113. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
849. Re Palestine in SC.Dixon (UK) called at his request to discuss current Gaza situation. He had no new facts to add to our present knowledge of the situation, but wished to discuss the [Page 217] possibilities of action by the three powers, either in the UN or elsewhere. He expressed some surprise that SYG Hammarskjold had not already asked to meet with the three powers on the situation.One suggestion he put forward was for us to stimulate a meeting with the SYG to consider matters.
Dixon appeared to believe that MAC would censure Egypt for incident of May 30, and fully expected Israel to come to SC seeking endorsement of MAC finding. As possible alternative to awaiting this result,Dixon suggested three powers might summon Egypt and Israel to the SC and, in effect, read the riot act to them. He felt there were certain disadvantages to this, however, such as: (a) forcing parties to take extreme positions; and (b) risking an upset to the progress made thus far by General Burns.
I told Dixon that we agreed things were a little worse than usual, but that we had no specific thoughts on what should be done about it. I told him we would get in touch as soon as we had anything to offer.
It would not seem helpful and might be harmful to have regular session of SC at which Israeli and Egyptians would give a repeat performance.
Likewise unless we have some particular course which we wish to press, it would be preferable not to stimulate a meeting between the Secretary General and the three powers. Our initiative in this matter would make it most difficult to refuse support to any suggestions of the Secretary General which might be contrary to our policy. We can assume that the Secretary General is fully aware of the events in the area and if such a meeting were to be held, the initiative should be his.
One course which would at least have the advantage of novelty and might have some impact would be to have Burns summoned to New York to report fully to a closed session of the SC at which the Egyptians and Israelis would not be present.Burns would be expected to give, as he has given in private to governmental representatives, a frank assessment of the most important elements creating tension. These would undoubtedly include the provocative effect of Israeli patrols practically on the demarcation line and Egyptian failure effectively to prevent infiltration and mining.One meeting of the Council should suffice to hear the report.Burns would return to Jerusalem immediately. The SC could then press for practical measures which would remove the most immediate causes of friction, including perhaps (1) joint patrols, (2) joint mine-clearing, (3) mutual withdrawal to specified distance from the demarcation line, and (4) effective Egyptian control over the troops and population in the Gaza area.
[Page 218]In view of preparations for San Francisco,2 if the preceding suggestion were to be carried out, we should discuss the proposal without delay with the British and French and the Secretary General. It should not be impossible for Burns to get here by the end of next week.
Department’s views requested.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–255. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:11 p.m.↩
- Reference is to the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the signing of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco, June 20–26, 1955.↩
- See Document 115.↩