299. Staff Study Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board1

THE LOCATION OF UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC INTERESTS

Problem

1. The interest in the Antarctic shown by other countries has increased sharply in the past several months, probably as a result of plans for the International Geophysical Year, 1957-58, and of the renewal of U.S. activities. The plans of other countries include the establishment of bases on the continent where such bases had not previously been permanently maintained and the exploration of the presently unknown interior. Such activities tend to require still greater and more extensive U.S. efforts if we are effectively to compete in the maintenance and extension of Antarctic rights in the whole continent. At the same time such activities narrow our freedom of choice concerning areas of eventual claim and broaden the areas of potential conflict between the U.S. and friendly countries.

2. Recent developments thus present a need to determine questions which have arisen in the operations and planning required for the implementation of NSC 5424/1:

a.
On which major areas should the U.S. concentrate its future activities (and eventually claims)?
b.
Can the existing pattern of U.S. rights in the Antarctic be adequately protected as regards legal and political requirements?
c.
Can these existing rights, scattered as they are throughout the explored part of the Antarctic, be adequately maintained as regards physical and financial requirements?

Background

3. The strength of U.S. rights in the Antarctic can be gauged only by comparing them with the rights of other countries, according to rules which are by no means yet agreed upon. It is fairly certain, however, that any legal settlement would give weight to both the formal acts by which nations indicate their intention to [Page 612] claim sovereignty and the priority, intensity and continuity of national activities in the region.

4. The U.S. is the only country of the eight primarily interested in the Antarctic which does not have an official claim dating back one or more decades. In any controversy over the significance of an early statement of claims, the seven friendly claimants would tend to be arrayed against the U.S. (and the USSR, if it should make a claim).

5. It has thus far been considered impossible, from a foreign relations and psychological viewpoint, to announce a U.S. claim extensive enough to include all existing U.S. rights. Such rights virtually circle the continent and undoubtedly will be extended by future U.S. expeditions; it may, however, be doubted whether we will ever find it desirable to announce a claim to all.

6. Irrespective of prospects for an official U.S. claim, the relative strength of all existing U.S. rights can be maintained only by matching the Antarctic activities of each of the seven countries with which we presently compete for Antarctic rights. In the past we have excelled all other countries in certain areas in respect to certain transitory types of activity, such as aerial photography.

7. U.S. plans for the IGY call for establishment of three U.S. stations in the presently unclaimed section (90°–150° West), and possibly a fourth in an area (Weddell Sea) claimed by Argentina and the U.K. but most extensively explored by an American. One or more of these stations could be continued permanently. There is also strong sentiment for undertaking a large-scale program of aerial photography and mapping of the unknown interior half of the continent.

8. To carry forward this program while at the same time trying to match the activities of other countries in areas already explored would impose an additional annual financial burden on the Government which would be difficult to defend in terms of prospects for tangible returns in the foreseeable future. If such activities had to be sharply curtailed or abandoned after a time for lack of public support, the end result would be the impairment of U.S. rights relative to those of countries maintaining a steady, though modest, tempo of activity in the Antarctic.

9. In the past the U.S. has operated on the theory that it should await the acquisition of additional information of its various parts, before defining the limits of its interests. As a practical matter, however, it may be many years before we possess detailed knowledge of the region (much less the techniques to exploit it) sufficient to make that judgment. Meanwhile, our ability to acquire such information in the interior is in direct competition with our desire to halt the deterioration of our rights in the coastal areas.

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10. The general situation commends an early resolution of conflicts between U.S. rights and those of friendly countries. Such a resolution is essential if the U.S. is to frame a coherent program of Antarctic exploration and observations geared to a reliable estimate of long-term interests and capacity.

11. Any plan for definition of U.S. interests in the Antarctic should take into consideration the desirability of arousing the least opposition from friendly countries and should contemplate obtaining, if possible, the prior acquiescence of other claimants. Negotiations of this type could hardly be expected to succeed in toto in the near future.

Discussion

12. The Department of State proposes to enter into bilateral negotiations with the seven Antarctic claimant countries (Argentina, Chile, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France) to obtain their recognition of superior U.S. rights in certain areas (indicated on the map attached to this report) in return for U.S. agreement not to contest their individual claims in the remaining areas.

13. The problem of negotiations toward a definition of U.S. interests and resolution of conflicting claims involves several elements depending upon the parts of the region being considered:

a.
In the sector 90°–150° West Longitude (including most of Marie Byrd Land), U.S. rights are practically uncontested. This area could be explored and claimed with no foreign objections. The first three U.S. IGY stations will be located here. It would logically constitute the nucleus of a future U.S. claim. (Area A of attached map)
b.
Around the rim of the continent (Area B) seldom to a depth of more than a few hundred miles, from 150° West, westward to about 20° West (plus Heard Island), U.S. rights are in conflict with single claimants (New Zealand, Australia, France and Norway) which recognize each others’ claims. U.S. rights here are significant, but scattered. Communications between parts of this area would be difficult by sea, surface or air, because the coastal distance from one end to the other is about 5,000 miles, and the straight-line distance about 2,000 miles. In the vast unexplored interior of those claims, but mainly the Australian and Norwegian (Part of Area C) the U.S. probably could acquire superior rights in the near future by carrying out its plan for aerial photography and mapping. The U.S. objective here should be to seek recognition from the four claimants of an exclusive US. interest in the interior, and a suitable coastal outlet for the U.S. somewhere in the Australian claim, in return for U.S. agreement not to contest their claims along the coasts.
c.
In the remaining coastal areas from 20° to 90° West (Weddell Sea and the Palmer Peninsula areas (Area B)), U.S. rights are in conflict with the overlapping claims of the U.K., Argentina and Chile. Here the problem is complicated by the fact that the U.S. could not recognize any one of the claims in the areas where they [Page 614] conflict. We could, however, in the same terms as indicated above, agree not to contest their claims along the coasts, in return for their individual recognitions of superior U.S. rights south of about 80° South Latitude (Part of Area C) (plus an outlet to the Weddell Sea and some coastal area near the western base of the Palmer Peninsula, e.g., Alexander I Island). The alternative presented to these three claimants might be an eventual U.S. claim including the Peninsula and conflicting with their own.

14. While such negotiations, if successful, will tend to set the limits of any future U.S. claims, no specific recommendation for announcement of a claim can be made until the results of the negotiations are known.

15. The advantage of this proposal lies partly in the fact that it would not require disruption of the major areas of present and past activities of other claimants. They should find it easy to “give up” to the U.S. those areas which are largely unexplored, in exchange for U.S. recognition of (or non-objection to) their claims. It would give the U.S., on the other hand, a large area, accessible from several directions and just as likely to be of value in the future as the areas of its existing rights.

16. This plan also has advantages as a counter to any Soviet attempt to obtain a foothold in the region. The present fluidity of the territorial situation, maintained largely by U.S. policies, constitutes an invitation to additional claimants. Removal of potential conflicts among friendly powers would, moreover, reduce the opportunity for trouble-making between claimants by supporting one against the other. An approach to eventual “partition” of the region would leave no portion of the continent outside the cognizance of at least one of the eight friendly claimants. U.S. rights in the coastal areas need not be abandoned in relation to outside powers and, ultimately could be formally ceded to the friendly powers to strengthen their respective claims against outside encroachment.

17. To summarize, the foregoing plan would help to insure that the U.S. could:

a.
proceed unimpeded with a coherent plan of exploration and scientific observations in areas where there is the greatest likelihood of ultimately acquiring undisputed possession,
b.
avoid irritation of, and perhaps open controversy with, friendly powers claiming other parts of the region,
c.
prevent the U.S. from dissipating its resources and efforts in areas of no certain long-term value to U.S.,
d.
provide guidance to questions (para. 2 herein) presently impeding U.S. operations.

Recommendation

18. It is recommended that the State Department proceed with negotiations as outlined in paragraph 13.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1. Secret. The source text is Tab D to a memorandum of April 19 from Barbour to Hoover. That memorandum recommended that in OCB deliberations Hoover support the negotiations with seven Antarctic claimants proposed in this paper. This study also was submitted to the OCB in connection with the Board’s consideration of the location of U.S. Antarctic interests (see infra). An earlier version of this study appears as a paper to OCB Board Assistants by the OCB Working Group on Antarctica on March 10. (Department of State, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1) An even earlier version of late January 1955 is alluded to in Document 296.