Office of the Historian

102. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State1

Jerusalem,May 20, 1955—6 p.m.

328. I discussed current situation with General Burns today particularly in light Israeli retaliation raid May 19, Tel Aviv’s telegram 9662 and London’s 5099.3 I thought it would be well ascertain Burns present appraisal usefulness proposed high-level talks Israel and Egypt as well as his ideas regarding any steps which might be taken in atmosphere resulting most recent incidents and Egypt’s aversion high-level talks.Burns commented as follows: [Page 193]

(1)
He had done his best to comply with UNSYG instructions arrange talks. However, he thought respective governments might well accept judgment their Ambassadors in Cairo and refrain from further pressure bring about such talks at this time.
(2)
Lacking a precise agenda with significant points (in addition to the four points of the March 30SC resolution)Burns failed to perceive any especial need for such talks. He was thus somewhat at a loss to refute Egyptian thesis that there is no need for discussions above the Shalev–Gohar level.
(3)
With regard to the mines which causing much of the trouble,Burns expressed relief that these were not planted by or at the instigation of any authority of the GOE. However,GOE authorities have shown themselves unable to prevent this activity thus far. He has written to Gohar to ask what further measures may be taken to stop mine planting. He has also recommended that GOE revamp administrative set-up in Gaza strip. Present organization places control police and refugees under Governor while military force is responsible to Army Commander.Burns urges that unified command all elements be established enhance effective control situation.
(4)
Burns suggested that powers might again urge upon Israelis futility their policy of retaliation. Gaza incursion of February 28 certainly did not improve the situation, and there appears no valid reason to expect future retaliation efforts would prove more successful. In addition, very serious results might follow owing existence large body refugees there toward whom UN and powers have considerable responsibilities.

Consulate General comment: Foregoing suggests that perhaps time has come to tell Israelis that we have done what was possible to arrange high level talks; but that in existing atmosphere and lacking firm and basic agreed agency [agenda?] sound reason for pressing for talks does not now exist. Meanwhile, best efforts should be made to resume negotiations at working level, to discourage retaliatory activities by Israel and to encourage Egyptians improve control Gaza area.4

Regarding last paragraph my telegram 3275Burns states he has no present intention evacuating UNTSO dependents Gaza.

Cole
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2055. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:27 a.m., May 21. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 99.↩
  3. Document 99.↩
  4. Byroade cabled the Department that he agreed “completely with views General Burns (Jerusalem telegram 328, May 20), and, unless instructed to contrary, will not press here for high level talks (Deptel 2030)” (printed as Document 100). Instead,Byroade planned to discuss the “general situation with Foreign Office along lines Deptel 674 to Tel Aviv repeated Cairo 2030. In this discussion will urge GOE take steps proposed by Burns re administrative set up in Gaza or such alternative steps as can be found which would make for more effective control.” (Telegram 1758 from Cairo, May 21; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2155)↩
  5. Not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/5–1955)↩