Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

64. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee to the Mission at the United Nations (Stone) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)¹

New York, February 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Permanent United Nations Force

1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Chairman, Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, (CM—415—56), dated 26 December 1956, subject: “Permanent United Nations Force”.²

2. The Enclosure, USMS/67, is a study presenting the views and recommendations of the U.S. Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee in accordance with the referenced memorandum.

Charles B. Stone, III³
Lt. General, USAF

Enclosure⁴

STAFF STUDY: PERMANENT UNITED NATIONS FORCE

The Problem

1. To determine the views and recommendations of the U.S. Delegation to United Nations Military Staff Committee on the possible establishment of a Permanent United Nations Force.

Facts Bearing on Problem

2. The U.N. Charter provides for a military force composed of national contingents functioning under the Security Council. This provision has never been implemented because of political differences among the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. United Nations military action in Korea in 1950 was in accordance with Security Council resolutions passed in the absence of the USSR representative, who had boycotted the Council. The United States was the executive agent for the United Nations for the organization and direction of the Unified Command.

4. The “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of 1950 provided the General Assembly with the necessary authority to take military action in the maintenance of peace when the Security Council failed to function. The current United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was organized under the SYG in accordance with this Resolution.

5. The UNEF is composed of a combination of contingents from member states other than permanent members of Security Council. There is no executive agent, and it is directed by SYG in accordance with broad General Assembly resolutions and with advice of an Advisory Committee. Precedent has been established that the host country must voluntarily accept the force and can dictate the acceptability of national contingents. The United States, though not contributing forces, provides equipment, supply, transport and airlift for UNEF, and maintains liaison with respect to these matters.

6. The UNEF was established as an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956.

7. Although the UNEF was organized on an “ad hoc” basis, some members of the United Nations Secretariat and certain United Nations delegates have recently suggested the desirability of extending the status of this force to a permanent or long-range basis.

8. On 7 January 1957, a Resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate (S.Res. 15, 85th Congress, 1st Session) to make the current UNEF a permanent arm of the United Nations.

9. Various other types of forces have been proposed in the past. The “Foreign Legion” concept of internationally-recruited personnel owing allegiance to the United Nations has been prominent among these. Other proposals have been introduced in the Congress of the United States.

Discussion

9. [sic] Proposed Types of Forces

It may be assumed that any permanent United Nations force would conform in general to one of five types. There are of course many variations which could result from combining some of the characteristics of each. For the purpose of this study, however, only those listed below will be considered. The characteristics of each of the five are tabulated in Appendix F. Background information and a discussion of each are contained in separate appendices as indicated.

a. An “integrated national contingent” force, as envisaged by the United Nations Charter. (See Appendix A)

b. A “unified command” as employed in the Korean action in 1950-53. (See Appendix B)

c. A “Voluntary Reserve” force as proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1950. (See Appendix C)

d. An “international volunteer contingent” force, along lines proposed in a joint resolution introduced in the Congress in 1950. (See Appendix D)

e. An “international police force” as typified by the United Nations Emergency Force employed in Egypt in 1956–57. (See Appendix E)

10. Basic Considerations

Proposals for the establishment or use of armed forces under the auspices of the United Nations raise many complicated problems. The military or technical aspects of any concept cannot be wholly divorced from the political implications. An examination of any proposal must be based upon the following major considerations:

a. Effect on national sovereignty.

b. Strategic direction and command.

c. Logistical support.

d. Standardization of equipment and procedures.

e. Integration, including organization and training.

f. Location of forces and bases.

g. Financing.

11. National Sovereignty

a. The basic problem in devising a system of collective military measures for the United Nations is to establish an effective force competent to maintain or restore peace, but so limited and restricted that it cannot be used in a manner which would infringe on the sovereignty of the member states. This presents a dilemma.

b. Since the United Nations is not a world government but a treaty organization of independent nations, member states are reluctant to reduce their own national defense resources in favor of a United Nations force without adequate safeguards as to the ultimate use of such international forces. The sponsoring great powers insisted upon the incorporation of safeguards in the United Nations Charter by provision of the veto in the Security Council. (See Annex A)

c. A truly international combat force, i.e., a force operating under a United Nations agency, is a step toward a supra-national government. The desirability or undesirability of a world government is beyond the scope of this discussion. It should be reiterated, however, that the United Nations Charter did not contemplate a world government nor, in fact, have the de facto modifications of the Charter by precedent and usage produced such an institution. Accordingly, the action of each member state in the United Nations is determined on the basis of national sovereignty and self-interest.

d. The current UNEF, though bearing some of the characteristics of an enforcing arm of a supra-national government, does not constitute a threat to the sovereignty of the member states. Certain features operate as restraint on its employment:

(1) Temporary, “Ad Hoc” nature.

(2) Limited size and non-combat capability.

(3) Dependence on the United States for logistical support.

(4) Ability of any contributing state to withdraw its contributions at its discretion.

(5) Requirement in its employment for consent of “governments concerned”, not only as to the force itself but as to its composition by nationality, the areas in which it is employed.

e. It is assumed that because of the political cleavage in the Security Council, any force constituted on a permanent basis will be under broad political direction of the General Assembly. This means that 2/3 of the Member States, regardless of their size and strength, will control its actions. Thus there is no assurance that the employment of this force would be in the interest of the United States and it could possibly result in its use to the contrary. Accordingly, some of the above restraints, and possibly others, on its use, should be prerequisite to U.S. support of a permanent status.

12. Direction and Command

a. Closely related to the political problem of national sovereignty are the interlocking and often incompatible politico-military issues of political direction, strategic direction, and command.

b. It has been the precedent in both the Korean experience and in the current UNEF operation that broad guidance to the respective forces has been given in the form of Security Council or General Assembly resolutions. These resolutions have been through necessity, general, vague, and subject to interpretation. In the Korea action, these interpretations were made by the United States Government and/or field commanders acting for the Unified Command or the United Nations Commander respectively. In the current arrangement, the Secretary-General freely exercises his judgment in interpreting the intent of the General Assembly resolutions on the disposition and mission of the UNEF in Egypt.

c. In the Korean action, the United States was in a favorable position by virtue of the delegated authority to make politico-military decisions in the conduct of operations. Although the other contributing member states were consulted and kept informed, in practice there was little restraint on the actions of the United States as executive agent. Such actions were not always enthusiastically received and, in fact, were a source of criticism from both contributing and non-contributing member states of the United Nations.

d. The present United Nations operation in Egypt is an entirely different problem since combat operations are not contemplated and most of the decisions are political in nature and must be reached after negotiation. Obviously, a member state as executive agent for the UNEF employment could be placed in a very difficult position. However, if military operations were involved, the Secretary-General without military background and without an adequate command structure, would be unable to execute effective directional responsibility. Further, and more important, it would seem unwise to entrust to one man, acting under extremely broad guidance, subject to a wide variety of acute international political pressure, the authority for the conduct of military operations of any nature involving a sizeable and effective force.

e. In summary, when the mission of a U.N. force is symbolic rather than military and when no enforcement or punitive measures are contemplated, control and direction by a U.N. agency under the General Assembly is not inimicable to the interest of the United States. On the other hand, if the nature, size and composition of the U.N. force were such that military operations could be conducted in enforcement of General Assembly resolutions, it would seem necessary that the United States be assured of more definitive and effective measures of control over its direction.

13. Logistic Implications

a. Many of the broad proposals or suggestions for the establishment of United Nations forces do not take into account the overriding logistic requirements to support a force in the field. Of the five types considered in this paper, type E, the current force in Egypt, presents the smallest problem. Even in this case it should be realized that logistic support of this small force, not involved in combat, could not be accomplished without the facilities of the United States in terms of depots, stock-piles, shipping, airlift, communications, and organization structure which were already in existence at the time the force was established, and provided that quick mobility so essential in time of crisis.

b. Logistic support for the U.N. Command in Korea was provided by the United States. This action could not have been accomplished without the logistic complex which was in being in the Far East in 1950. To support a force of comparable size without such facilities would have been impossible on short notice.

c. Attempts to build up a United Nations Force without the use of a world-wide logistic system presently possessed only by the United States would require tremendous outlays in men, money and equipment. The problems in establishing such a system would require years to resolve.

d. Because of its unique situation with overseas bases and military assistance program, the United States is the only member state currently in a position to furnish world-wide logistic support. Such future capability on the part of USSR cannot be ruled out, however. Certain European member states could undertake logistics support in certain areas but not without seriously affecting their own defense commitments. It is evident therefore that the United States will be asked by the United Nations to supply logistic support.

e. There exists at least a theoretical point beyond which United States commitments to the support of a United Nations Force could not be extended without critically weakening its own defense structure. This is a complicated problem, and probably the impact could never be measured in finite terms. Any commitments on the part of the United States to support a U.N. force logistically on a permanent or long-range basis, should be preceded by a determination and the net effect on our own military defense capabilities.

14. Standardization of Equipment and Procedures

a. Where an international military force of any size is unified in a single effort, standardization of equipment and procedures presents a difficult problem. Where the force is composed of large national contingents, these problems can be partially solved; for example, the Allied forces in combined operation in World War II and in the present NATO structure. Where the forces are large enough, and where each national contingent relies upon its own logistical facilities extending to and resting upon national industrial bases, the effectiveness of the force is dependent upon unification by command relationship at higher levels. As the size of the national contingents decrease, however, and the jointure of command is at a tactical level, operational problems in equipment and supply, language, staff procedure, and tactical doctrine will become more acute.

b. With respect to a theoretical international force composed of individuals of many nationalities there would be no particular problem other than language barriers, so long as that force was organized and equipped on the existing structure of a military establishment of one nation or small group of nations. On the other hand, to attempt to establish an effective balanced combat force capable of enforcing United Nations actions without accepting an established system as a standard would be impractical. Unless the United Nations or some international organization were in a position to create a military establishment of its own, including production, procurement, etc., such a possibility is clearly ruled out. The cost alone of building an entirely new international establishment is prohibitive.

c. The problem of standardization is obviously closely related to that of logistical support. Standardization problems cannot be solved independently of a solution of the logistical support problems which, as it has been indicated above, must be based on a single or small group of existing national military establishments.

15. Integration

a. The term “integration” here means the welding together of the elements of available forces into a single force to accomplish military missions. It is applicable to all size forces whether they be land, sea, or air forces, or a combination of such forces. It is obvious that if a given force, such as UNEF, does not have a combat role, integration is not critical. On the other hand, a force such as envisaged by the U.N. Charter as an enforcing agency cannot be effective without some degree of integration.

b. Where large national contingents are employed and integration has been accomplished within these contingents on a national level, the problem becomes less important. Where small units are brought together, however, there are immediate and serious problems of organization and training, aside from the previously mentioned question of standardization.

c. The organization and training essential to integration of a force requires bases, installations, lines of communications and logistics facilities. If there are large national contingents satellited on national establishments, there is no particular problem. Such activities can be accomplished in respective national territories or in other territories through bilateral agreements between nations. Where the force is composed of small national contingents, widely separated geographically, integration becomes more difficult. Where the force is recruited internationally, the international recruiting agency must obtain such facilities from selected states. This introduces serious political problems.

16. Location

a. A major point of difference in the deliberations of the Military Staff Committee and in the debate in the Security Council over the establishment of Article 43 forces in 1948, was the question of location of proposed forces when not being employed. (See Appendix A) Granted that this difference was political rather than technical, there is no reason to believe that the same problem would not arise in the establishment of any permanent force. Actually, the Charter type national contingents concept presents less of a problem in this respect as has been pointed out above in connection with training facilities.

b. It appears that the question of location of forces, including operating bases, could be more easily met under some sort of national contingent force rather than under a U.N.-controlled international permanent force. Thus, the supplying of bases and facilities as a part of the national contributions of the various states would tend to solve both the political and financial problems.

17. Financing

a. The experience in connection with financing the current UNEF has demonstrated the reluctance of member states to contribute monies to an international force. Acting on a report from the Secretary-General, the General Assembly on 26 November passed a resolution (A/RES/412) allocating $10,000,000 as an initial outlay to finance UNEF. Subsequently, in Committee 5 of the General Assembly, an extended debate ensued as to how this cost should be distributed. The Soviet bloc flatly refused to contribute to this appropriation on the basis that the so-called aggressors in Egypt should be held financially responsible. Smaller nations, on the other hand, pleaded inability to contribute in accordance with the regular pro-rated assessment scale for U.N. budget. It was finally agreed to recommend that this initial outlay be distributed in proportion to the regular assessments. It was clearly indicated, however, that any subsequent outlays would be subject to further consideration.

b. If this bickering over relatively small financial outlays is to be accepted as a pattern on further financing procedures, any plan for a permanent U.N. Force will have to take into consideration the reluctance of member states to assume financial responsibility.

c. It should be noted that the relatively small annual outlay of an estimated $17,000,000 in fact represents an increase at about 33⅓% of the regular annual UN budget.

18. Current Proposals for a Permanent United Nations Force— see Appendix G.

Conclusions

19. Agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council will not soon be reached in implementation of Charter provisions for a U.N. force.

20. From the technical viewpoint, the “Unified Command” concept under an executive agent state, as employed in Korea, offers the best prospect for an efficient United Nations force.

21. Proposals for an internationally-recruited force owing allegiance to the United Nations under direct control of a United Nations agency are not technically feasible or politically acceptable.

22. Thus far the UNEF is adequate for the express purpose for which it was established. It should not, however, be accepted as a pattern for a permanent force of greater strength and size as a substitute for forces envisaged under Article 43 of the Charter.

23. United States will be expected to contribute logistical support either in part or in full in the event of the establishment of any United Nations force unless the force has been established by the General Assembly sponsored by the USSR contrary to U.S. interests.

24. Currently, most serious suggestions for the establishment of a permanent U.N. force are directed toward an extension of the status of the current UNEF.

25. Proposals advanced for making UNEF permanent should be examined with the following in mind:

a. The U.S. should insist upon a greater voice in the control of the force over and beyond a single vote in the General Assembly.

b. Logistic support of the force by the United States should be granted only under the following conditions:

(1) This support should be limited in terms of supply and services to that which is previously determined as feasible.

(2) The extent of this support and terms of reimbursement should be clearly delineated and defined by agreement with U.N.

Recommendation

26. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the above discussion and conclusions as a basis for establishing a position with respect to a permanent United Nations force.

1. Source: USUN Files, IO, Armed Forces. Confidential. A covering memorandum from Stone to Charles D. Cook, Deputy Counsel of the Mission at the United Nations, February 18, reads: “I would appreciate your comments on this first draft as to the acceptability of the paper from the Department of State viewpoint, and any suggestions you care to make to improve the paper.” No written reply or comments by Cook have been found.
2. Not found.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. This draft staff study included a table of contents, 13 appendices, and 6 annexes, none of which is printed here.