Office of the Historian

31. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, July 27, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Strengthening US Participation in UN General Assembly
1.
You requested me after the last General Assembly to explore ways of strengthening the general US diplomatic position in the UN, specifically in connection with the forthcoming Assembly session. [Page 109] We have made a thorough evaluation of the 10th Assembly, and an analysis of the current trends in the UN as they affect American interests. On the basis of this analysis IO has developed some action recommendations designed to improve the overall US posture.
2.
The attached recommendations are selective in that they do not attempt to cover the entire range of policy operations, or to reaffirm existing policies. In the case of colonial policy I understand you will be receiving recommendations separately, based on an S/P study.2 On disarmament, although we fully recognize the desirability of, for example, an “educational campaign” for new UN Members in the face of new Soviet tactics, it was felt that this matter can best be handled through the present channels.
3.

The attached recommendations have been fully discussed with USUN and other bureaus. Because a number of the recommendations represent changes in existing policy, it has not been possible to secure complete agreement on all points, and the paper should be regarded as IO’s response to your request, rather than as a cleared Departmental staff study.

There was, however, general agreement on a number of points. P, E, and NEA were in agreement with the substance of all the recommendations, as was S/P, subject to the reservation that the US should be entirely consistent in its policy on voting in favor of inscription. Other areas agreed with the majority of recommendations, but dissented in a few cases, as follows:

On recommendation 1 (Economic), ARA and FE dissent. On recommendation 2 (Inscription), ARA and EUR dissent. On recommendation 3 (Human Rights), L dissents, and FE, on the contrary, wishes it strengthened. On recommendation 4 (Elections), there is complete agreement. On recommendation 5 (Psychological Strategy), there is agreement, except for some additional suggestions from FE, and Ambassador Lodge’s feeling that the US might wish to inscribe a “cold war” item for purposes of educating Members who may be misled by current Soviet poses. On recommendation 6 (Organizational), there is agreement except that FE questions the impact on Far Eastern states of relations with new Communist members (subparagraph d).

4.
I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss this paper with you at your early convenience.3
[Page 110]

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State

SUBJECT

  • Strengthening US Participation in UN General Assembly

Analysis:

The following assumptions and estimates form the basis for the recommendations proposed:

1.
The US position in the UN has been complicated by the new Russian pose of reasonableness, the coalescence of the Bandung powers,4 and the increasing emphasis, by a growing UN majority, on multilateral action in the economic, social, colonial, and human rights fields.
2.
In this new setting, two basic factors will tend to limit the ability of the US to command a comfortable margin of political support in the UN:
a)
The Communist Issue: While the Cold War seems increasingly remote to many nations, the US is required to maintain certain basic policies toward the communist world. In the UN these involve: continuing exposure of communism’s threat to freedom, emphasis on collective security against possible Soviet aggression, and vigorous opposition to the seating of Communist China. These policies tend to receive diminishing support so long as other nations continue to downgrade the communist threat to the free world.
b)
The Colonial Issue: On this issue, which preoccupies many UN members, affirmations of traditional US attitudes tend to displease the colonial powers, while US actions often alienate the anti-colonial nations. At the same time, the US is quite properly unable to adopt inflexible stands either in favor of the anti-colonial majority, or of our European allies who administer dependencies.
3.
Given the above framework, within which the US enjoys restricted maneuverability, this study has focussed on those areas where the US seems to have more flexibility: a) the economic and social field; b) procedural problems arising from elections and inscription of agenda items, both of which have caused disproportionate complications for US diplomacy in the recent past; c) the tactics and tone of US psychological strategy in the UN; and d) internal [Page 111] procedures and mechanisms to improve the preparation and execution of US policies.
4.
It is recognized that other foreign policy considerations must enter into final decisions on the recommendations that follow. We estimate, however, that in the time ahead the UN will represent an increasingly vital sector in the battle for the allegiance and support of politically undecided nations, and that action along the following lines could significantly enhance US influence and standing in the UN.

Recommendations:

1. Economic

The US would improve its position in the UN by asserting leadership in the creation of a UN economic development fund, and/or in a substantial expansion and development of the UN technical aid program. Both these proposals are under detailed study elsewhere in the Department, and specific recommendations will be submitted at an appropriate time.

2. Inscription

a)
The US should affirm its traditional policy that inscription and discussion of an item do not fall within the scope of “intervention” prohibited by Article 2(7);
b)
The US should, as a matter of policy, vote in favor of inscription except in rare cases where vital interests require us to oppose or abstain;
c)
Where the US opposes or abstains on inscription, the argument should be based on the political ground of unwisdom of UN consideration—i.e., that such consideration will not be helpful in contributing to a solution of the particular issue—or on US neutrality with regard to an issue, rather than lack of legal competence;
d)
A US vote in favor of inscription should be understood to be without prejudice to the US retaining full freedom to support actively one party or another in committee debate, and if necessary to oppose any Assembly action on grounds of legal incompetence, but without having placed itself in the position of appearing to block a hearing on international grievances;
e)
The US should promote the acceptance of a process of “pigeon-holing” items once inscribed which are of no general interest, or on which most members would prefer not to have to take a stand.
[Page 112]

3. Human Rights

The US should make an exception to its policy of non-participation in international conventions in the human rights field, in order to support a convention on slavery as well as a forced labor convention, both to be drafted in a manner consistent with US constitutional provisions.

4. Elections

a)
The US should make every effort to avoid differences with its close allies on UN elections, and should seek to avoid active campaigning or engagement of US prestige unless US interests are substantially involved, and there is a reasonable chance of success.
b)
Where the election of a Soviet bloc candidate would not adversely affect US security interests, and where a generally accepted geographic pattern clearly allocates a given seat to the Soviet bloc, the US should normally be prepared to vote for (but not campaign for) the Soviet Union, and to consider voting for a satellite candidate after examining each case carefully. (The US will probably have to accept a geographic pattern which reserves seats for the Soviet bloc, in order to secure Soviet agreement to any Charter amendment enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC.)

5. Psychological Strategy

a)
In order to secure maximum support for US policies in the altered UN atmosphere, the US, while remaining prepared to counter vigorously any renewed Soviet attacks in the UN, should not itself take the initiative in placing “cold-war” items on the agenda, but should leave the onus to the Soviet Union. The US should abjure gratuitous “cold-war tactics”, while continuing to restate the facts about communism whenever appropriate. In social contacts it should observe normal, if minimum, diplomatic courtesies toward Soviet bloc representatives.
b)
When major policy considerations require, the US should continue to use the UN to expose Soviet bad faith or intransigence in such deadlocked situations as the division of Germany or the status of Eastern Europe. In such cases US tactics should be carefully tailored to the prevailing atmosphere, and the possibility should be accepted of negative reactions on the part of other member nations.
c)
The US should be fully prepared for any Soviet reversion to former “cold-war” tactics, and should have in reserve, for use as appropriate, a strong case on, for example, Soviet suppression of nationalism, interference with free communication, slave labor, or Soviet colonialism.
[Page 113]

6. Organizational

a)
In order to develop the strongest possible international support for US positions on the most sensitive agenda items, top-level decisions should be taken in sufficient time to permit a minimum of two weeks of intensive pre-Assembly consultations. Considerably earlier decisions would be desirable on the bulk of agenda items.
b)
An overall review should be made of US position papers to determine the limited number of issues on which the US should engage its full prestige.
c)
Position papers should include a maximum and minimum objective, to give the US delegation greater tactical flexibility.
d)
Relations with new non-communist UN members should be cultivated with a view to developing support and understanding for US positions. We should be responsive to approaches from new communist members to the extent that appears profitable for the US.
  1. Source: Department of State, I 0 Files: Lot 60 D 113, Strengthening US Participation in UNGA. Confidential.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. No record of such a conversation has been found.↩
  4. Reference is to the countries that participated in the 29-nation Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955.↩