of his discussions with Nasser would have to take into account the possible effects on the Johnston Mission.)

3. The U.K. would outline our intentions to Jordan. This approach is necessary prior to discussions with Israel because of the special treaty relationship between the U.K. and Jordan.

4. Indication of the intentions of the U.K. and the U.S. would be given to France and Turkey simultaneously with the approach to Jordan and before the approach to Israel.

5. As soon as possible after stage 4 above, the nature of a general settlement would be discussed in detail with Israel. We would indicate that Nasser was prepared to consider a settlement and that we have drawn up as a basis for discussion a set of ideas which we consider offers prospect of progress toward a settlement. We would state that if Israel is ready to pursue discussions on this basis, we were prepared to continue our efforts. If it should be necessary, we would make clear to Israel the effects of a refusal on her part to cooperate, mentioning particularly that under such circumstances we would be unable to extend the security guarantee she has requested, and that she would have to bear the onus for failure of our efforts to progress toward peace.

6. The approach to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq would be determined in the light of the discussions with Egypt.

. . . . . . .

8. It is essential that we retain the utmost flexibility and endeavor to maintain secrecy. We must always be ready to exploit quickly any unexpected opportunity for progress. Each step should be taken cautiously; and in the early stage of the negotiations we should avoid actions which might commit us more deeply than necessary to formal support for a rigid plan.

III. Inducements and Psychological Factors

1. The terms of the settlement itself will contain inducements to the parties, but these will probably be insufficient to overcome the Arabs’ resistance to any settlement and Israel’s reluctance to make the concessions required of her. Outside inducements will therefore be necessary: e.g., military and economic aid, and security guarantee.

2. Since no Arab state is likely to participate in a settlement unless it knows that Egypt is sympathetic, Egyptian cooperation is of first importance in any attempt at a settlement. We shall therefore need to offer inducements to Egypt. The following are the main possibilities:—

a. The flattery implied in the fact that we have chosen to consult Nasser first and cannot get on without him.

b. The suggestion that if Egypt will take the lead in solving this problem it will eventually strengthen her position in the Middle East and enable her to play a more important role in cooperation with the West. The solution of the Palestine problem will eliminate a major impediment to such cooperation.

c. Military assistance, the extent and conditions of which will in any case depend on the state of the relations between Israel and the Arab states.

d. The prospect of support for Colonel Nasser’s plans for the future of Egypt.

e. Specific offers of economic aid, for example, on the High Aswan Dam project.

f. The offer of a security guarantee.

3. Inducements to Israel include:—

a. A security guarantee.

b. Elimination of factors creating tension between Israel and her neighbors.

c. Removal of Suez Canal restrictions. Termination of the secondary boycott.

d. Continued U.S.–U.K. interest in Israel’s economic future.

. . . . . . .

f. Military assistance.

g. Brighter prospects for Israel’s association in area defense arrangements.

IV. Elements of Settlement

A. Territorial Adjustments.

1. Israel must make concessions. The Arabs will not reconcile themselves to her present boundaries. But we cannot expect large transfers of territory: the concessions will be partly symbolic and partly designed to produce a frontier which could last with a minimum of friction.

2. We cannot make final recommendations on the North Jordan Valley and Lake Tiberias area until the results of Mr. Johnston’s mission are clear. . . .

3. The No Man’s Land areas between Israel and Jordan should be divided. The aim should be that most of the territory should go to Jordan but the question of awarding the tip of the Latrun salient to Israel to permit the restoration of the old Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road should be studied further.

4. On the Israel-Jordan frontier, Israel would be asked to agree to adjustments based on the principle of reuniting farm lands with Arab agricultural villages. Further study must be given to the possible magnitude of such adjustments and their strategic and economic effect before the United States and United Kingdom can make firm recommendations.

. . . . . . .

6. In the discussions with Egypt, the Egyptians should be asked to comment on disposition of the Gaza Strip. . . .

7. In the southern Negev Israel would be asked to relinquish a small triangle of territory north of Elath. This triangle would have its base on the Israel-Egyptian frontier and its apex on the Israel-Jordan frontier so as to provide over-land communications between Egypt and Jordan. The triangle would be located at a point where the Israel road to Elath from Beersheba and Sodom runs close to the Jordan frontier. At the junction of the Israel north-south road and the Arab east-west road there might have to be some form of international supervision and control.

8. Terms of reference for the study group on this matter are attached.³

B. Refugees

1. Israel would offer to readmit those refugees who wish to return up to a certain figure, say 75,000. This figure might run up to 150,000 if the Gaza Strip were ceded to Israel (see IV, A. 6. above). It would be understood that refugees returning to Israel, would come as Israel citizens.

a. The Israel Government would donate land and UNRWA would finance the development of that land to permit the rehabilitation in Israel of those refugees choosing to return there.

2. Israel would undertake to pay compensation for Arab refugee real property and establish a fund for the purpose. Some kind of trustee organization would be set up to handle the payment of compensation.

3. Israel would borrow money from the Western Powers to help pay the compensation. It is however desirable that some part of the money should come directly from Israel herself: and German reparations and contributions from World Jewry might be used to this end.

4. In the payment of compensation individual claims would be scaled down.Persons receiving more than a fixed amount would thereby relinquish all claims on UNRWA for relief and rehabilitation. Some arrangement would be needed to ensure that large sums paid to individuals were invested in the area and used to promote employment for the refugees. In general compensation should be so applied that it would make as many refugees as possible independent of UNRWA assistance.

5. Of the refugees who remained a charge to UNRWA after the payment of compensation, it is hoped that 100–150,000 could be settled in the Jordan Valley when the development scheme was completed, and 50–75,000 on the Sinai project. Those refugees in Syria and Lebanon who did not return to Israel would stay in their host countries which would gradually integrate them into their societies, possibly with the help of lump sum payments by UNRWA.

6. In Jordan, and possibly Gaza,UNRWA would have to continue relief until the further economic development of the area or resettlement schemes create opportunities for the remaining refugees.UNRWA relief would be made less attractive as these opportunities became more promising.

7. Terms of reference for the safety group on this matter are attached.⁴

C. Jerusalem

1. The U.S. and U.K. would inform the parties that they were prepared to sponsor a U.N. resolution on the lines of the Swedish proposal of 1950 on the supervision of and access to the Holy Places; . . . .

2. Israel would be informed that following agreement upon a settlement and pending the adoption of such a resolution, the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors would start to call at the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem, . . . .

3. The aim should be to eliminate the No Man’s Land in Jerusalem by agreement between Israel and Jordan. Government House would become the seat of the international authority charged with the supervision of the Holy Places and possibly other U.N. agencies.

4. Jerusalem to be demilitarized along the lines of plans which have been discussed by the Consuls-General of Britain, France and the U.S.A.⁵

D. Communications Arrangements

1. Israel to offer Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to the port.

2. Mutual overflight rights for civil aircraft of the parties.

3. Israel to permit the restoration or construction of telecommunications between the Arab states across her territory.

4. Israel to accord to Egypt or Jordan the right to construct a road across the Southern Negeb and to allow free transit without inspection in peace-time (but see A above).

5. Some mixed or U.N. authority to be established to hear complaints on the infringement of communications rights.

E. The Boycott

1. The Arab states would:

a. remove restrictions on transiting the Suez Canal, including those on Israel vessels,

b. cease the “secondary boycott”, defined as attempts to prevent trade between Israel and non-Arab countries, including termination of all pressure on non-Arab firms trading with Israel,

c. abolish the Arab League Boycott offices and all legislation rising therefrom.

2. The Arab states would not be pressed to engage in direct trade with Israel.

V. The Form in Which a Settlement Might Be Embodied, and the Guarantees to the Parties

A. Instruments of Settlement

1. Permanent frontiers should be established by re-negotiation of the Armistice Agreements in accordance with the provision in the Agreements for modification by consent of both parties. The UNTSO should continue to supervise the boundaries as long as necessary. The new frontiers should be noted in any guarantee decided upon.

2. The whole settlement need not be covered in a single document. Different means should be used for the different components, possibly as follows:

a. Territorial. The territorial settlement to be embodied in a revision of the Armistice Agreements (see above).

b. Jordan Waters. A separate agreement would be made between the parties on the development of the Jordan Valley and the operation of the unified scheme.

c. Refugees. A settlement providing for repatriation and compensation could be contained in a letter from the Israel Government to the Secretary-General of the U.N., referring to the 1948 resolution⁶ and giving details of Israel’s intention to carry it out.

d. Jerusalem. Arrangements for Jerusalem and the Holy Places would be the subject of a U.N. resolution.

e. Communications. Free ports and transit arrangements would be the subject of direct agreements between the parties.

f. The Blockade. The Arab states would dissolve the Arab League Boycott Committees and give informal assurances that they intended to put an end to their secondary boycott.

g. While treaties of peace between Israel and the Arab states remain our ultimate objective, the state of Arab public opinion does not make it feasible to insist upon such treaties as an immediate objective. We should endeavor to bring about to the maximum extent possible permanent arrangements which would provide the substance, as distinguished from the form, of peace. It should be our objective to obtain the termination of the state of belligerency between the countries both to remove the basis for the Suez Canal blockade and the secondary boycott and to justify to the U.S. and U.K. public and law makers the security guarantees and substantial financial contributions required. The termination of belligerency could be provided for in the revision of the Armistice Agreements (see a above) and would involve the revocation of any Arab legislation based on the existence of a state of belligerency.

B. Security Guarantees

1. It will be necessary for the United States and United Kingdom and possibly Turkey and France, to guarantee the frontiers to be established between Israel and the Arab states against alteration by force. (See attached draft treaty which will require further legal study.)⁷

2. The Guarantee would not cover other aspects of the settlement. Nor would it come into operation in the case of frontier incidents not involving the occupation of territory. Such incidents, however, if sufficiently serious would bring into operation the commitment of the parties to consult together. The guarantors might inform the Arab states and Israel that they are prepared to discuss the means of implementing the guarantee.

3. The participating powers might offer one treaty to Israel embodying the guarantee and a separate similar treaty to each Arab state. Should the Arab states be unwilling to sign treaties with the Western Powers, a unilateral guarantee might be extended to them and the offer of a treaty left open. Should the Arab states refuse to accept a settlement involving a treaty between Israel and the Western Powers, other means of guaranteeing Israel’s security would be considered.

4. Any guarantee of the division of Jordan waters required would be considered separately in connection with the Jordan waters agreements.

VI. The Roles of France, Turkey and the United Nations

1. France should not be included in the planning or initial approach to the parties but should be informed of the proposals at the time of the approach to Jordan. (See II, 4, above.) France should be included in the arrangements for the final settlement and should participate in the guarantees, unless the Arab states or Israel reject her participation.

2. Turkey would not be included in the planning or in the initial approach to the two sides but may be informed at the same time as the French. It would be desirable for Turkey to participate in the guarantee envisaged unless this is resisted by the parties.

3. The U.N. would be involved in the machinery of a settlement, for example in supervision of frontiers and Holy Places. The U.N. should therefore take note of the settlement at some stage, perhaps by accepting a P.C.C. report on it. But the U.S. and U.K. guarantees would have to provide for their execution independently of U.N. action.

VII. Cost of the Operation

A. As inducements to a resolution of the Arab-Israel problem, it is anticipated that it would be necessary for the United States and the United Kingdom to provide assistance in addition to present and already projected commitments (development assistance,UNRWA relief and rehabilitation, and the unified development of the Jordan Valley). Such new assistance might include:

1. U.S.–U.K. participation in the financing of compensation by Israel to certain of the Palestine refugees.

2. Economic inducements such as substantial grant aid for the High Aswan Dam, accelerated release of sterling balances by the U.K., etc.

3. Military aid to the cooperating countries.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Russell also transmitted copies of the attachment under cover of separate memoranda on February 2 to Murphy, MacArthur, Allen, and Byroade. (Ibid.: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. during progress of meetings (Dated 1/24 thru 2/4))
2. No record of such a discussion has been found in Department of State files.
3. Attached to the source text but not printed. An undated and uninitialed document entitled “Recommendations Of Working Group On Frontiers”, which presumably was the study group’s report, is in Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Project Alpha 1955.
4. Attached to the source text but not printed. Undated and uninitialed documents concerning compensation, repatriation, and resettlement of refugees in Arab States, along with additional documentation incidental to the efforts of this study group, areibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Arab Refugees: Memos—U.S., U.K. working party papers on Compensation, Repatriation, Resettlement, andibid., NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Project Alpha 1955.
5. The consuls general of Great Britain, France, and the United States initiated their discussions in 1954. Documentation concerning their deliberations isibid., Central Files 684.85, 784.00, 784.5, and 784A.00, as well asibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha: Status of Jerusalem.
6. On November 19, 1948, the General Assembly unanimously adopted, at its 163d plenary meeting, General Assembly Resolution 212 (III), which granted relief assistance for the period ending August 31, 1949, to Palestine refugees of all communities. For text, see U.N. doc.A/PV. 163.
7. Attached to the source text but not printed. Documentation concerning the preparation of plans to guarantee frontiers is in Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha Treaty: Successive drafts of Legal Aspects—Forms and Guarantees.