104. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
987. In accordance with Deptel 6742 I called late yesterday afternoon on Prime Minister in Jerusalem to which he had returned from weekend. He was obviously expecting me to deliver message of nature I gave orally to him on basis reference telegram. He received message seriously. In somewhat stern tone and speaking without notes he said he wished to reply as follows:
He desired to comment first on the final sentence our message which he said described as “sting in the tail of the message”. He [Page 195] said that he emphatically rejected the suggestion that there was any jockeying for political advantages on the part of the GOI and “speaking for the government I reject this suggestion most emphatically.”
As explained on many occasions, he said, “there is no systematic policy of retaliation—there are isolated acts which to Israel are unavoidable.” He said that the loss of three innocent young lives cannot occur without punishment.3 “I challenge the representative of any government to say that if such an outrage had occurred on its frontier no retaliatory action would have been taken,” he said. He then referred to the long period of time since US borders have been disturbed, implying that it would be difficult for US Government to visualize itself in same position, and appealed to US to put itself in Israel’s position.
He did not think it “easy to accuse GOI of deliberately flouting SC resolution March 28” at a time when, (a), the resolution seems to have “had no effect on GOE” and (b), when the “SC itself did not keep faith with its own principles by refusing to condemn Egypt for outrages committed against Israel, to which outrages Israel did not retaliate but about which Israel complained to the SC.”
He then referred to a press announcement, reported, he said, to have some Department connection, to effect that the mines which caused the loss of life in this latest incident were old mines laid before recent admonitions to Egypt. He said, “this is not my information. It is true that Egypt had informed General Burns some time ago that couple of old mines remained in the ground and he warned us, after which we discovered and disposed of them. But the mines in the last outrage were newly laid mines. Moreover, they were not primitive or handmade mines but regular military mines of British manufacture and undoubtedly from stocks of military supplies used by the Egyptian Army. I impute nothing to the British, of course.”
On the subject of “high level talks,” he directed attention to the fact that the initiative came from the GOI, “and was then taken over by the UN.” He said, “we responded immediately, accepting the entire agenda as outlined by the UN Chief of Staff.4 We note with concern, to this day Egypt’s reply is still outstanding—and we have been hearing for quite a time from UN circles that there is no likelihood of a favorable reply. In meantime, General Burns initiated talks at a routine level. Here again, the GOI responded and we do not think we can be properly blamed for not accepting every single [Page 196] suggestion, made in perfectly good faith by General Burns. Any country enters a conference on the understanding that it is free to use its judgment as to the efficacy and usefulness of the matter proposed. The fact that the GOI accepted three of the four proposals whereas Egypt accepted with reservations all four, does not leave us, in the balance, in an unfavorable position or lay the GOI open to the charge of non-cooperation with the UN. General Burns has referred to Egypt’s reservations, however we are aware that they flatly rejected some of the proposals, such as telephone communication between local commanders without which any local commanders agreement is likely to become a farce.”
He then referred to the fact that the GOI had repeatedly stated that it had no greater desire than to see complete calm along the border. “There is,” he said, “only one way to bring this about on the Gaza border zone and that is a complete cessation of all aggressive violence on the part of the Egyptian Forces.”
Comment: The above is virtually a verbatim report of his remarks which he made at dictation speed and obviously desired that they be accurately recorded. They were it seemed, extemporaneous.
I endeavored at several points to inject comment or explanation but this was firmly resisted as he proceeded firmly ahead with his remarks. I was able after his comments, however, to underscore US Government attitude on this policy of retaliation and how such acts upset our timetable in our efforts to promote area stability and Israel’s basic security in particular. I was able also to indicate our failure to understand why the GOI was not in favor of joint patrols, pointing up their value in cases such as this last mining incident. I likewise called his attention to the advantages of patrolling further back from the border.
It seemed to me that the Prime Minister was “making a case” much as a lawyer would and certainly he was defending vigorously the policy of his government. But it is believed, as has been reported to us from responsible quarters, that his personal views are not those which supported retaliation in this instance (Embtel 9845). In response to my direct question, he agreed that retaliation seemed to occur when (a) there was loss of Israeli life, and (b) when in the judgment of the GOI the aggravating action by the other party is military in character or supported directly or indirectly by the [Page 197] military. It would appear, therefore, that at the moment at least, the pattern as to when retaliation is to be used has been firmly set.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2355. Confidential; Priority. Received at 12:57 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, London,USUN, Jerusalem, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Paris.↩
- Document 100.↩
- Reference is to the death of three of four Israelis wounded by the explosion of a mine near Kisufim on May 17.↩
- Major General E.L.M. Burns.↩
- Ambassador Lawson reported on May 21 in telegram 984 that on the afternoon of May 18 the Mapai inner group had considered the mining incident which had resulted in the deaths of the three officers the previous day. The group, composed of Sharett,Ben Gurion, Eshkol,Myerson, and Aranne, decided by a vote of four to one, with Sharett dissenting, to retaliate for the mining incident. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2155)↩