238. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 8, 19561
SUBJECT
- Representation of Communist Chinese Government in the UN
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. John Maybee, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. Robertson—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Miss Bacon—FE
- Julian L. Nugent, Jr.—BNA
Ambassador Heeney remarked that the State Department was undoubtedly well aware of the somewhat different emphasis which the Canadian Government placed on the question of Communist Chinese representation in the UN and the general recognition of that country. He simply wanted to say that, despite the somewhat different viewpoint held by Canada, the Canadian Government was prepared to support the “moratorium” procedure at the forthcoming GA.
The Ambassador pointed out, however, that the ability of UN members to renew the moratorium might become very much more difficult next year. He said it was hard to overlook the fact that such a large portion of the world’s population was being excluded from the precincts of the UN and thereby deprived of the useful influence which that body was established to foster. Consequently, the present notice of Canadian support for a moratorium should not be taken to imply an indefinite projection of policy that would be adhered to in any and all circumstances.
Mr. Robertson thanked the Ambassador for his notice of support and mentioned that the U.K. had likewise informed us that it would support the moratorium procedure. Mr. Robertson then took the opportunity to remind the Ambassador of the intensity of U.S. opposition to the seating of the Communist Chinese. Congress had made its position unmistakably clear in recent months through a series of resolutions and riders to bills in the course of its sessions. There are probably a number of Congressmen who do not have very definite opinions concerning the matter but the unanimity marking Congressional action shows quite definitely that the legislators are reflecting a popular determination. He commented that highly placed officials from other countries did not always seem to appreciate fully [Page 478] the firmness of U.S. opinion. Ambassador Heeney referred to the planks in both parties’ platforms and said that it was his impression that U.S. opinion with regard to the Chinese Communists had hardened rather than softened during the past six months and that he had so reported to his government in Ottawa. He mentioned also the President’s conversation with Prime Minister St. Laurent at White Sulphur Springs last March and commented that his Prime Minister had apparently for the first time realized the strength of the U.S. position on this question. Ambassador Heeney gave assurance that he now well understood the U.S. position. He had simply wished to remind us that situations change with world events and that Canada could not regard itself as pre-committed to any specific attitude over an indefinite period.
Mr. Robertson asked hypothetically, how, in view of the UN Charter and the UN resolution naming the Chinese Communists as an aggressor, the UN could find it procedurally feasible to admit representation from that regime. The Ambassador said that he had not thought through the technicalities of the situation. He thought, however, that the U.S. might find itself confronted at the General Assembly a year hence with a growing demand on the part of UN members to seat the Chinese Communists and wondered what the U.S. would intend to do in that situation. Mr. Robertson referred to the President’s statement to the British Prime Minister last January with regard to anticipated Congressional reaction to the seating of the Chinese Communists and said that he thought in this situation other UN members would have to decide whether they preferred U.S. participation in the UN or Chinese Communist participation. Ambassador Heeney replied that of course there was no question on Canada’s decision in such a choice.
The Ambassador then asked whether any information was available concerning Soviet plans with regard to Japanese admission into the UN. Mr. Robertson replied that the Japanese, on the basis of carefully recorded minutes, believe that they have a commitment from the Soviets not to veto their application. The Japanese, however, are somewhat worried by a remark by Soviet representatives that it was not possible to say whether or not some other country would invoke a veto. All in all it is believed that the Russians will not actively oppose the Japanese case per se. The Japanese unfortunately are in a basically difficult situation vis-à-vis the Russians since the agreement signed at Moscow on October 19 has still to be ratified. The Japanese Government does not wish to have the Japanese membership application brought up in the Security Council until this agreement has entered into force for fear that the U.S.S.R. might withhold the support promised in the agreement.
[Page 479]The difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S.S.R. over certain islands does not help the general situation. The agreement provides that the Habomais and Shikotan will go to Japan, once a peace treaty is concluded, but the agreement gives no indication of the date when negotiations for the peace treaty are to be initiated. The agreement makes no mention of Etorofu and Kunashiri, the islands which have been the main bone of contention during the entire negotiation and there is every indication that the U.S.S.R. will make conclusion of the peace treaty contingent upon Japan’s recognition of Russia’s claim to these islands.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–856. Secret. Drafted by Bacon. At the end of the source text Bacon wrote: “approved in substance by Mr. Robertson. RB.”↩
- In a conversation with Christopher Phillips on November 12, Charles Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy, indicated that France would support the existing moratorium concerning the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation, ibid., 310.2/11–1256)↩