Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

35. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

CA–3343

Washington, October 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Eleventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

1. The eleventh regular session of the General Assembly is scheduled to convene in New York on November 12. Enclosed for your information is the Department’s check list of items certain or likely to arise at the session (SD/A/348/Rev. 1).² Items are arranged according to their probable allocation to the plenary meetings of the Assembly and its seven Main Committees. Items not bracketed are included in the provisional agenda which was circulated by the SYG on September 13, 1956, or have subsequently been proposed for inclusion in the supplementary agenda which will be circulated soon. As in previous years, we would appreciate information you may receive regarding any items which the Government to which you are accredited is likely to propose for inclusion in the Agenda. However, we are anxious to avoid giving any impression that we wish to stimulate the introduction of new items.

2. We are planning, as in previous years, to consult informally with other friendly governments in advance of the Assembly concerning major agenda items. Consultations will be held on the basis of our tentative views in order that we may be able to take the views of other governments into account in the formulation of our final positions. We shall parallel your approaches with consultations, through USUN, with permanent delegations in New York and in some cases with diplomatic representatives in Washington.

3. Outlined below are the Department’s tentative positions (except A, B and E below) on a number of items which will be dealt with in the political committees or in plenary sessions. You are requested, in your discretion, to outline these views to the foreign office and to report its reactions as soon as possible. As noted above, you should indicate that these positions are tentative and that we shall wish to take account, insofar as possible, the views of other friendly governments in determining our final position. Any significant information you receive should be cabled if it is not likely to be received in the Department by November 1 if sent by air despatch. (Detailed background information on most of the issues you will be asked to discuss may be found in the Annual Report of the President to Congress on U.S. Participation in the U.N. for 1955.)

A. President of the Eleventh G.A.

Prince Wan of Thailand is the only candidate, and his election appears certain. The United States strongly favors his election and has informed other UN members of its position.

B. Election to the International Court of Justice

The General Assembly and the Security Council must elect a judge to fill the vacancy on the International Court of Justice created by the death of the Chinese judge, Hsu Mo, whose term of office runs until February 5, 1958. The United States strongly supports Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, the Chinese nominee, and has made its views known to other UN members. Dr. Koo is known to be well-qualified, and there is a tradition that a national of each of the five permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected to the Court.

C. Elections to UN Councils

Besides the usual elections to select three states for the Security Council, six states for the Economic and Social Council, and two states for the Trusteeship Council, the G.A. will hold an election in 1956 to fill the second half of Yugoslavia’s term on the Security Council. Following a long contest between the Philippines and Yugoslavia at the tenth G.A. in 1955 for election to the Security Council, Yugoslavia was elected on the understanding that it would resign from the Council at the end of this year and that the Philippines would be elected to serve for the remainder of the term. The United States accepted this understanding and assumes that it will be honored.

The Department is actively considering its position with respect to the other elections, most of which present no problem. In accordance with our usual policy, we will support Latin American candidates to replace Latin Americans and will await the views of the Latin American states before deciding for which Latin American to vote. Background information on the elections to the three Councils follows:

Security Council—The G.A. will elect three non-permanent Members for two-year terms to succeed Belgium, Iran, and Peru, whose terms expire on December 31, 1956. Iraq and Colombia are the only announced candidates to succeed Iran and Peru, respectively. There are three candidates for the Belgian seat: Italy, Sweden, and Spain. We consider that the choice of the West European candidate is a matter in the first instance for the West Europeans to decide and hope that they will reach a decision in time to avoid an open contest in the G.A.

Economic and Social Council—The G.A. will elect six countries for three-year terms to succeed Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Norway, Pakistan, the USSR, and the UK, whose terms expire on December 31, 1956. The five permanent members of the Security Council have always been represented on the Economic and Social Council, and it is therefore assumed that the UK and the USSR will be reelected. Poland is the Soviet-bloc candidate for the Czechoslovak seat. Mexico and Finland are the sole announced candidates for the Ecuadoran and Norwegian seats, respectively. Pakistan desires to be reelected but Ceylon also has announced its candidacy for this seat.

Trusteeship Council—The G.A. will elect two states for three-year terms to succeed Haiti and India, whose terms expire on December 31 of this year. Both states are running for reelection. Liberia also has announced its candidacy for the Indian seat. The Department has taken no definite position as yet on this slate.

D. Enlargement of UN Councils

Sixteen Latin American States, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, [sic] Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, and Spain have proposed for inclusion on the Assembly’s agenda the question of amending the UN Charter to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council and consequently the number of votes required for Council decisions. The same states plus another Latin American country, Mexico, have requested that the agenda also include the question of amending the Charter to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. Six Latin American members, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Haiti, and Spain have proposed for inclusion on the agenda the question of increasing the membership of the International Court of Justice to increase the number of judges. In addition, the same sixteen Latin American states which proposed the item on the enlargement of the Security Council (listed above) and Spain have asked that the agenda also include the question of increasing the membership of the International Law Commission. These items have been submitted in light of the substantial increase in UN membership.

Amendments to the Charter and to the Statute of the Court come into force when adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the UN members, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Statute of the International Law Commission, which was established by the Assembly, can be amended by the Assembly.

We recognize the need to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in view of the increase in UN membership. We also recognize the need to avoid their becoming unwieldy in size. For the present we wish to maintain a flexible position on the size of any increases. If you are asked about our position, you should indicate that the addition of two non-permanent seats to the Security Council, making a total of eight such seats, and an increase of four in the Economic and Social Council, bringing the membership of this body to 22, would seem to us reasonable. FYI. We are not prepared as yet to discuss how these new seats would be allocated geographically. End of FYI.

We do not see any need for an increase in the International Court of Justice and have made our position known to others. A Court of fifteen is sufficient to assure representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world, and any increase in its size would tend to hinder its effective functioning. Moreover, the Statute provides that when the Court includes no judge of the nationality of a party to a case brought before the Court, the party may choose a judge, who takes part in the Court’s decision on terms of complete equality with the regular members of the Court. We have not made any definite decision as to a possible increase in the membership of the International Law Commission. We have open mind on the matter.

Should the question of increasing the number of permanent seats on the Security Council be raised, we would strongly oppose its consideration at this time. It has serious implications for the status and operations of the Council and could more properly be considered at any general conference to review the Charter. Moreover, consideration of this question would almost certainly raise difficult collateral issues.

E. Chinese Representation

We shall, of course, continue actively to oppose any efforts designed to change the representation of China in the General Assembly. We shall take the position that the Assembly should decide not to consider any proposals designed to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. We have been informed by the UK that it will support this moratorium formula for the entire session. FYI—By taking the foregoing procedural position and avoiding votes on the substance we anticipate that we should be able again this year to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support and with minimum difficulty. End FYI. We assume each Embassy will solicit support, as appropriate, for the above position.

F. UN Membership

The Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia will be admitted to the UN in an early plenary meeting of the Assembly. We view, with concern, the continued exclusion of qualified applicants, including Japan and the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam, as a result of past vetoes of the Soviet Union. The United States strongly hopes that Japan will be admitted at this session. We will continue to support the candidacies of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. We are opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia. FYI—The United States last year abstained both in the Assembly and in the Security Council on all Soviet satellite applicants, including Outer Mongolia. While the United States is opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia, whether we would vote in the negative or abstain in the Assembly would depend upon the circumstances in which the issue is raised. End FYI.

G. Indians in South Africa

The tenth General Assembly urged the parties (India, Pakistan, Union of South Africa) to pursue negotiations with a view to bringing about a settlement and requested them to report to this session. The Indian and Pakistan offer to negotiate was rejected by the South Africans.

We assume this item will again be inscribed by the Assembly. We continue to believe that the only real hope for a settlement of this dispute lies in direct negotiations between the parties. While not playing a leading role on this item, the United States is prepared to support a moderate resolution to this effect.

H. Apartheid

Last year the Assembly decided to discontinue the Commission of three individuals whose efforts since 1952 had been to no avail in finding a solution to this problem. We continue to oppose racial discrimination in any form, and in our statements before the Assembly this year, as in the past, we expect to make this clear. We view with concern the continued implementation of apartheid in South Africa.

Nevertheless, we doubt that either censure or condemnation of one member nation or the establishment of more UN machinery is likely to improve the racial situation in South Africa or contribute to the UN objectives in the human rights field. The United States therefore hopes that the discussion of this question will be kept within a moderate framework.

I. Antarctica

India has submitted for Assembly consideration an item entitled, “The Peaceful Utilization of Antarctica”. The Indians have suggested that “the General Assembly should call upon all States to agree and affirm the peaceful utilization of Antarctica for the general welfare and in particular to agree that that area shall not be used in any manner that would promote the increase of world tensions or extend to this area the influence and the effects of existing tensions”.

The United States’ position on inscription has not yet been determined. However, we can see no need to raise the question of Antarctica in the United Nations at this time and doubt the wisdom of doing so. While the Government of India apparently wishes to avoid raising the question of territorial claims, we doubt if this can be avoided entirely. This could lead to exacerbation of existing rivalries among claimants of Antarctica territory making even more difficult an eventual solution to the problem. Moreover, we doubt whether any constructive ends can be served by UN consideration at this time, especially since the agenda for this session is already heavy. We fail to see any legitimate basis for what we understand to be the Indian concern over possible use of the Antarctic region for nuclear testing. As we have indicated previously, the United States has no present intention or plan to use the Antarctic as a nuclear testing site. We wish to underline, however, that the United States doubts regarding the discussion of Antarctica in the United Nations does not mean that the United States has modified its desire to further international cooperation in the Antarctic, and the Indians and others are aware of past U.S. efforts to this end.

FYI—We would welcome an Indian decision to withdraw the item or agree to postponement of its inscription at this session. Since the Latin American caucus decided recently to oppose inscription of this item, it is not definite that the Indians intend to press for inscription. While having doubts as to the advisability of UN consideration at this time, the United States has sought to avoid getting out in front on this issue. We wish to avoid bearing the onus of preventing the inscription of the item, and we have sought to leave the UK, Old Commonwealth and Latin America a free hand in organizing opposition to inscription. The United States can be more flexible in its approach to this problem since we have not made any claims to territory nor have we recognized the claims of others. Should this matter eventually be inscribed, our present tentative view is that the objectives of the United States in the Antarctic and our interests there would not be adversely affected by the adoption of a resolution which was limited to a carefully worded UN declaration in favor of peaceful utilization of the Antarctic. End FYI.

J. United Nations Relief and Works Agency

Pursuant to the resolution adopted last year, the Assembly will again review the report of the Director of the Agency and the annual budgets. The United States has not determined its specific position, pending the receipt of the reports which are expected sometime in early November. As in the past, it is our hope that this item can be limited to a discussion of UNRWA activities without getting involved in a difficult political debate on the Palestine item.

K. Disarmament

FYI—A comprehensive review of U.S. disarmament policy is now underway in preparation for meetings of the Disarmament Commission and for the Assembly itself. We do not expect this review to be completed in time to permit extensive consultations with most governments prior to the opening of the Assembly. End FYI.

Meanwhile, you may indicate that in keeping with the recommendation of the 10th Assembly, the U.S. is making a careful study of such measures of adequately controlled disarmament as may be feasible in the near future and pending agreement on a more comprehensive system of reductions and limitations of conventional and nuclear armaments with necessary inspection and control. The disarmament negotiations during the past year, while failing to achieve such concrete progress toward a comprehensive agreement, have been useful in pointing up areas where progress might be made in the foreseeable future.

L. West New Guinea (West Man)

Fifteen Arab-Asian members (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) have requested that the Assembly consider the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea. First considered at the Ninth Session where an Indian sponsored resolution (opposed by the Netherlands and favored by Indonesia) failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority, this question was also inscribed on the agenda of the Tenth Session. At that session the Assembly took note of a Netherlands-Indonesian announcement that negotiations on certain outstanding issues would be resumed and adopted a resolution expressing the hope that the negotiations would be fruitful and that the problem would be settled peacefully. However, these negotiations failed to achieve a settlement and Netherlands-Indonesian relations have deteriorated steadily.

Although you should take no initiative on this issue, you may in response to questions indicate that the U.S. intends to maintain its policy of neutrality with regard to the handling of this issue in the General Assembly. FYI—This position is based primarily on our estimate of the importance of avoiding involvement in an emotion-charged dispute between two nations friendly to the United States. We shall refrain from stating any views on the merits of the case. End FYI.

M. Cyprus

This item appears on the provisional agenda at the request of Greece which at the past two sessions has sought to obtain the Assembly’s endorsement for its view that the people of Cyprus should be granted the right of self-determination. At the Ninth Session there was a consensus that extensive discussion might only exacerbate the situation and the Assembly adopted unanimously a motion stating that for the time being it did not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus and decided not to consider the matter further. At the Tenth Session the Assembly, again influenced by a general desire not to inflame further our already tense situation in Cyprus and between the Greek and Turkish Governments, rejected the inclusion of this question on its agenda by a vote of 28 (US)–22–10. At that time the U.S. stated that it opposed inscription because the situation called for quiet diplomacy rather than public debate, but reserved its right to support inscription later if that would advance the purposes and principles of the Charter.

In addition to the item suggested by the Greeks, the UK has submitted an item of its own on this question entitled: “Support from Greece for Terrorism in Cyprus”.

FYI. It is not yet clear whether, by the time this subject comes up for consideration at the GA, the situation will remain essentially deadlocked as at present or whether some constructive element will have been injected which would influence the Assembly’s approach to the problem. We continue to hope that the governments principally concerned will utilize the intervening time to work out some basis for an eventual accommodation of views and that the issue will, accordingly, not be considered appropriate for extensive discussion at the GA. End FYI.

You may indicate that we assume the governments principally concerned will be reviewing their attitudes and positions on this question prior to the opening of the Assembly and that we hope this review will be fruitful. For this reason we have not as yet formulated our position regarding the inscription of these items. We continue to believe that this problem must be solved by agreement among the governments directly concerned. We hope other delegates at the GA will share our view as to the importance of allowing the parties most concerned adequate time to seek a basis for an eventual agreement. This might require the Assembly to delay its consideration of this matter until the latter part of the session.

N. Algeria

Serious nationalist outbreaks beginning in November 1954 have given rise to concern especially among Arab-Asian states which in 1955 requested that an item on Algeria be placed on the agenda. The inscription of the Algerian question by a one vote majority caused the French delegation to walk out of the Assembly at the last session. France returned only after the Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote a motion stating that ‘The GA decides not to consider further the item entitled The Question of Algeria’ and is therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda of the 10th Session”. The French position is that consideration of this question by the UN is precluded by Article 2(7) of the Charter on the ground that Algeria is an integral part of France and any Assembly discussion would constitute interference in its domestic affairs. The item appears on the provisional agenda for the coming session at the request of 15 Asian-African states who claim that the situation has worsened since last year and can no longer be ignored by the Assembly.

Although we have not yet been informed of the final lines of the action contemplated by the French, we would anticipate that France will again strongly protest inscription and that the vote is expected to be close.FYI—The US does not contemplate any action being taken by US missions on this issue, however, until it has received more information concerning the French position. End FYI.

O. Korea

As in past years, the Korean question will automatically be on the agenda pursuant to the previous Assembly’s resolution which reiterated the UN objectives in Korea and decided to place the item on the Agenda of the 11th session. The item contains two sub-items: (a) the report of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and (b) report of the Government of India on ex-prisoners of the Korean War.

Although we continue to maintain that Korean unification pursuant to the objectives of the UN is a vital and urgent matter and shall again express our willingness to negotiate whenever the Communists agree to cooperate in realizing the UN objectives by permitting genuinely free elections, we do not anticipate an extended debate at this session on the question of Korean unification. The UNCURK report raises no issues requiring Assembly consideration. In these circumstances Assembly action may be confined to noting the UNC report and reaffirming UN objectives in Korea.

We have no reason to believe that any substantial number of Members are concerned with respect to the status of the Korean armistice, which the UNC is continuing to observe. Some inquiry might be made, however, regarding the withdrawal of the NNSC last June from the north and south. The background of this problem was reported in Circular Usito 529, May 25, 1956.³ Should this issue be raised, you should use the information in that instruction as appropriate.

We know of no problem concerning the ex-prisoners of the Korean War who were taken to India in the custody of the Indian Red Cross pending resettlement in “neutral” countries. During the past year, those ex-prisoners who desired to be settled outside of India have left that country, and those remaining in India are presumably settled there.

P. Soviet Omnibus Item

It has been Soviet practice in recent years to put forward what has come to be known as an “omnibus” resolution which sets forth current Soviet propaganda objectives. It may be expected that any such proposal will be couched in seemingly moderate and reasonable terms calculated to attract the support of those delegations anxious to see a lowering of East-West tensions.

Although we remain ready to cooperate with the Soviet Union and other governments in concrete measures to facilitate a peaceful solution of the various outstanding issues, we believe it is important that the Soviets not be permitted in the guise of an innocuously worded resolution to obscure vital issues and to gain credit for a willingness to negotiate sincerely which is not supported by concrete evidence.

With this in mind, we shall of course examine carefully any Soviet proposal along these lines and will wish to cooperate closely with all non-Soviet delegations on procedures for dealing with any such proposal which are best calculated to maintain our common objectives.

For the Chief of Mission

It is suggested that you make available, at your discretion, this circular to the Embassy PAO for background information only.

For Latin American Posts Only

The Department is preparing Spanish translations of selected parts of the above circular which the Embassy may wish to present to the Foreign Ministry.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–1756. Confidential. Sent to 68 posts and repeated to 10 others.
2. Dated October 9, not printed. (Ibid.,IO Master Files, SD Series, 1955–1958)
3. Not printed.
4. On October 24, the Embassy in the United Kingdom in despatch 1007 transmitted the “UK Views on Principal Items” at the Eleventh General Assembly; on October 29, the Embassy in Sweden reported in telegram 498 that the Swedish Cabinet had tentatively approved positions on 17 anticipated issues at the General Assembly; on October 30, the Embassy at The Hague reported in telegram 669 that it had discussed the tentative positions on the checklist contained in instruction CA–3343 with the Foreign Office and had received a number of specific comments. (All ibid., Central File 320)