Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

76. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Soviet Representative to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (Chetchetkin) and the Senior Adviser on International Organization and Legal Matters to the Mission at the United Nations (Bender), New York, July 25, 1957¹

New York, July 25, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Election of UNSYG

In my conversation with Chetchetkin today, he asked whether I thought that Hammarskjold would be reelected. I replied in the affirmative, saying I saw no other candidates in the field and that I knew of no reason why the US would not support Hammarskjold.

I asked Chetchetkin about the Soviet position on this matter. He said that the Soviet attitude towards Hammarskjold was “positive” but that no final decision concerning his reelection had been taken by the Soviet Government. He said that he knew of no other candidates for the position.

Chetchetkin then asked whether I thought it would be desirable to have the election of the SYG occur early in the Assembly session. I answered in the affirmative, saying that I thought it would be helpful in connection with a number of decisions to be taken in the Assembly to know as soon as possible who would be the Secretary General for the next five years. I pointed out that, for example, the Fifth Committee would be making recommendations to the Secretary General relating to personnel policy and that, certainly for this purpose, it would be helpful to know to whom the recommendations were being addressed. When I asked Chetchetkin what the Soviet Delegation thought about the timing of the Secretary General’s election, he was hesitant about a reply. He said that there were really several important questions which probably ought to be settled first and that, since Hammarskjold’s contract did not expire until next spring, there was no urgency about his election. He then said that probably the Soviet attitude on this point would depend upon its attitude towards Hammarskjold’s election. If the Soviets favored his election, they might well agree to have the election held early.

Comment:

From Chetchetkin’s remarks, I think it quite possible that the Soviets, even though favoring Hammarskjold’s election, might think it best to hold off the election until late in the Assembly in order to hold a weapon over Hammarskjold’s head. They might well believe he would be more cooperative on items like the Hungarian question if his election was still in abeyance.²

1. Source: USUN Files, IO, SYG. Limited Official Use.
2. Telegram 149 from New York, August 1, reported that during a discussion among U.S., U.K., and French officials it was tentatively agreed to have the Security Council convene September 5 to reappoint Hammarskjold, with General Assembly action to follow. It was also agreed that the U.S. official would meet with a Soviet representative to ensure agreement on the timing. (Department of State, Central Files, 315/8–157)