9. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly1



The Problem

The USSR will undoubtedly seek to capitalize on the “spirit of Geneva”2 at the 10th General Assembly. The Soviet “peace offensive” will be very much in evidence as the USSR attempts to convince the Members that by its recent “deeds” it is now the leader in the quest for world peace. It will seek to build confidence in Soviet intentions and generate pressures on the West, particularly [Page 18] the United States, to make concessions of its own. The new Soviet attitude and demeanor will be reflected in the nature of the items introduced at the United Nations as well as in the debates. Except on the Chinese representation issue, Moscow will probably avoid locking horns directly with any of the Western powers, and for the first time since 1946, its courtship of other delegations may extend to the United States as well.

The United States must maintain the initiative for peace, security, and justice which it seized at Geneva under the leadership of President Eisenhower. We should welcome this new attitude on the part of the USSR and the relaxation of tension resulting from Geneva. On the other hand we should point out that this present session of the General Assembly as well as the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting offers a good testing ground for the USSR to prove its intentions. We should calmly and factually stress the point that the free world must adopt a “wait and see” attitude and not relax its vigilance.

United States Position

The United States should seek to hold the initiative seized at Geneva as the accepted leader for peace, security, and justice. This should be reflected not only in statements by its spokesman but in constructive proposals in all United Nations activities.
The United States should welcome the new Soviet attitude and demeanor.
The United States should point out that this session of the General Assembly and the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers offer the Communist bloc excellent opportunities for new “deeds” consistent with the “new spirit”.
The United States should calmly and factually point out that nothing has yet occurred which justifies the free world relaxing its vigilance or substantially altering its programs of collective security.
In the present atmosphere the United States should refrain from initiating “cold war” items. However, every charge against the United States should be forcefully met and any relevant Communist vulnerability calmly and factually exploited.
From a procedural standpoint, the United States should not oppose the inclusion in the agenda of a Soviet resolution of the omnibus type.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–2355. Confidential.
  2. Reference is to the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, July 18-23, 1955; see volume V.